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Abstract 
 
Food security has always been at the heart of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
However, the way in which this objective has been pursued and formulated has changed 
considerably since the policy was first introduced in 1962. Not least, the European 
approach to food security has evolved from being primarily focused upon ensuring high 
levels of food supply and internal price stability to becoming increasingly responsive to the 
environmental implications of agricultural intensification. Thus, as the wider costs of 
intensive production have garnered heightened recognition, so too has appreciation of the 
need to move towards ecologically sustainable forms of agriculture, as a pre-requisite for 
securing long-term food security.  
 In response, the sustainable management of natural resources and climate change 
has become a central CAP objective aimed at addressing the environmental externalities of 
land management practices funded under the CAP. And the relevance of this discussion 
has recently been carried forward in the context of the 2013 CAP reforms, which delivered 
the latest in a long line of measures aimed at greening the policy and reducing the negative 
externalities of European agriculture. These were explicitly introduced to give expression 
to the underlying principle of sustainable development, but important questions remain as 
to their ability to provide ecologically sustainable solutions. 
 This thesis explores the central CAP objective of sustainable agriculture and its key 
role for ensuring food security. In doing so, it seeks to add to the current debate by critically 
assessing the impact of the sustainable development paradigm upon the framing of the EU 
agri-environmental measures and the greater implications that these may have for the long-
term protection of ecological systems and food security. In particular, it analyses the main 
legal measures delivered by the 2013 CAP reforms and the extent to which they correspond 
to these long-term objectives. 
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Introduction 
 
The most recent reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was initiated in 
April 2010 under the leadership of the, then, Commissioner for Agriculture, Dacian 
Cioloș,1 and concluded in September 2013 when political agreement was reached 
between the European Parliament (EP), the Council and the European Commission. 
The final legal acts were formally adopted in December of that year, programming 
the CAP framework for the 2014-2020 period. However, the process leading up to the 
2013 reforms was arguably different to previous rounds in several notable ways. It 
was, for example, the first time that the EP was acting as a full-fledged legislative 
partner, together with the Council, under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure.2 It was 
also exceptional in that it commenced in the aftermath of the worse global food crisis 
since 1974, as well as the start of deepest financial depression since the 1930s. 
 Definitely, the experiences of 2007-2008 and beyond were influential in 
setting the tone of the CAP negotiations. In particular, the 2007-2008 food crisis was 
instrumental in steering the direction of the talks and prompted the central institutional 
actors to focus on food security as ‘a question of the utmost urgency for the EU’.3 The 
crisis, which occurred following decades of relative market stability, sent shockwaves 
through the global food system with dramatic effects on the prices of a number of 
staple crops.4 For instance, in 2009 the EP raised its alarm over wheat and maize 
prices, amongst others, which had risen globally by 180 and almost 300 per cent, 
respectively, from late 2006-2008.5 These increases had particular implications for 
                                                 
1
 European Commission, The Common Agricultural Policy After 2013: Public Debate, Summary 
Report (DG Agriculture and Rural Development, 2010). 
2 
See, eg, L. Knops and J. Swinnen, The First CAP Reform under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure: 
A Political Economy Perspective (European Parliament, Policy Department B, 2014); A. Greer, T. 
Hind, ‘Inter-institutional decision-making: the case of the Common Agricultural Policy’, (2012) 31 
Policy and Society 331.
 
3 
See, eg, European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 13 January 2009 on the Common 
Agricultural Policy and Global Food Security (2009/2153 (INI)), Preamble, paragraph S, 1.
 
4
 OECD-FAO, Agricultural Outlook 2011-2020 (OECD/FAO, 2011) 22. 
5 
European Parliament Resolution of 13 January 2009 on the Common Agricultural Policy and Global 
Food Security (2008/2153(INI)) paragraph A.
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food security and the access to food in net-importing countries, many of which were 
low-to-middle-income economies.6  
 The sharp increases in price also impacted on the access to food by the poorest 
members of European society which, compounded with the financial crisis that started 
to unfold in 2008, had the effect of reducing the purchasing power of the average 
household, with the Commission estimating that the 16 per cent of Europeans living 
below the poverty line at the time were at greatest risk of being squeezed by the 
extraordinary price volatility that characterised staple commodities.7 Moreover, the 
potential market recovery was undermined by further instability in 2010-2011, when 
food prices started to rise once again.8  
 In response to these developments, the Commission initially took direct action 
in the form of market measures aimed at ensuring the supply of food and lifting 
existing barriers to production, in order to counterbalance the steep rises in food 
prices.9 In addition to exposing vulnerabilities of the global food system, the crisis 
also had the effect of propelling a much wider societal debate on food security, which 
was being increasingly recognised for its propensity to come under pressure from a 
number of converging environmental, geo-political and demographic changes over 
the coming decades.10 Key amongst these emerging challenges were projections of 
significant human population growth, as well as greater levels of affluence and 
prosperity during the first half of the 20th century.11 More specifically, it was estimated 
                                                 
6
 M. Huchet-Bourdon, Agricultural Commodity Price Volatility: An Overview, Food, Agriculture 
and Fisheries Working Papers, No. 52 (OECD, 2011) 10; FAO, The State of Food Insecurity in the 
World (FAO, Rome, 2008) 4; United Nations Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Observations on the current food price situation, Background note, 21 January 2011 
(United Nations, 2011) 1. 
7 
European Commission, Tackling the challenge of rising food prices, Directions for EU action, 
COM(2008) 321, 3.
 
8 
G. Tadesse et al, ‘Drivers and Triggers of International Food Price Spikes and Volatility’, (2014) 
47, Food Policy, 117-118. See also, European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 8 July 
2010 on the Future of the Common Agricultural Policy After 2013 (2009/2236(INI)) paragraphs 23-
26; FAO, World Food Prices Reach a New Historic Peak (available at 
http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/50519/icode/, last accessed on 27 June 2017).
 
9
 European Commission, EU’s Response to the High Oil and Food Prices, Memo/08/41 (European 
Commission, Brussels, 2008) 8 (available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-
421_en.htm?locale=en, last accessed on 27 June 2017). See also, A. Greer, T. Hind, ‘Inter-
institutional Decision-making: The Case of the Common Agricultural Policy’, (2012) 31 Policy and 
Society, 331. 
10 
See, eg, Foresight, The Future of Food and Farming, Final Project Report (Foresight Report) 
(Government Office for Science, London, 2011); The Royal Society, Reaping the Benefits: Science 
and Sustainable Intensification of Global Agriculture (Royal Society, London, 2009).
 
11
 At the time, the UN estimated that the global population would reach 9 billion by 2050, but later 
revised this figure upwards to 10 billion. See; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
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that these factors could increase the demand for food by up to 60 per cent by 2050,12 
with much of this rise stemming from global dietary shifts towards greater 
consumptions of resource intensive products, such as meat and dairy.13  
 However, the prospects of raising the output of food to meet this demand 
without further undermining global ecological systems and climate change were put 
sharply into question given existing restrictions to both expanding, as well as 
intensifying agricultural production.14 With regard to extensificatin, for instance, there 
were, and remain, obvious limitations given the lack of available land left to convert 
to agricultural uses in many parts of the world.15 Also, such expansion would have the 
effect of exacerbating the challenges of climate change due to the unavoidable release 
of CO2 associated with land conversion.
16 On the other hand, agricultural 
intensification in regions such as Europe have already been widely pursued, with great 
cost to both the environment and human health. Not least, accelerated rates of 
biodiversity loss, the pollution of waterways and soil, as well as climatic changes have 
all been closely linked to intensive agricultural management practices. 17 In this light, 
Tilman et al have observed that although there exists some agreement regarding the 
possibility of producing food to meet the needs of up to 10 billion people there is ‘little 
consensus on how this can be achieved by sustainable means’.18 Consequently, they 
argue that overcoming these obstacles will represent ‘one of the greatest scientific 
challenges facing humankind because of the trade-offs among competing economic 
environmental goals, and inadequate knowledge of the key biological and ecological 
processes’.19 
 According to the Foresight Report on The Future of Food and Farming, a 
‘redesign of the whole food system’ would be required in order to successfully 
                                                 
Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, The 2015 Revision: Key Findings and 
Advance Tables, Working Paper No. ESA/P/WP.241 (United Nations, New York, 2015) 2. 
12 
N. Alexandratos, J. Bruinsma, World agriculture towards 2030/2050: the 2012 revision. ESA 
Working Paper No. 12-03. (FAO, Rome, 2012) 7.
 
13
 FAO, Livestock’s Long Shadow (FAO 2006); FAO, World Livestock 2011 – Livestock in Food 
Security (FAO, Rome, 2011) 82-83.  
14
 United Nations Environmental Program, The Environmental Food Crises: The Environments Role 
in Averting Future Food Crises (UNEP, 2009) 5. 
15
 Royal Society (n 10). 
16
 H. Charles, J. Godfray, T. Garnett, ’Food Security and Sustainable Intensification’ (2014) 369 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 5. 
17
 B. Jack, Agriculture and EU Environmental Law (Ashgate, Farnham, 2009) 38. 
18 
D. Tilman et al, ’Agricultural Sustainability and Intensive Production Practices’, (2002) 418 Nature 
671, 672. 
19 
Ibid. 
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overcome the long-term challenges to food security.20 In particular, it stressed that 
‘[u]nless the footprint of the food system on the environment is reduced, the capacity 
of the earth to produce food for humankind will be compromised with grave 
implications for future food security’.21 In doing so, moreover, it added that 
‘[c]onsideration of sustainability must be introduced to all sectors of the food system, 
from production to consumption, and in education, governance and research’.22 And, 
in practical terms, the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) of the United 
Nations (UN) underlined in 2009 the importance of translating the increased 
awareness of the challenges to food security ‘into political will and effective action to 
render the system better prepared to respond to long-term demand growth and more 
resilient against various risk factors that confront world agriculture.’23 
  In the European context, the start of the CAP reform process in 2010 
presented a major opportunity to formally address these challenges, with the 
Commission affirming that a central aim of the 2014-2020 programming framework 
would be to ‘guarantee long-term food security for European citizens and to contribute 
to growing world food demand’.24 The premise of this approach was to be found in 
its guiding Communication The CAP towards 2020: Meeting the food, natural 
resources and territorial challenges of the future, which set forth the Commissions 
initial vision for legislative reform based on three strategic objectives: (i) viable food 
production; (ii) the sustainable management of natural resources and climate action 
and; (iii) balanced territorial development.25 And two defining features may be 
highlighted at this point.  
 First, as already indicated, the Communication outlined a clear ambition to 
keep the focus of the reforms on addressing the long-term and structural challenges to 
global food security that had been highlighted in recent years.26 Secondly, moreover, 
it emphasised significantly the need to do so without further undermining the viability 
of ecological systems and resources that underpin agricultural productivity. Not least, 
                                                 
20
 Foresight, (n 10) 12. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 FAO, How to Feed the World in 2050 (FAO, Rome, 2009) 4. 
24
 European Commission, The CAP towards 2020: Meeting the Food, Natural Resources and 
Territorial Challenges of the Future COM (2010) 672, 2. 
25 
Ibid, 7.
 
26
 European Commission, Mainstreaming sustainable development into EU policies: 2009 Review of 
the European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development COM (2009) 400, 11. 
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the importance of this approach was underscored by the strategic aim to ensure ‘the 
sustainable management of natural resources and climate action’,27 and an increased 
understanding of the need to ‘preserve the food production potential on a sustainable 
basis throughout the EU’.28 More specifically, it pointed to the need ‘to enhance the 
sustainable management of natural resources such as water, air, biodiversity and soil’ 
as primary reasons for CAP reform.29 And, in its accompanying Memo to the 
Communication, the Commission further noted that one of the main challenges of the 
CAP would be to maintain the ‘capacity to produce quality products in sufficient 
quantities whilst at the same…encouraging sustainable production practices’.30  
 These and other acknowledgements of the link between food security and 
sustainable agriculture suggested that the formulation of environmental measures 
would be a focal point of the reform agenda. In doing so, the Commission had a 
number of choices as to how to extend and improve the structures of environmental 
governance under the CAP. It could, for instance, have supported the expansion of 
targeted environmental schemes and climate measures under the CAP’s rural 
development framework, as had long been advocated by some environmental interest 
groups and commentators.31 Likewise, the Commission could have chosen to 
reinforce the cross-compliance regime that had been in operation since 2005,32 but 
which suffered from differing levels of implementation and, consequently, differing 
levels of environmental outcomes and benefits across the EU.33 In particular, there 
                                                 
27
 European Commission (n 24) 7. 
28 
Ibid, 2.
 
29
 Ibid, 6. 
30
 European Commission, Background note: Commission Communication on the future of the CAP, 
18 November 2010 MEMO/10/587. 
31
 The possibility of substantially increasing the funding for agri-environmental measures under Pillar 
II was considered and rejected by the Commission in its own impact assessment. See, A. Buckwell, 
‘Where Should the CAP go post-2020?’, in J. Swinnen (ed) The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 
Common Agricultural Policy: An Imperfect Storm (Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd, London, 
2015) 509, 515. 
32
 Council Regulation (EC) 1782/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing common rules for direct 
support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for 
farmers and amending Regulations (EEC) No 2019/93, (EC) No 1452/2001, (EC) No 1453/2001, 
(EC) No 1454/2001, (EC) 1868/94, (EC) No 1251/1999, (EC) No 1254/1999, (EC) No 1673/2000, 
(EEC) No 2358/71 and (EC) No 2529/2001, [2003] OJ L270/1. 
33
 See, eg, Birdlife International, ‘Through the Green Smokescreen: How is CAP Cross-Compliance 
Delivering for Biodiversity?’ (Birdlife International, 2010) (available at 
https://www.rspb.org.uk/Images/Through_the_green_smokescreen_November_2009_tcm9-
350725.pdf, last accessed on 27 June 2017).  
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was the option of integrating relevant aspects of the Water Framework Directive34 
(WFD) and the Sustainable use of Pesticides Directive35 into cross-compliance, 
which, by some accounts, had so far ‘had little impact on reducing pollution’.36 
 Concrete expression of the Commissions intended direction of travel was 
revealed by the publication of the main reform proposals and Impact Assessments in 
October 2011.37 The reform package contained four basic acts covering direct 
payments, rural development, horizontal measures and rules on the common market 
organisation (CMO) of agricultural products. Key amongst the proposed measures 
was the formulation of a novel ‘greening component’, intended to impose agri-
environmental obligations upon farmers in exchange for their receipt of basic income 
support under the direct payment framework.38 More specifically, the proposed Direct 
Payments Regulation called for each Member State (MS) to ‘use part of their national 
ceilings for direct payments to grant an annual payment…for compulsory practices to 
be followed by farmers addressing, as a priority, both climate and environment policy 
goals’.39 These practices were to cover crop-diversification, the maintenance of 
permanent grasslands, and the designation of ecological focus areas (EFA),40 with the 
                                                 
34
 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy [2000] OJ L327/1. 
35
 Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 
establishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides [2009] 
OJ L309/71. 
36
 L. P. Mahé, ‘Do the Proposals for the CAP after 2013 Herald a Major Reform?’, Policy Paper 53 
(Notre Europe, 2012) 20. See also, European Court of Auditors, Integration of EU Water Policy 
Objectives with the CAP: A Partial Success, Special Report No 4 (European Court of Auditors, 
Luxembourg, 2014). 
37
 For the proposed regulations, see European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes 
within the framework of the common agricultural policy, COM (2011) 625; Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common organisation of the markets in 
agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation), COM (2011) 626; Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on support for rural development by the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), COM (2011) 627; and Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing, management and monitoring of the 
common agricultural policy, COM (2011) 628.  In addition, there was a proposal to address the 
application of direct payments to farmers for the transitional year of 2013: COM (2011) 630.  For the 
Impact Assessment, see European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact 
Assessment: Common Agricultural Policy Towards 2020 (Impact Assessment) SEC (2011) 1153. For 
full discussion, see, eg, J.-C. Bureau et al, ‘The Common Agricultural Policy after 2013’, (2012) 47 
Intereconomics 316; A. Matthews, ‘Greening agricultural payments in the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy’, (2013) 2(1) Bio-based and Applied Economics 1.  
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 Ibid, Proposal Direct Payments Regulation, Preamble (26). 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Regulation (EU) 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 
establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the 
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significance of this greening component being reinforced by the requirement that 
some 30 per cent of direct payments be tied to observation of the agricultural practices 
which it mandated. In addition, the proposals included changes to the agri-
environmental measures under the rural development framework, as well as to the 
horizontal applicability and substance of cross-compliance. 
 Importantly, the Commission contended that these revisions of the CAP 
framework would ‘accelerate the process of integration of environmental 
requirements…and reinforce the ability of land and natural ecosystems to…address 
major EU biodiversity and climate change adaptation objectives’.41 This was similarly 
echoed in commentary by the General Secretariat of the Council, which emphasised 
that the ‘coherence and consistency of the greening model is essential in order to 
ensure…more sustainable agriculture’.42 In consequence, one of the defining features 
for measuring the success of the 2013 reforms is arguably whether the revised legal 
framework corresponds to the objective to create greater synergies between food 
production and the protection of agricultural resources.   
 
Contribution  
Against this background, the present thesis explores the central CAP objective of 
sustainable agriculture and its crucial role for ensuring food security in the EU 
context. In doing so, it seeks to add to the current debate by critically assessing the 
impact of the sustainable development paradigm upon the framing of EU agri-
environmental measures and the greater implications that these may have for the long-
term protection of ecological systems and food security. More specifically, it analyses 
the main legal measures delivered by the 2013 CAP reforms and the extent to which 
they correspond to these long-term objectives. 
 The thesis and arguments are generated by research questions that guide the 
analysis of relevant legal instruments and policy measures. These include: 
 
o What is food security? 
                                                 
common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council 
Regulation (EC) No 73/2009, [2013] OJ L347/608, Article 43(2). 
41 Proposed Direct Payments Regulation (n 37) 3. 
42 General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, CAP Reform: Linkages Between Pillar 
I and Pillar II and new Baseline for Agri-Environmental Climate Measures, (Fiche No 17, 2012) 3. 
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o What is the role of the CAP for ensuring food security in the EU 
context? 
o What is the link between food security and sustainable agriculture? 
o How has the concept of sustainable agriculture been pursued in the EU 
context? 
o What has been the impact and influence of the principle of sustainable 
development upon the formulation of the objective of sustainable 
agriculture under the CAP? 
o To what extent do the 2013 CAP reforms correspond and provide 
meaningful responses to the fundamental objective of sustainable 
agriculture? 
 
Given this primary approach, the employed methodology may largely be described as 
doctrinal. However, this characterisation may be complemented by two additional 
features of the underlying research. First, the research questions are embedded within 
a theoretical framework that provides the conceptual prisms through which the 
analysis and the final conclusions are generated. More specifically, this framework 
provides the basis for exploring the concept of sustainable agriculture and the notion 
of sustainability that lay at its core. Key to this discussion is a systematic review of 
the sustainable development paradigm, which has underpinned policy approaches to 
sustainable agriculture for more than two decades. Thus, although the thesis is 
inductive in the sense that the analysis and conclusions are derived from a defined 
conceptual framework, this process has been influenced by normative understandings 
and formulations of sustainable agriculture.  
 Secondly, there has been a deliberate attempt to extend the scope of the 
underlying legal analysis by engaging with non-legal and inter-disciplinary literature. 
Not least, appreciation of the ecological challenges to food security demands 
consideration of wide-ranging scientific and academic findings, as well as in-depth 
understanding of the constantly evolving policy frameworks that have been 
implemented in response. Moreover, in this context more than in any other, the depth 
of the thesis has been profoundly enriched by the opportunity to undertake part of the 
research at the New Zealand Centre for Environmental law, University of Auckland, 
whose mission is to develop scholarship focused on the transnational and inter-
- 9 - 
disciplinary aspects of environmental law.43 The visit has also led to the wider 
dissemination of the current work through publication at international fora. 
Outline  
The thesis proceeds in two parts, consisting of three Chapters respectively. The first 
part outlines the fundamental research problem and the theoretical considerations that 
underpin the subsequent analysis. More specifically, Chapter 1 begins by exploring 
the concept of food security and the impact that it has had on international policy 
formulations since the early 20th century. The discussion is then complimented by 
detailed consideration of the approach to food security in the European context and 
the historic role that the CAP has played for pursuing this central objective. The 
Chapter concludes with an overview of the policy’s legal framework and outcomes 
prior to the 2013 reforms.  
 Chapter 2 then looks at the background to these recent reforms and the main 
events that served to influence the formulation of the prospective CAP agenda. It 
considers, in detail, the impact of the 2007-2008 food crisis on the institutional debates 
surrounding food security and the role of the CAP for meeting this central EU 
objective. Moreover, the Chapter discusses the wider ecological challenges to food 
security and the increased understanding of their projected implications for 
agricultural productivity. The discussion also explores the difficulty of ensuring food 
security against a backdrop of rising global food demand for resource-intensive 
commodities, with the final part of the Chapter outlining the main objectives of the 
2013 reforms.  
 Chapter 3 moves away from the broader treatment of food security in Chapters 
1 and 2, and focuses on the ecological and teleological dimensions of this concept. 
More specifically, it considers the primary link between food security and ecological 
sustainability and argues for the need to ensure the productive capacity of agricultural 
resources for the benefit of food security for both current and future generations. Not 
least, given the pervasive impacts of conventional farming and the rising threats to the 
stability of global ecological systems and functions, the discussion centres on 
sustainable agriculture as an indispensable imperative moving forward. The first part 
of the Chapter considers the sustainable development paradigm and the extent to 
                                                 
43
 This research was made possible by the Worldwide Universities Network and a research mobility 
grant for early career researchers. 
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which it has impacted upon the formulation of sustainable agriculture, as a key CAP 
objective. Environmental policy integration has been a crucial part of this process and 
the second part provides a historical overview of the incremental changes that have 
been made to the CAP framework in order to bring it closer in line with the EU’s 
wider objective of sustainable development. 
 The second part of the thesis analyses the main legal measures introduced by 
the 2013 CAP reforms and Chapter 4 begins with an overview of the legislative 
proposals delivered by the Commission in October 2011. Of the four proposed 
regulations, three included measures with specific environmental objectives. These 
related to direct payments, rural development and cross-compliance under the 
proposed horizontal regulation. An overview of each of these is offered before 
considering key elements of the subsequent intra-institutional negotiations that served 
to determine their fate. In particular, the negotiations focused on reaching agreement 
on the novel ‘greening component’ proposed by the Commission, and this process is 
outlined before discussing some of the main reactions by stakeholders and NGO’s. 
The enacted regulations are then analysed in the following two chapters.  
 Chapter 5 considers the framework for direct payments introduced by the 2013 
reforms, with a focus on the introduction of the three specific measures aimed at 
delivering ‘benefits to the environment and the climate’. These measures were, by far, 
the main novelty of the reforms and were intended to extend the process of 
environmental policy integration under the CAP. In this light, the analysis considers 
the extent to which their implementation and expected outcomes correspond to the 
objective to ensure the sustainable management of natural resources and climate 
change.  
 The changes made to the rural development framework were far less extensive 
and those elements relating to agri-environmental instruments are detailed and 
examined in the first part of Chapter 6. The second part of the chapter considers the 
role of the cross-compliance regime under the new horizontal framework. 
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Chapter 1  
Food Security: An Overview of Approaches Prior to the 
2013 Reforms 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 The question of how to feed human populations has undoubtedly existed since the 
dawn of civilisation and every society has had to address this challenge based on 
varying means, priorities and preconditions. Consequently, the concept of food 
security is not new, but rather one that has undergone substantial change over time 
and space.1 This Chapter traces some of the main developments that have underpinned 
Western approaches to food security and the creation of the CAP following the end of 
the Second World War. The aim is to provide an initial layer of discussion concerning 
the conceptual and legal frameworks that have defined food security as the primary 
objective of European agricultural policy since that time. The discussion is then 
carried forward in Chapters 2 and 3, where the ecological dimensions of production 
agriculture are further considered in light of current and future challenges to food 
security. 
The Chapter is divided into two parts and commences with a historic outline of 
the agricultural production policies, market crises and experiences of food (in)security 
that served to shape international responses and definitions of food security in the 20th 
century. Against a backdrop of a significantly expanded global food system, these 
experiences have been particularly instrumental in bringing about a paradigmatic 
focus on supply and pricing policies, as fundamental pillars of national and 
international approaches to food security.2 Given their role in the framing of recent 
                                                 
1 
S. Maxwell, ‘Food security: a post-modern perspective’ (1996) 21 Food Policy 155, 156. 
2 
A. Cunha, A. Swinbank, An Inside View of the CAP Reform Process: Explaining the MacSharry, 
Agenda 2000, and Fischler Reforms (Oxford University Press, 2011) 71. See also; E. Neville-Rolfe, 
The Politics of Agriculture in the European Community (Policy Studies Institute 1984); European 
Social and Economic Committee, ‘Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the 
Amended proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
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agricultural production practices, supply and pricing considerations are therefore 
distinguished as key dimensions of the international food security paradigm, although 
other micro-level aspects such as individual and household access to food are also 
highlighted. The second part of the Chapter considers, more closely, food security in 
the European context and provides an overview of the historical legal and political 
framework that underpinned the formation of the CAP and the distinctly European 
approach to food security that was subsequently pursued under the Treaty of Rome. 
In doing so, the discussion aims at highlighting some of the main developments and 
policy outcomes that have served to shape the policy, including the main elements of 
reforms carried out prior to the Cioloș reforms in 2013.  
 
1.2 The Meaning of ‘Food’ in Food Security 
On the most basic level, food security is undoubtedly concerned with food. In the EU 
context there exists no legal definition of food security, though, as a preliminary point 
of reference it is possible to look to the legal definition of food within the context of 
EU food safety law. Specifically, Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) 178/2002 
defines food as ‘any substance or product, whether processed, partially processed or 
unprocessed, intended to be or reasonably intended to be ingested by humans’.3 Thus, 
although this definition covers food in a variety of forms (primary, as well as, 
processed food products), it is important at this early stage to point out the very limited 
utility of focusing solely on the food in food security. For instance, the definition does 
not include animal feed, which is meant for animal ingestion, rather than human.4  
 Yet, as will be seen, crops produced for animal feed constitute a significant 
part of the global food chain and are as much affected by agricultural inputs (such as 
fertilisers and pesticides) and outputs (such as waste and environmental degradation) 
as food grown for human consumption.5 Perhaps, then, a more conducive way of 
                                                 
Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 and Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 as regards distribution 
of food products to the most deprived persons in the Union’, (2012/C 43/21) 95. 
3 
Council Regulation (EC) 178/2002 of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and 
requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down 
procedures in matters of food safety [2002 OJ L31/1. 
4 
Ibid, Article 2.
 
5 
See, eg, FAO, Livestock’s Long Shadow (FAO, Rome, 2006) 106-107; FAO, World Livestock 
2011: Livestock in Food Security (FAO, Rome, 2011) 82-83; R. Bailey, A. Froggatt, L. Wellesley, 
Livestock: Climate Change’s Forgotten Sector Global Public Opinion on Meat and Dairy 
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explaining the basic concept of food security in the present context is that it is 
concerned with a wider understanding of food and food production. This includes food 
products meant for direct human consumption, as well as crops grown for the purpose 
of providing animal feed for livestock, which are in their turn intended to provide 
ingestible products for humans in one form or another.6  
A broader classification is offered by the Treaty on the Functioning on the 
European Union (TFEU), which refers to agricultural products as meaning ‘products 
of the soil, of stockfarming and of fisheries and products of first-stage processing 
directly related to these products’.7 In other words, even though the term agricultural 
products linguistically indicates a reference to primary products of the soil, the 
concept may be understood as extending to primary products of the sea, such as fish 
and other ‘seafood’.8  
However, in order to aggregate a more comprehensive definition of the 
concept of food security it is necessary to look to multidisciplinary literature, as well 
as international agreements and policy documents. As shall be seen, this is not a 
straightforward task, as approaches have varied considerably and according to some 
estimates there existed some 200 definitions and 450 indicators of food security by 
2002.9  
  
                                                 
Consumption (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2014) 5. The production of 
animal feed may also have significant impacts upon the price of food in general, see, R. Trostle, 
‘Global Agricultural Supply and Demand: Factors contributing to the Recent Increase in Food 
Commodity Prices’, Economic Research Service (United States Department of Agriculture 2008) 5. 
6 
Annex I of the Treaties provides a full list of the products of fisheries and stock farming that are 
covered by the agricultural policy. Although, note that not all products listed there are meant for 
human or animal ingestion. 
 
7 
Article 38 TFEU.
  
8 
Ibid.
 
9 C. Sage, ‘Food Security’, in E. Page and M. Redcliff (eds) Human Security and the Environment: 
International Comparisons (Elgar 2002) 128-129.
  
- 14 - 
1.3 Western Approaches to Food Security in the 20th Century 
1.3.1 Experiences of Hunger, Malnutrition and Food Insecurity  
Throughout the 20th century, as economies have become ever-more interlinked, food 
security has evolved into a policy objective increasingly pursued at the national, 
regional and global level.10 Indeed, the earliest internationally concerted efforts to deal 
with food security took place under the auspices of the League of Nations and dated 
back to the 1930s when the first accounts of the extent of global hunger and nutrition 
were undertaken.11 At that time, the increased nutritional value of food was credited 
as a key factor in human development, which had been facilitated by the tremendous 
strides made by nutritional and health sciences since the late 18th century.12 Moreover, 
the discovery of hybridisation in North America served to significantly increase the 
output of staple crops, which had promising implications for supplying sufficient 
nourishment and calories for a growing and more affluent human population.13 Hence, 
the link between nutrition (primarily in the form of food) and human development 
formed a central part of early attempts to combat hunger and malnutrition, as well as 
to improve global food security.14  
It was also during that time that the effects of the Great Depression were being 
increasingly felt across industrialised economies, with particularly devastating effects 
on hunger and malnutrition. The existence of such depravation was, of course, not a 
new phenomenon, but a specific feature of the great depression was that people were 
starving amidst a time of agricultural surpluses.15 Indeed, a particularly long-lasting 
observation made by scientists and policy-makers at the time, was of the parallel 
                                                 
10 
D. Shaw, World Food Security: A History Since 1945 (Palgrave 2007) Chapter 1; K. Brandt, ‘Basic 
Elements of an International Food Policy’ in T Schultz (ed) Food for the World (first published by 
University of Chicago Press 1945, Arno Press 1976) 329-334.
  
11 
See, for instance: League of Nations, The Relation of Health to Nutrition Agriculture and Economic 
Policy, Final Report of the Mixed Committee of the League of Nations (League of Nations 1937).
 
12 
F. Boudreau, ‘The International Food Movement in Retrospect’ in T Schultz (ed) Food for the 
World (first published by University of Chicago Press 1945, Arno Press 1976) 1-3.
 
13 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Drivers of Change in Ecosystem Condition and Services 
(MEA, Scenarios, 2005) Chapter 7, 197. 
14 
C. Elvehjem, ‘Advances in Nutritional Research and Welfare’ in T.Schultz (ed) Food for the World 
(first published by University of Chicago Press 1945, Arno Press 1976) 70.
  
15 
For instance, there were several occasions during – and after – the First World War, where food 
production in the US outweighed demand. To prevent farm incomes from collapsing, the US 
government intervened by exporting excess supplies in the form of food aid, among other things. See, 
eg; J. Black, ‘The Experience of Adjustment Relating to Food and Nutrition’ in T.W. Schultz (ed) 
Food for the World (reprinted; Arno Press 1976: original print; University of Chicago Press 1945) 17. 
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existence of malnutrition and hunger amongst children, elderly and the unemployed 
in some of the most economically advanced nations of the world.16 The great paradox 
was, nonetheless, that several of these same governments, such as that of the United 
States (US), were tackling substantial surpluses of food and other agricultural 
products, while some portions of the population could barely afford to eat.17 These 
developments would gradually have the effect of shifting the initial focus of 
industrialised nations away from nutrition, and increasingly towards trade-related 
considerations of supply and pricing as key dimensions of food security at the national 
and international level.18 Moreover, as will be further explored below, this 
paradigmatic change had important implications for the formulation of national 
agricultural production policies at the time, which increasingly pursued the objectives 
of supply and pricing through the use of direct market and production adjustment 
measures following the experiences of the 1930s.19 Likewise, this provided part of the 
context in which the CAP framework was later created and implemented. 
In the US context, food production had not only outdone demand, but demand 
was further stifled by the lack of purchasing power that prevailed within the context 
of mass unemployment and economic depression.20 Apart from the simple reality that 
many people simply could not afford to increase their calorific consumption despite 
prices being pushed down to record levels, a well-founded concern was of the 
potentially harmful effect that overproduction could have on the vulnerable incomes 
of farmers and farming communities, and, thereby food security.21 This was 
inconsistent with observations in economic theory, which showed that the net-barter 
terms between primary producers and those of processors and manufacturers higher 
up on the production chain were characterised by a long-term negative trend for the 
former.22 In other words, primary food producers were arguably not getting a fair 
share of wealth and income compared with their overall input and contributions. The 
                                                 
16 
Shaw (n 10) 12-13.
 
17 
P. Lamartine-Yates, ‘Food and Income’ in T Schultz (ed) Food for the World (first published by 
University of Chicago Press 1945, Arno Press 1976) 183.
 
18 
Shaw (n 10) 13. 
19
 See 1.4, below. 
20 
Black (n 15) 17.
 
21 
See, eg: Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (7 U.S.C. § 1281: US Code - Section 1281).
 
22 
R. Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems (United 
Nations 1950, reprinted in Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 7 1962); H. Singer, ‘The 
Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries’, (1950) 40 The American 
Economic Review, 473.
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latter aspect should not easily be overlooked in the context of food security and, as 
will be further elaborated below, has been a particular focus of the CAP since its 
commencement.  
Moreover, the dynamics of production and over-production are highly 
complex, as they are often linked to a number of interrelated and reinforcing social, 
economic and political factors.23 On the socio-economic level, as has been seen, the 
welfare of farming communities and individual farmers may be negatively affected 
when market prices for their products fall. This is, indeed, likely to be the case for any 
given industry or sector that experience significant reductions in revenue. However, 
one of the most striking features of agricultural ‘exceptionalism’24 is the length to 
which the EU and other national governments have been willing to go to ensure that 
farming communities enjoy ‘a fair standard of living…by increasing the individual 
earnings of persons engaged in agriculture’.25 The latter position has historically 
expressed itself in various degrees of willingness to support farm incomes, which is 
in recognition of the role of food as a basic necessity that may warrant extraordinary 
measures to ensure its availability. Conversely, it has also resulted in numerous 
instances of food surpluses due to increased financial incentive to produce. The irony 
is, of course, that the overproduction of food can also have the effect of threatening 
farm incomes by driving down prices, which may reduce levels of production and 
create food shortages, thus, potentially having a direct and negative effect upon food 
security.26 
Such a state of affairs occurred in the US, where measures were introduced in 
response to reduced consumer demand in the 1930s. Despite originally being intended 
to bolster the income of farming communities, these price support mechanisms had 
the opposite effect of incentivising increased production and food surpluses, which 
ultimately served to further drive down the price of food.27 In response, contemporary 
commentators pointed out that although ‘the logical response to food surpluses would 
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be to rein in production, the US and other exporting nations chose to use marketing 
adjustments’, which had a direct impact on farm incomes.28 Not least, the adoption of 
marketing measures increasingly led surplus food producing nations to look to global 
markets as outlets for their agricultural products. Thus, rather than reining in 
production through production adjustment measures, ‘the prevailing notion 
of…exporting countries was that they could dispose of their surpluses by dumping 
them in [for instance] Europe’ prior to the World War Two.29 
1.3.2 International Responses to Food Crises  
Another effect of the augmented reliance on export markets was that national food 
supply networks became increasingly global and interdependent – prompting equally 
global efforts to address food security. The creation of the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations (UN) in Hot Springs, Virginia, in 1943 
marked such an effort and has been largely instrumental in defining food security and 
coordinating international efforts ever since.30 Following the Second World War, the 
situation with regards to food supplies varied considerably between countries and 
continents. For instance, American food production and output emerged relatively 
unaffected due to its geographic distance from the battles zones, while the situation in 
many parts of Europe differed greatly. There, food shortages and rationing would 
continue for years after the war and this harsh reality arguably had a remarkable 
impact upon the subsequent formation and objectives of the European agricultural 
policy.31 The particularities of the CAP will be explored in greater detail below, but 
for now it may suffice to mention that despite the promising start to international 
efforts aimed at addressing food security at the Hot Springs Conference in 1943, many 
nations, as well as the original European Economic Community (EEC), would 
continue to pursue rather inward-looking agricultural policies.32 
After relative economic stability and growth during the 1950s and 60s, initial 
signs of disruption were felt in 1972 when food production dropped for the first time 
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since the end of the Second World War.33 This reduction was principally due to heavy 
droughts, which had a significant impact on wheat production in the Soviet Union and 
led to massive purchasing on the world market.34 The situation was worsened in the 
following years, with poor weather conditions further affecting agricultural output and 
contributing to a near depletion of cereal stocks in several regions, including the Far 
East and North America, as well as rising food prices.35  
Although these developments had certainly been cause for concern, it was not 
until 1974, when the world experienced one of the most severe oil crises to date, that 
the instability on agricultural markets translated into a full-blown emergency 
requiring international cooperation and assistance in order to minimise the risk of food 
insecurity in those nations worse affected. This prompted the UN to convene the 1974 
World Food Conference, which Maxwell has argued was ‘born largely out of the 
shock at the sharp rise in world food prices in the preceding two years and fear that 
the world food system was running out of control’.36 The message was also brought 
home, if it had not already been, that disruptions on the global level could have a 
significant impact on food security on the regional, national and local level and vice 
versa.37 Thus, notwithstanding the years of economic growth and stability that had 
characterised much of the post-war period, it was clear that severe insecurity within 
the global food system could – and would – continue to occur, even as societies 
became increasingly wealthy and developed.38 
 
1.3.3 Definitions of Food Security 
Against a backdrop of market instability, low crop yields, and ensuing famine in some 
parts of the world,39 the report of the 1974 World Food Conference sought to address 
food security by providing, what is largely considered to be the first major 
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international definition of the concept.40 According to the report food security 
entailed;  
 
‘[the] availability at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic 
foodstuff…to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption…and to 
offset fluctuations in production and prices’.41  
 
This definition placed considerable importance on the supply of food (in terms of 
quantity), as well as the need to ensure the stability of food prices and to expand food 
consumption. Consequently‘the focus of the debate was on strengthening food 
production to increase availability and stability of world food supplies of basic 
foodstuffs...to meet increasing demands’.42 However, this enunciation of food security 
failed to include the role of food safety and issues of access in attaining food security 
and many subsequent definitions made by various international bodies have attempted 
to incorporate these aspects, to one extent or another.43 For instance, the FAO 
expanded its own definition of food security in 1983 to reflect this shortcoming by 
adding that food security included: ‘Ensuring that all people at all times have both 
physical and economic access to the basic food that they need’.44 Likewise, the 
importance of individual and household access was subsequently reflected in the 1996 
UN World Food Summit, which adopted a considerably more complex definition than 
that expounded upon in 1974 and remains one of the most oft-cited definitions to date. 
According to this: 
 
‘Food security at the individual, household, national, regional and 
global levels is when all people, at all times, have physical and 
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economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’.45 
 
Definitely, the 1996 declaration expanded the definition of food security to include 
the key dimensions of access and food safety as part of the food security paradigm.46 
For instance, it highlighted that ‘constraints on … incomes to purchase food…prevent 
basic food needs from being fulfilled’.47 Moreover, as will be further elaborated 
below, a vast body of academic literature has also contributed to a more nuanced 
understanding of the complex roles of access and vulnerability as they relate to food 
security on the individual and household levels.48 
 The increased focus on these micro-level aspects of food security marked an 
important shift towards addressing the structural deficiencies that may cause people 
to be food insecure or, equally, prevent them from becoming food secure, and has also 
been instrumental for conceptualising the key role of individual and household access 
and entitlement to food.49 Thus, it should be noted from the outset, that although the 
focus of the current thesis is on the production-related aspects of ensuring food 
security under the CAP, these merely reflect one dimension (albeit a major one) of the 
food security matrix. Food security on the individual level, on the other hand, 
definitely depends on additional considerations, but these are beyond the scope of the 
present discussion.  
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 Notwithstanding the increased attention to these dimensions of food security, 
however, international approaches and definitions have continued to hinge strongly 
on maintaining adequate food supplies, as well as, ensuring that these be subject to 
pricing policies that make them accessible and affordable.50 Therefore, the following 
section briefly outlines some basic observations on supply and pricing, before 
exploring how these factors have impacted upon the approach to food security policy 
under the CAP.  
 
1.3.4 The Focus on Supply and Pricing 
It is arguably somewhat self-evident that ensuring the existence of sufficient food 
supplies represent the most immediate and basic means of pre-empting food 
insecurity. Indeed, dating back to ancient civilisations, the availability of, eg buffer 
stocks have played an important role in ensuring food security, translating into overall 
societal stability in times of peace, war, famine and abundance alike.51 Recently, 
however, the high costs of maintaining and storing intervention stocks, along with 
increased reliance upon trade, have brought stock levels down significantly.52 This 
was a cause for significant concern during the food crisis of the 1970s when, as already 
noted, a series of bad harvests, combined with low levels of cereal stocks were partly 
responsible for the sharp rises in food prices that were experienced at that time.53  
 As will be discussed extensively in Chapter 2, a combination of similar 
conditions were experienced during the recent 2007-2008 food crisis, during which 
low global food stocks did little to address the inelasticity of, for instance, grain supply 
and demand functions, which tend to be highly susceptible to relatively small shocks, 
especially when stocks are low.54 This contributed, amongst other factors, to global 
wheat and maize prices rising by 180 per cent and almost 300 per cent respectively 
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from late 2006-2008.55 Moreover, similar to the course of events described above in 
relation to crisis of the early 1970s, the prospects of replenishing stocks was further 
undermined by significantly reduced grain harvests in Russia and Ukraine, with both 
countries further restricting global supply and trade through the imposition of export 
restrictions.56 This prompted global agencies to call for systems of international grain 
reserves, but such plans have yet to come to fruition.57  
Importantly, however, it should be added that notwithstanding the potential 
role of stocks and supply, it has been widely acknowledged that the existence of 
sufficient amounts of food, calculated on a per capita basis, does not necessarily 
guarantee food security.58 Thus, although falling outside the European context, 
important works such as Sen’s Poverty and Famine have emphasised the role of 
access for individual food security and pointed out that many a famine has occurred 
while the supply of calorific output remained largely the same on a per capita basis.59 
According to Sen, ‘[w]hile food availability will clearly be an important influence on 
[the] terms of exchange, other forces are also involved, and famines can thus arise 
from causes other than food availability decline’.60 This was, for instance, observed 
with regards to the Bengali famine of the early 1940s where widespread starvation 
occurred despite relatively minor fluctuations in the overall availability of food and 
without major declines in supplies.61 Similarly, as seen above, although far from 
constituting a famine, the extent of malnourishment and hunger experienced in the 
U.S. during the economic depression of the 1930s was clearly also linked to a lack of 
access for many people, as seen above.62  
It follows that within systems based on capital exchange, price is a key factor 
for determining the access of individuals and household to food, with price stability 
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constituting a core focus of macro-level frameworks and policies.63 And, the dedicated 
preoccupation of politicians and economist alike with the price stability of agricultural 
products is one that is seemingly unparalleled in other sectors. Indeed, food security 
is seen as a fundamental condition for achieving the greater aim of societal stability,  
and, as will be seen below, continues to be a central objective of EU agricultural 
policy, notwithstanding numerous reforms aimed at reducing market intervention and 
the expansion of additional dimensions (such as environmental governance) of its 
approach to food security..64 Thus, even though global price shocks and food crises 
tend to have a greater impact upon developing – and often import-dependent – 
countries,65 the effects of sudden price fluctuations also have implications for the 
poorest members of developed societies, whose access to food is particularly 
vulnerable to price fluctuations.66  
Food price volatility has consequently been highlighted by the Commission as 
‘one of the main risks [to]… food security’,67 while, the FAO has pointed out that 
‘high food prices may have detrimental long-term effects on human development as 
households, in their effort to deal with rising food bills, either reduce the quantity and 
quality of food consumed, cut expenditure on health and education or sell productive 
assets’.68 However, as already noted in the discussion above, this point also reflects 
the nuanced nature of price policy, as downward fluctuations of price are problematic 
for producers ‘because of their negative effects on revenue’.69 Thus, low market prices 
do not necessarily provide incentives to produce and can even lead to shortages of 
supplies if producers pull out of the market or turn to cultivating alternative crops for 
which they expect higher returns.  
Against this background, it is clear that food security is determined by a 
number of multifaceted mechanisms, some of which are beyond the realm and control 
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of agricultural policy.70 Moreover, the interplay between food price volatility and 
supply is further complicated by the intricate role played by fossil fuels for the 
production of food in conventional agricultural systems.71 Indeed, rising oil prices 
were instrumental in generating parallel increases in food prices, and thereby 
restricting access to supplies, during both the price shocks experienced in 1974 and 
the more recent global crisis.72 Thus, as will be extensively discussed in the 
subsequent Chapter, not only does the entrenched reliance upon fossil fuels continue 
to have a major impact upon food security, but it has also become increasingly 
recognised for its implications for long-term productivity, given the impact of this use 
upon climate change and the environment.73  
Before considering these recent developments, the remainder of this Chapter 
provides a brief historic overview of the CAP and its role in formulating and pursuing 
the objectives of food security in the European context.  As will be seen, the emphasis 
on high levels of supply and pricing stability have remained constant features of the 
CAP framework throughout this time, and have served to define the EU’s underlying 
approach to food security in a number fundamental ways.   
 
1.4 A Brief Historic Overview of the CAP and the European 
Approach to Food Security 
Undoubtedly, the very meaning of a distinctly ‘European’ approach has undergone 
tremendous change, from one determined for – and by – six founding MSs, to one that 
now extends to 28. However, one aspect that all of these MSs have in common is that 
accession to the EU has entailed that the governance of food security policy has been 
significantly transferred to the EU institutions and administered within the framework 
of the CAP. Thus, in order to further explore the wider ecological implications of the 
European approach to food security in subsequent chapters, it is first necessary to 
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consider how this policy objective has been pursued and implemented under the 
auspices of the CAP.  
The following subsections commence with an overview of the early 
architecture of the CAP and its distinctive approach to food security. Thereafter, 
consideration will be afforded to some of the negative externalities of this early 
framework, such as the effects of overproduction and environmental impacts, before 
turning to the process of formal CAP reform that has been undertaken since the early 
1990s. The account spans about five decades and covers the period from the policy’s 
inception under the Treaty of Rome, to the implementation of the so called Health 
Check reform in 2009. The main purpose of this discussion is to provide an initial 
outline of the main developments that have served to shape the CAP and pave the way 
for the 2013 reforms, with the latter being more closely analysed in subsequent 
chapters.  
 
1.4.1 The Initial Objective of Increased Production and the Resort to Market 
Measures 
Following the end of the Second World War, political and economic cooperation were 
increasingly seen as possible means of breaking with decades of devastating 
nationalism and inward-looking policies. Thus, for the six founding MSs of the EEC, 
the establishment of the common market provided a compelling platform  for 
pursuing peace, prosperity and supranationalism between the previously warring 
parties.74 Importantly, it was established that any attempt at European integration 
would necessarily have to include a common market for agricultural products, in 
addition to steel and industrial goods.75  
 The initial plan for integration was sketched out under the leadership of the 
former Belgian Prime Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, and summarised in a report 
delivered to the negotiating parties.76 However, neither the Spaak report, nor the 
resulting Treaty of Rome gave rigid guidance as to how the proposed agricultural 
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policy was to be carried out.77 Indeed, apart from the fact that agriculture was to fall 
under the exclusive competence of the EEC, it would largely be left to the institutions 
of the latter to choose between the prescribed methods of integration of agricultural 
markets.78  
 The fundamental provisions of the CAP were contained under Title II of the 
Treaty of Rome, with Article 39 (1) laying out the primary objectives of the policy. 
These were;  
(a) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by 
ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum 
utilisation of the factors of production, in particular labour; 
(b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in 
particular by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in 
agriculture;  
(c) to stabilise markets; 
(d) to assure the availability of supplies; 
(e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices.79 
 
Foundation for the structural policy in agriculture was provided under following 
subsection, with regional concerns to be addressed as a key priority.80 Furthermore, 
Article 40(2) provided that these objectives should be pursued through a ‘common 
organisation of agricultural markets’, which ‘shall take one of the following forms, 
depending on the product concerned’:  
 
(a) common rules on competition;  
(b) compulsory co-ordination of the various national market organisations;  
(c) a European market organisation’.  
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In order to implement such common organisation, moreover, the EEC was empowered 
under Article 40(3) to include ‘all measures required to attain the objectives set out in 
Article 39, in particular regulation of prices, aids for the production and marketing of 
the various products, storage and carry-over arrangements and common machinery 
for stabilising imports or exports’.81 
 The subsequent organisation of the European agricultural market would 
overwhelmingly be pursued in the form of Common Organisations of the Market 
(COM) under the CAP82 which, in turn, had a decisive impact upon food security and 
production in the EU. One of the main reason for this was that underlying framework 
of the COMs was largely based on the three core principals of; (i) common financing; 
(ii) common prices and; (iii) community preference.83  
First, the principle of common financing essentially expressed the collective 
financial solidarity that was expected to extend to the expenses incurred in running 
the CAP.84 In other words, MS were required to share in the responsibility of funding 
the CAP budget, which would then be used at the supranational level to cover the 
costs of, eg, export refunds, intervention purchases, price support and other expenses 
that would otherwise have to be covered to by national budgets.85  
Second, the setting of common prices sought to harmonise market prices 
across the Community, and was operationalised by a framework of highly complex 
and technical legal measures aimed, amongst other things, at eliminating distortion of 
intra-Community competition between farmers.86 This was especially relevant from 
an economic perspective, since considerable differences in national prices risked 
creating competitive advantages for those countries with lower price levels and 
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thereby undermining the integration process as a whole.87 In setting common prices 
the community also opted to set commodity prices slightly higher than those 
prevailing on world markets, which had the effect of raising farm incomes88 and 
protecting the latter from international competition.89 Importantly, with regards to 
food security, it followed that the high prices offered to farmers for their products 
would have the effect of stimulating production and eventually even overproduction 
of food and feed.90 However, this was arguably difficult to reconcile with Article 
39(1)(e), which included, as one of the main CAP objectives, ensuring that these 
supplies reached consumers at reasonable prices. 
The system of common pricing was based on calculations of: first, a target 
price, which was the price that it was hoped a product would attract on the open 
market; secondly, an intervention price, which obliged national authorities to 
‘intervene’ and purchase agricultural commodities when they fell below a certain 
price; and, thirdly a threshold price established by means of, eg variable import levies 
that raised the price of third country goods (which tended to be cheaper) in order to 
prevent these from causing the price of European products to fall.  
Thirdly, the ECJ has pointed out in Greece v Council91 that community 
preference is not strictly speaking a legal principle, but rather an enunciation of the 
special treatment and market position that is afforded EU producers vis-à-vis third 
country producers. This can be exemplified by the use of import duties, variable 
import levies and export subsidies.92 Thus, as will be further discussed below, by 
insulating European producers from market signals while guaranteeing the income of 
farmers, the twin pillars of common pricing and community preference had the 
combined effect of significantly increasing food production, albeit at a high economic 
and environmental cost. In this light, the early pursuit of European food security 
centred upon the idea of increased production with the purpose of ensuring the 
availability of food supplies for the European populous, as well as providing a fair 
standard of living for the agricultural community.   
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Importantly, increased agricultural productivity and farm incomes were 
merely two out of the five CAP objectives listed in Article 39, with the ECJ declaring 
from the outset that no clear hierarchy existed between these objectives and that it was 
acceptable that they could not all be attained simultaneously.93 Rather, the Court held 
that it might at times be necessary to afford temporary priority to one of the objectives 
for the purpose of fulfilling the ‘demands of the economic factors or conditions in 
view of which Community decisions are made’.94 Moreover, the Community was 
afforded wide discretion for the purpose of implementing the policy.95 However, as 
pointed out by Advocate General Capotorti in Bela-Mühle v Grows-Farm, the 
framework of the COMs often led to a disproportionate legislative focus upon eg 
raising farm incomes, through price and market support.96 Furthermore, it has also 
been stressed that this imbalanced focus has largely been at the expense of undertaking 
structural reform of the agricultural sector,97 even though the need for such reform 
had been stressed as early as 1968 in the so-called Mansholt Plan.98 
Nonetheless, the Community continued to pursue an agricultural policy that was 
largely based on market measures aimed at increasing production and raising farm 
income. The latter was especially evident given the choice to set Community prices 
at levels slightly higher than those prevailing on the international market, despite the 
higher cost for consumers. This has even prompted some to argue that, due to the 
seemingly economic illogicality of the CAP, its main purpose could not possibly have 
been to ensure food security, but must instead have been to secure the income of the 
farming community.99 Importantly, though, the Court of Justice has held that Article 
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39(1)(b) does not constitute an income guarantee for farmers,100 but rather measures 
aimed at market stabilisation.101 
 
1.4.2 External Dimensions of Food Security and the Prevailing Atmosphere of 
Protectionism under the Early CAP 
By the time that the Treaty of Rome was ratified in 1957, most Western European 
states had already grown accustomed to the protectionist policies that had served to 
shield domestic agricultural markets and producers from external competition for 
decades.102 Thus, it was perhaps not too surprising that the founding Member States 
ultimately decided to adopt an agricultural policy that continued along similarly 
protectionist lines.103 Some have even argued that the removal of protective measures 
would have been ‘neither politically acceptable nor socially desirable…as 
alternative systems would have required too big a break with tradition and a 
departure into mechanisms of policies in which Member countries were for the most 
part inexperienced, and for which the necessary bureaucratic structure did not 
exist’.104 On the other hand, others have submitted that the centralised European 
policy was even more protectionist than previous national ones since it covered a 
wider range of agricultural products and generally resulted in overall higher prices 
due to the pressures exerted by high price countries.105 
Importantly, however, it was established at an early point that the aim of the 
Community would not necessarily be to achieve full self-sufficiency, thereby 
indicating that international trade would continue to play a role in providing sufficient 
food supplies.106 Indeed, Article 39(1)(d) does not exclude trade as means of ensuring 
the availability of food supplies, nor does it specify that it must be attained solely by 
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internal production.107 However, international observations stressed from the outset 
the potentially negative impacts of the envisioned CAP. For instance a GATT expert 
panel report led by Professor Haberler in 1958 was keen to emphasise that adverse 
effects of protectionism could be reduced if there were greater willingness among the 
contracting parties to ‘shift away from price-support towards deficiency payments’.108 
The report also stressed the propensity for food surpluses to arise under a system based 
on price support and external protection, and cautioned that the disposal of such 
surpluses on world markets could have a particularly detrimental effect on countries 
that otherwise enjoy a comparative advantage.109 
The choice to pursue high levels of external protection should, moreover, not 
be viewed in isolation, as there were many other social, economic and political factors 
that would serve to affect the CAP framework. However, the framing of protectionist 
policies was arguably key to early European attempts to attain food security through 
the adoption of market measures primarily aimed at increasing production, as well as, 
farm incomes. As further discussed below, the policy of pursuing high levels of 
external protection undoubtedly came with considerable pressure from fellow GATT 
signatories. This has, in turn, been a major driver of policy reform of the CAP, 
increasingly subjecting farmers to the market forces and signals.  
 
1.5 From Empty Pots to Overflowing Storage Coffers: The Effects 
of Overproduction 
One of the main effects of the early CAP framework was its propensity to encourage 
production, by means of guaranteed price support and market measures.110 Together 
with increasingly efficient and advanced technologies, this paved the way for greater 
intensification and specialisation of agricultural production. Indeed, as already 
highlighted, the widespread reliance upon, eg, nitrogen fertilizers and pesticides have 
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been instrumental in attaining the political objective of greater self-sufficiency 
through increased internal production.111 However, this intensification has not come 
without its fair share of economic, social and environmental costs resulting from 
overproduction and the strenuous usage of natural resources.112 The following 
sections consider some of the main effects of intensification, before turning to the 
early CAP reforms that were carried out with the aim of addressing the negative 
consequences that past polices have given rise to.  
 
1.5.1 Food Surpluses 
One of the most contentious legacies of the CAP is arguably the lakes of wine and 
mountains of butter that were accumulated as a result of coupling farm incomes with 
production. In other words, the early CAP and its reliance on market measures had 
not only given farmers incentive to produce; it had also encouraged them to 
overproduce.113 The guaranteed price support that was due to farmers entailed that 
they would get paid for their goods, whether there was a demand from consumers or 
not. There was, thus, an immense motivation for farmers to produce at maximum 
capacity in order to capitalise on the generous subsidies offered in exchange.  
 As expressed by Kay, ‘price support drove up production, which drove up 
surpluses, which drove up the budget costs’.114 This incentive resulted in vast 
surpluses for a number of products by the mid-1980s, at which time the output of beef, 
veal, pig meat, cereals, sugar, wine, eggs and poultry were all estimated to be beyond 
the level required for self-sufficiency within the Community.115 It follows that even 
though certain sectors, such as  pig and poultry, never benefited from direct price 
guarantees, they nonetheless ‘benefited indirectly along with all other feed-based 
systems through subsidised cereal feed from large arable payments’,116 in that cereals 
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constituted a key input for intensive feed systems. Moreover, these sectors ‘also 
benefitted from export subsidies and other market interventions which maintained 
prices above a minimum threshold’.  
The most pressing situation was possibly that pertaining to the dairy industry, 
where quotas were introduced in 1984 to curb the high levels of surpluses.117 Prior to 
their introduction, the level of production had effectively bypassed demand, with the 
demand even experiencing a slight reduction in the case of dairy.118 These 
commodities were subsequently stored or disposed of on the international market at 
great cost to the Community, which was required to compensate farmers for products 
that were superfluous on the internal market.119 In this light, Winters has argued that 
the budgetary implications of having to deal with these surpluses were such as to 
effectively ‘endanger the future of the CAP, which by 1984 accounted for 69.8 per 
cent of the Community’s entire budget’.120  
Cardwell has also pointed out that the adoption of such a drastic solution as 
quotas ‘clearly reflected the critical state of imbalance that pervaded the dairy 
sector’.121 Moreover, even when quotas were introduced, the overall effectiveness of 
the scheme has been questioned based on the initial quotas being set too high ‘with 
the result that, notwithstanding reductions in quotas over the years serious problems 
have been encountered in balancing supply with demand’, which in turn entailed that 
surpluses still existed many years after the scheme was put in place.122 Some have 
also attributed the inefficiency of the quota system to the failure to couple it with 
reductions in price ‘for the consumer that would be likely to lead to an increased 
demand’.123  
It would take many revised attempts, an enormous budget and a mass of 
legislation before measures to curb overproduction had the desired effect124 and 
according to some estimates the total cost of the CAP even trebled between 1980 and 
                                                 
117 
See, M.N. Cardwell, Milk Quotas: European Community Law and United Kingdom Law 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996).
 
118 
Court of Auditors, Special Report No. 2/87 on the Quota/Additional Levy System in the Milk 
Sector 1987 OJ C266/1, paragraph 1.1. 
119 
Ibid, paragraph 1.2
 
120  
M. Winter, Rural Politics (Routledge, 1996) 130.
 
121 
Cardwell (n 24) 8. See also Preamble to the implementing legislation 856/84 and 857/84.
 
122 
Ibid, 13.
 
123 
Neville-Rolf (n 2) 28.
 
124 
See, generally, Cardwell (n 24).  For views on the general inefficiency of the Commission at the 
time, see, G. Ross, Jacques Delors and European Integration (Polity Press, 1995) 27-28.
 
- 34 - 
1992.125 Importantly, given these and other outcomes, the Commission has ultimately 
had little choice but to concede that the ‘imbalance between price support and other 
measures was not what the original designers of the CAP intended’.126 
 
1.5.2 Appreciating the Environmental Effects of Intensification 
In addition to creating unnecessary surpluses and corresponding budgetary burdens, 
the intensification of agricultural production also gained increased attention for its 
propensity to impact negatively upon the environment.127 However, although these 
implications were considered in the Community’s very first environmental action plan 
in 1973,128 Jack has argued that the latter ‘had only limited knowledge of this 
environmental impact’ and that it took until the mid-1980s before the adverse effects 
of agriculture seriously considered.129  
 As is extensively explored in the following chapters, this awareness was 
further advanced in the beginning of the 1990s when the concept of sustainable 
development was endorsed as the main Western paradigm for growth-based 
development. In the context of European agricultural policy, this has entailed an 
incremental reappraisal of the historic approach to food security and its propensity to 
impact negatively upon the environment.130 Thus, in 1991 the Commission expressly 
acknowledged that, if left unchecked, systems that link support to production not only 
had the potential to stimulate production growth and encourage intensification of 
production techniques, but could also have negative environmental impacts in the 
long-run.131 Without mincing its words, the Commission noted that ‘[w]here intensive 
production takes place nature is abused, water is polluted and the land 
impoverished’.132 
Importantly, the increased appreciation of the link between conventional 
agricultural activity and ecological degradation has prompted the EU to adopt a 
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number of strategic legal measures aimed at addressing the most pressing of these 
developments over the course of several decades.133 Although strictly speaking, many 
of these measures have not been implemented under the agricultural title of the 
Treaties, they have nonetheless been part of the process of environmental policy 
integration (EPI), which has been instrumental for ‘greening’ the CAP and adding an 
environmental focus to what was originally a production-oriented policy.134 Given the 
centrality of this process to the current thesis and posed research questions, a detailed 
account of the CAP’s environmental framework is provided in Chapter 3, while the 
main ecological challenges to agriculture are considered in Chapter 2. Before 
concluding the current part of the discussion, however, an initial overview is offered 
of the major reforms that have been pursued for the purpose of re-programming the 
policy to more accurately reflect societal demands and expectations. 
 
1.6 Change and Reform: Reappraising the European Model of 
Agriculture  
In response to the experiences outlined above, a process of incremental reform 
commenced in the 1980s with the aim of moving CAP expenditure away from market 
support measures, toward more direct forms of income support. This process was 
formalised by the so called MacSharry135 reforms of 1992, which focused primarily 
on reducing market distortion and price support, as well as increasing competition 
within the agricultural sector and reducing the budgetary burden of the CAP.136 More 
specifically, this included the conversion of market measures into coupled subsidies, 
whereby payments could be linked to either the number of livestock137 or hectares.138 
These were phased in to compensate farmers for the reductions in price support, 
however, as is further elaborated in Chapter 3, coupling could only ever serve as a 
partial fix, as it retained an immediate link between income and production without 
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placing substantive obligations on payment recipients.139 Thus, as pointed out by 
McMahon, these ‘were not wholesale reform of the CAP, rather a response to both 
internal and external problems’.140  
A major source of external pressure for these and subsequent reforms stemmed 
from the Community’s undertakings as a contracting party of the GATT.141 Indeed, 
in its 1980 Green Paper ‘Reflections on the Common Agricultural Policy’ the 
Commission listed external commercial conditions and financial restraints as the 
policies main constraints.142 Amongst other issues, the generous provision of 
subsidies and export refunds had effectively served to ‘dump’ these products onto 
international commodity markets with highly distorting effects and at great cost to 
consumers.143 Hence, its trading partners were pushing for less trade-distorting policy 
measures and greater access to the European markets by means of decreased 
protection.  
Moreover, as already outlined, the need to stifle overproduction and reduce 
the use of expensive export refunds was likewise the source of increased internal 
pressure to alleviate the haemorrhaging Community budget, which had been all but 
overburdened by the CAP.144 One way in which this was addressed under the 
MacSharry reforms was through the introduction of compulsory set-aside, aimed at 
compensating farmers for taking land out of production and thereby reducing the level 
of Community output and surplus production.145 As is further discussed in Chapter 3, 
however, the effects of this initial instrument was weakened by a limited uptake by 
farmers. 
 The process of market reorientation was carried forward under Agenda 2000, 
which delivered a substantive reform package consisting of some 20 pieces of 
legislation aimed at addressing and overhauling a number of EU policy areas. Key 
amongst its priorities for CAP reform was the expansion of the framework of direct 
support, as a continuation of the move from price to producer support that was 
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initiated in the early 1990s. For instance, Council Regulation 1253/99146 further 
lowered the intervention price for cereals, while Council Regulation 1254/99147 aimed 
at reducing the oversupply of beef by lowering the basic price in that sector.148 
Likewise, the extension of milk levies and quotas featured prominently, as the need 
to curb overproduction in this sector remained a central challenge to widespread 
market reform.149 In particular, the latter revealed a sustained focus on meeting the 
Community’s obligations to liberalise agricultural trade under the WTO agreements, 
as noted above.150 
 However, Agenda 2000 was also instrumental for the development of the CAP 
framework in a number of additional ways that may be highlighted as part the current 
discussion. For instance, the reform was essential for preparing the EU for its largest 
round of accessions, with the need for budgetary discipline being particularly 
predominant in this respect.151 Thus, in recognition of the need to address these issues, 
the Commission contended that ‘enlargement plays a far greater role in Agenda 2000 
than in any of the large financial packages of the past’.152  
Importantly, the reforms embarked on a process of transforming the structural 
policies of the CAP into a broader framework for rural development.153 These 
policies, which had remained largely intact following the MacSharry round, were 
becoming increasingly in need of reform in light of the overall low levels of 
employment and the high degree of modernisation and consolidation that had been 
attained in many of the agricultural sectors of the EU 15.154 Furthermore, the 
budgetary burden of extending structural payments based on past regimes to acceding 
MSs – in which agricultural sectors were generally less advanced and retained a larger 
share of the overall work force – provided ample reason to reconsider the ways in 
                                                 
146
 Council Regulation 1253/99 [1999] OJ L160/18. 
147
 Council Regulation 1254/99, [1999] OJ L160/21. 
148
 A Swinbank, ‘CAP Reform and the WTO: Compatibility and Developments’ (1999) 26 European 
Review of Agricultural Economics 389, 392. 
149
 Council Regulation 1255/99, [1999] OJ L160/48. 
150
 European Commission, Agenda 2000: for a Stronger and Wider Union, Bulletin of the European 
Union, Supplement 5/97 COM (97) 2000, 12. 
151 
Cardwell (n 141) 67.
  
152 
European Commission (n 150) 11. The specific aspects and implications of enlargement were set 
out in a separate communication. See, European Commission, Enlargement and Agriculture: 
Successfully Integrating the new Member States into the CAP, SEC (2002) 95.
 
153
 See Preamble of regulation. 
154
 European Commission, (n 151) 26. 
- 38 - 
which rural development was funded and pursued under the CAP.155 Against this 
background, the EU opted to abandon the old framework of its structural policies for 
one that was committed to ‘supporting the broader rural economy’ including the 
provision and promotion of environmental public goods under the newly created Rural 
Development pillar.156 In particular, the Commission called for ‘a prominent role be 
given to agri-environmental instruments to support a sustainable development of rural 
areas and respond to society’s increasing demand for environmental services’.157  
With regards to direct payments, moreover, Agenda 2000 introduced 
compulsory measures aimed at environmental protection under Regulation 
1259/1999.158 Thus, although the reforms were not primarily formulated to pursue 
environmental objectives, there was nonetheless an anticipation that they would 
contribute indirectly to improving the CAP’s environmental performance. Not least, 
there was an expectation that the price reductions introduced under Agenda 2000 
would lead farmers to lessen their use of fertilisers and pesticides in order to save on 
input costs and increase their own profit margins.159 Such arguments were raised by 
the EU in favour of the price cuts, but were arguably somewhat offset by the 
underlying rationale of direct payments, which were essentially compensated farmers 
for the loss of coupled compensation. Thus, as one report noted ‘direct payments does 
not change the price relation between input and output, but it does influence 
profitability of the specific agricultural activity, and thus influence crop choice and 
land use’.160 In this light, the introduction of direct payments may be seen to have 
perpetuated the CAP’s failure to internalise the negative environmental costs of 
agricultural production by simply topping up the profit margins of farmers following 
the reductions in price support.161 
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Another significant development that occurred during these early CAP 
reforms related to the policy’s growing imperative to ensure food safety throughout 
the supply chain.162 In particular, this focus evolved from a string of food safety scares 
that started in the late 1990s and prompted the EU to adopt a comprehensive and 
integrated legislative framework ‘covering all sectors of the food chain’.163 According 
to the Commission the main objectives of food safety legislation was to ‘establish a 
high level of consumer health protection and clearly attribute primary responsibility 
for safe food production to industry, producers and suppliers’.164 And, to this end, the 
creation of an independent European Food Safety Authority responsible for risk 
assessment and risk management was a key feature of the comprehensive European 
response, based on scientific evidence to inform high standards of food safety.165 
Thus, the significance of food safety legislation has also been explained based on the 
‘inextricable links between food safety and farming, and thereby conferring on 
farming the distinctive status and responsibilities that go with being the first link in 
the food chain’.166  
The role of farmers for ensuring food safety was further underscored during 
the next set of CAP reforms, the Mid-Term Review (MTR), which made direct 
payments conditional upon observing specific environmental, food safety, 
phytosanitary and animal welfare standards, known as cross-compliance as of 1 
January 2005.167 The details of this regime will be extensively discussed in Chapter 3. 
For present purposes, however, it may be added that another significant aspect of the 
MTR definitely pertains to the introduction of the single farm payment (SFP),168 
which sought to consolidate the various arable and livestock payments into a single 
one. More specifically, this entailed ‘that all direct payments (not simply those 
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associated with the MacSharry reforms of 1992), previously paid on an area or 
headage basis, would be converted into the SFP’.169  
In order to discourage further intensification, moreover, the SFP was intended 
to be based on past production levels, but despite the Commission’s initial insistence 
that payments should be exclusively based on these, a number of exceptions persisted. 
For instance, Regulation 1782/2005 allowed for the partial implementation of the new 
SFP scheme, alongside continued arable and livestock payments for a number of years 
past the initial deadline. Notwithstanding this and other exceptions, however, Cunha 
and Swinbank have argued that this shift implemented by the MTR was particularly 
important for enhancing the EU’s negotiating position under the Doha Development 
round by switching a substantial amount of its support from blue box to green box 
payments.170  
The last set of reforms to take place prior to the CAP 2020 was the so-called 
Health Check in 2009. These were less extensive than the previous MTR and mainly 
sought to continue the general move towards streamlining, simplifying and 
modernising the CAP in order to enable farmers to respond more efficiently to market 
signals. For instance, it sought to decouple most of the remaining production-
incentivising payments following the MTR, although MS were able to maintain 
coupled support for a number of specific sectors, including goat, sheep and suckler 
cow premia.171 In preparation for the expiration of dairy quotas in 2015, the Health 
Check also attempted to limit the impact for farmers by slightly increasing quotas 
during the last remaining years of the system.172 Moreover, as is detailed in Chapter 3 
– and of central relevance to the current thesis – the 2009 reforms abolished 
compulsory set-aside, while streamlining certain elements of the cross-compliance 
regime and increasing the level of EU funding for rural development.  
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1.7 A Changing Food Security Paradigm?  
Undoubtedly, the CAP has been significantly overhauled during the past decades to 
reflect the changing internal and external circumstances that have evolved since it was 
first introduced. In particular, this has entailed ‘a switch of emphasis from the primary 
objective of increasing productivity and competitiveness to enhancing the long-term 
sustainability of agricultural policy and the agri-food system and giving the producer 
more opportunities to respond to market signals and the ever-growing demand for 
food’.173   
 A corresponding shift of focus has also taken place, from an approach to food 
security based on consistently high levels of output to one that has increasingly 
embraced a multifunctional role of agriculture and farming in order to maintain the 
‘richness and diversity of landscapes and cultural and natural heritage’.174 Indeed, the 
OECD has underscored that this goes beyond the primary function of supplying food 
and fibre and includes the provision of additional services and public goods, such as 
environmental conservation, preservation of biodiversity and the strengthening of 
rural economies, amongst others.175 Similarly, Cardwell has described this as a new 
form of agricultural exceptionalism ‘based less upon farmers as providers of food and 
more upon, inter alia, notions of rurality, care for the environment and food safety’.176  
 The multifunctional aspects of agricultural and rural activity were likewise 
reflected in the context of the subsequent 2013 reforms.177 For instance, the 
Commission stressed in its 2010 communication that the CAP would continue to 
support ‘the increasing diversity of agriculture and rural areas following successive 
enlargements, and the demands by EU citizens on the environment, food safety and 
quality, healthy nutrition, animal health and welfare, plant health, the preservation of 
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the countryside, biodiversity and climate change’.178 As will be seen in the next 
chapter, however, the 2013 reforms also marked an important conceptual shift in the 
EU’s approach to food security by moving beyond the language of multifunctionality, 
to emphasising the role of the CAP for ensuring the protection and sustainability of 
agricultural resources. Thus, in contrast to previous agendas, the Commission 
envisaged that a central objective for the reforms would be ‘to preserve the food 
production potential on a sustainable basis throughout the EU, so as to guarantee long-
term food security for European citizens and to contribute to growing world food 
demand’.179 In order to fully grasp the underlying motivations for this direction of 
travel, the discussion therefore turns to considering the main events that impacted 
upon on both the process and substance of the most recent round of CAP reforms.  
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Chapter 2 
 Reforming the CAP towards 2020: The Impact of 
Recent Food Crises and the Looming Challenges to 
Food Security 
2.1 Introduction 
As highlighted above, each successive reform of the CAP has been driven by specific 
priorities and shaped by internal, as well as external policy considerations. 
Undoubtedly, the same applied to the most recent round, which was concluded in 2013 
under the leadership of the Commissioner for Agriculture, Dacian Cioloș and 
programmed the CAP framework for the 2014-2020 period. The current Chapter 
traces some of the main events and developments that served to set the initial tone of 
the CAP 2020 reform agenda and is divided into three parts.  
 The first of these outlines the main effects of the global food crisis and general 
market instability of 2007-2008, as well as the institutional debates and responses that 
followed at EU level. The second part expands the discussion by considering some of 
the major projections that are expected to affect future food security and the particular 
challenges that these are likely to pose to agricultural production and productivity, 
according to current trends. In light of these developments, the third, and last, part of 
the Chapter provides an initial account of the CAP 2020 reform agenda, which clearly 
articulated food security as a fundamental objective for the policy moving forward. 
Specific attention is given to the Commission’s 2010 guiding communication, The 
CAP Towards 2020: Meeting the Food, Natural Resources and Territorial Challenges 
of the Future,1 which provided a fundamental point of departure for the intra-
institutional negotiations that would subsequently serve to determine the outcomes 
and substance of the Cioloș reforms. In particular, this document expressed a decisive 
intention to enhance the sustainable use and protection of natural resources as key 
objectives for ensuring food security under the post-2014 framework.  
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2.2 The 2007-2008 Food Crisis and Ensuing Market Volatility 
The decade since mid-2000 has been marked by experiences and projections that have 
served to re-emphasise food security as the main objective of the CAP. This process 
was partly catalysed by the 2007-2008 global food crisis, which not only resulted in 
price hikes that threatened access to food by the poorest members of society – but was 
notably also followed by increased volatility and price fluctuations on agricultural 
commodity markets in 2010-2011.2 The impact of these events were resolutely 
reflected in numerous policy statements and communications issued by the EU’s main 
institutional actors in response to rising insecurities on the global markets and fears 
that price volatility could become the future norm rather than the exception.3  
 The following subsections highlights some of the main elements of this 
institutional exchange and the role of these in influencing the European food security 
debate that preceded – and ultimately set the tone of – the reform process initiated by 
the European Commission in 2010. 
 
2.2.1 Causes and Consequences 
The root causes of the 2007-2008 food crisis continue to be widely debated, and 
although a full account is beyond the scope of the current discussion, a number of key 
coinciding developments have frequently been mentioned in relation to the extreme 
price hikes and volatility that characterised agricultural commodity markets during 
this period.4 For instance, in early 2009 the EP highlighted that ‘for the first time since 
the 1970s, the world is facing an acute food crisis, determined by both structural, long-
term factors, as well as by other determinants’.5 According to the Commission, these 
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included the impacts of ‘poor harvests in a number of regions of the world, a 
historically low level of stocks, the depreciation of the US dollar, and export 
restrictions in a number of traditional suppliers to the world market’.6  
It may also be noted that the market volatility of 2007–2008 coincided with the 
start of one of the most challenging economic crises to hit the EU and its member 
states in recent times. Indeed, in 2008 the EP pointed out that the effects of the global 
food crisis at the European level were ‘closely interconnected with the financial crisis 
in which liquidity injections made by central banks to prevent bankruptcies may have 
increased speculative investments in commodities’.7  
Together, these and other factors had significant impacts upon food prices for 
a number of staple products, including wheat and maize, which rose by 180 and almost 
300 per cent respectively from late 2006-2008.8 Moreover, food prices were further 
inflated by record high energy and fertiliser prices, which saw input costs rise for 
European farmers by almost 200 and 150 per cent each, during roughly the same 
period.9 Indeed, the Commission noted that ‘the effects of soaring food prices were 
worsened by simultaneous increases in energy prices’,10 which was especially 
worrisome for European living below the poverty line at the time.11 
In total, overall global food prices are estimated to have risen by over 80 per 
cent from 2007-2008.12 And, the impacts of this market volatility were particularly 
felt in net food importing countries, many of which were developing or amongst the 
least developed nations at the time.13 The sharp increases in staple commodity prices 
even prompted the UN to warn that the fundamental human right to food was in danger 
of being undermined in those nations were access to food was most severely limited 
or affected. It expressly recognised that ‘the complex character of the worsening of 
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the current global food crisis, in which the right to adequate food is threatened to be 
violated on a massive scale, as a combination of several major factors, including 
macroeconomic factors, also impacted negatively by environmental degradation, 
desertification and global climate change, natural disasters and the lack of the 
necessary technology to confront its impact, particularly in developing countries and 
least developed countries’.14 
The UN’s Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Oliver de Schutter, was 
especially vocal about what he considered to be the underlying causes of the food 
crises and issued numerous high-impact reports outlining his position. For instance, 
in 2009 he entered into a high-level open debate with the Director General of the 
WTO, Pascal Lamy, where the two discussed the impacts and implications of global 
trade upon food systems and the right to food, in particular.15 A central concern raised 
at the time was of the growing potential for energy markets to affect agricultural 
commodity prices and the structural implications for food security.16 Indeed, as 
already indicated, the convergence of high energy prices in 2007 served to propel the 
food crisis,17 largely due to the close link between conventional agriculture and inputs 
such as fertilisers and pesticides, as well as processing and transportation.18 He was, 
however, particularly critical of growing international ambitions to increase biofuel 
production as a means of attaining the dual political objectives of lower energy costs 
and climate change mitigation through reduced GHG emissions.19   
According to the Rapporteur, the emergent economic and policy incentives to 
produce renewable feed stock had not only exacerbated the ongoing food crisis by 
diverting land and resources towards biofuel production, but also posed serious 
structural threats to ensuring assess to food and food security for the most deprived 
members of the global population in the future.20 In contrast with other sources of 
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renewable energy, he emphasised that the production of biofuel had the potential to 
stand in direct competition with the cultivation of food crops for a limited set of 
resources and, as such, could lead to subsequent price hikes, volatility and land use 
change unless steps were taken to address the complexities of encouraging the further 
expansion of biofuel production.21 Indeed, de Shutter even went so far as to call for a 
complete moratorium on the use of food crops for fuel and argued against the 
established goal of incentivising additional investment though increased subsidies and 
other policy instruments.22 
While the call for an international moratorium was not heeded, there was some 
evidence that these criticisms were taken on board at the European level. Following 
the sharp rise in food prices, for instance, the EU engaged in a reassessment of its 
biofuels policy so as to ensure that renewable energy targets would not conflict or 
pose a threat to the central objective of food security.23 To this effect, the European 
Social and Economic Committee (ESSC) explicitly acknowledged that ‘the 
development of bioenergy have repercussions on food security for reasons closely 
linked to prices and local factors’.24 Moreover, pertaining to resource use, it submitted 
that further development ‘of biofuels will definitely exacerbate the water crisis, and 
access to water could be a limiting factor for the production of feedstock such as corn 
and sugar cane’.25  
With regards to the aggregate effects of this production upon the 2007-2008 
food crisis, however, the EP contended that ‘media reports blaming biofuels for the 
current food crisis are exaggerated as far as the EU is concerned … [but acknowledges 
that] the policy in countries such as the United States of assigning more land for maize 
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growing to produce bioethanol has had a knock-on effect on the price and availability 
of maize and other cereals on the global food market’.26 
 
2.2.2 The Impacts upon Food (in)Security in the European Context 
Although the overall impacts of the food crisis upon European consumers were 
somewhat tempered by the ‘appreciation of the euro … the declining share of 
agricultural raw materials in food production costs compared to energy and labour 
costs…and…the low share of food in the total household expenditure’,27 the effects 
of rising food prices and global market instability were particular felt by the poorest 
members of society.28 Indeed, compounded with the most serious economic crisis in 
decades and reduced purchasing power for the average household, the Commission 
estimated that the 16 per cent of Europeans living below the poverty line in 2008 were 
at greatest risk of being impacted by the extraordinary price volatility that 
characterised staple commodities at the time.29  
Thus, in its impact assessment on the EU’s ‘Food Distribution Programme for 
the Most Deprived Persons of the Community’ the Commission pointed out that 
although the situation was markedly different to that of structural under-nourishment 
and starvation in less developed economies ‘the lack of adequate food [was] still a 
striking aspect of material deprivation’ in the EU.30 To this effect, the programme, 
which has been in operation since 1987, still constitutes a key instrument for meeting 
the EU’s obligation to ensure that the basic human right to food can be meaningfully 
extended to its most deprived citizens.31 However, even it had difficulty responding 
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effectively to the effects of the 2007-2008 crisis, which had seemingly taken European 
policy-makers largely by surprise.32 
In particular, the Commission and other institutions expressed their concern 
over the record low levels of intervention stocks.33 This was partly the result of 
successive CAP reforms that had served to dramatically reduce the level of 
intervention purchasing without changing the framework of the scheme, which 
continued to be based primarily on the distribution of intervention stock.34 Indeed, 
only temporary changes had been made that allowed funds to be directed to market 
purchases, but these proved inadequate to fully cope with the pressures and 
implications of the food crisis.35 The Commission also noted that considering the 
direction of European agricultural policy, past levels of intervention purchasing were 
unlikely to be resumed in the foreseeable future, with the effect that the stocks upon 
which the program depended would continue to remain low.36 Thus, if left unchanged 
the EU’s food distribution program would struggle to keep up with the growing need, 
which saw the scheme expand from serving 13 million people in 15 MSs in 2006, to 
18 million in 20 MSs by 2010.37 
The Commission responded by drastically increasing the share of the program 
budget spent on market purchases in 2008, but was fiercely challenged when it 
attempted to maintain these high levels in the 2009 budget. In that case, an action for 
annulment was brought before the General Court by Germany and supported by 
Sweden (amongst other MSs), which argued that Commission Regulation No 
983/2008 went beyond the scope intended for the food distribution program as 
provided in the so called ‘single CMO regulation’.38 The latter established general 
rules for the common market organisation of agricultural markets and, in particular, 
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Article 27(1) of the regulation specified that market purchases for the scheme were 
only intended ‘where the temporary unavailability of a product exists during 
implementation of the annual plan that that product can be purchased on the market’.39 
However, Germany and other MSs argued that the scheme was entirely determined 
by the levels of intervention stock and did not permit the Commission to circumvent 
these rules by simply substituting intervention stock with market purchases.40 
Ultimately, the Court agreed with these MSs and approved the partial 
annulment of the contested legislation. And, following this ruling, the basis for the 
food distribution scheme was amalgamated and funded under the newly established 
Fund for European Aid to the most Deprived (FEAD) in 2014, to more accurately 
respond to socio-economic impacts of food insecurity and price volatility.41 
In addition to addressing the effects of food insecurity on the individual and 
household levels, EU institutions also reacted to global market instability by calling 
for the use of production measures aimed at boosting food supplies and pushing down 
prices. The EP, for instance, stressed as a matter of urgency the need to facilitate a 
temporary ‘increase in milk quotas in order to stabilise prices on the internal 
market’.42 The Commission duly responded by advising the Council to remove the 
obligation to set aside 10 per cent of arable land for the 2008 harvest, increasing milk 
quotas by 2 per cent and suspending import duties on cereals.43 Although it is difficult 
to quantify the exact impact of these measures, the abolition of set-aside in particular 
was credited by the EP with making a ‘considerable contribution to increasing the 
supply of agricultural commodities’.44  
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2.3 The Rising Challenges to Food Security  
2.3.1 Meeting the Growing Global Demand for Food: The Geo-Political and 
Ecological Challenges  
In addition to recent experiences of market volatility and crisis, it has become 
increasingly clear that food security will need to be provided amidst a growing number 
of converging geo-political and ecological challenges. Consequently, the need to 
address these developments have taken centre stage in European and international 
food security debates and, as already noted, a key such challenge is posed by the major 
increase in global food demand that is expected to arise as a result of demographic 
changes (such as urbanisation) and a rapidly growing global population, stemming 
predominantly (although not exclusively) from increased fertility rates in Africa and 
Asia.45 Indeed, the UN recently revised its data, which suggest that the human 
population is destined to reach almost 10 billion, rather than 9 billion as previously 
indicated, by the year 2050, and 11.2 billion by 2100.46 Based on these projections 
and current consumption trends, the FAO has estimated that the global food demand 
could increase by an additional 70 per cent by 2050,47 while others suggest this figure 
could rise by over 100 per cent before the end of the century.48  
 This is undoubtedly expected to have particular implications for many 
developing and least developed countries where the ‘concentration of population 
growth…will make it harder for those governments to…combat hunger and 
malnutrition…and implement other elements of a sustainable development agenda’.49 
However, population growth alone will not account for the significant increases in 
demand that are projected to occur by 2050. Rather, demand is expected to be 
particularly propelled by greater levels of material wealth in developing countries, 
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where dietary and consumption patterns are already shifting towards higher intakes of 
sugars, dairy and meat products.50  
With regards to resource use, the combination of changing consumer 
preferences and greater affluence is anticipated to create substantial increases in the 
demand for a number of commodities that emanate from some of the most 
environmentally taxing forms of agricultural production.51 For instance, recent studies 
have suggested that the global demand for dairy and meat products could rise by as 
much as 65 and 76 per cent, respectively, by the year 2050.52 This may be contrasted 
with a global population rise of around 30 per cent and an increase of 40 per cent in 
the demand for cereals intended for direct human consumption.53 It is, however, 
critical to stress that the extent to which this growing demand is translated into 
increased production will ultimately depend on a number of factors including 
consumer choices, dietary preferences and the content of agricultural production 
policies, but many commentators nonetheless agree that a corresponding surge in 
output will be necessary according to current projections.54  
 
2.3.2 Physical and Ecological Limitations to Substantially Increasing Global 
Agricultural Output 
In the past, such increases in agricultural output have been based on two 
fundamentally different approaches, namely; extensification and intensification.55 
Thus, while total production on, eg, the African continent has mainly increased 
through the expansion of agricultural land in recent decades  – the massive surges in 
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output that occurred in many developed regions (such as Japan, North America and 
the Europe) following the Second World War, have primarily been accomplished by 
intensifying production on existing land.56 This was, likewise, part and parcel of the 
Green Revolution in the 1960s, which transformed agricultural productivity and 
boosted yields in many part of Asia through the adoption of intensive agricultural 
practices, including mechanisation and the widespread use of chemical pesticides and 
fertilisers.57 Looking to the future, however, both of these options are fraught with 
limitations that could have serious implications for food security and cannot, 
therefore, easily be overlooked. 
In the case of extensification, the most formidable obstacle is perhaps the 
obvious lack of land on which to increase agricultural output. Indeed, in many regions 
of the world – including Europe – much of the land suitable for production has already 
been diverted to this end and whatever is left is often too stony, saline, wet, dry or 
afforested to be of significant agricultural use.58 Moreover, the prospects of bringing 
additional land into production is not only severely limited by competition from other 
human activities (such as urbanisation and infrastructural expansion);59 it is also 
greatly prohibitive considering the unavoidable ecological costs of, eg converting 
forests and other eco-systems into cropland.60 Among these, the risks of exacerbating 
global climate change and biodiversity loss are particularly pertinent, as such 
conversion would certainly result in extra releases of carbon into the atmosphere and 
the propelled loss of biological habitat, respectively.61 This additional warming of the 
Earth’s climate, in particular, could have potentially devastating effects for food 
security, making it a particularly taxing option for meeting the growing global demand 
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for resource-intensive food.62 Moreover, Rockström et al, have warned that further 
agricultural land expansion may ‘seriously … undermine regulatory capacities of the 
Earth system’.63 
The generally appreciated limitations associated with further expansion have 
consequently sparked renewed interest and debate over the possibilities of meeting 
the growing food demand through intensification. In particular, attention has been 
given to maximising yields through so called ‘sustainable intensification’, which 
entails, albeit in an oversimplified manner; ‘producing more food from the same area 
of land while reducing the environmental impact [of such production]’.64 As will be 
further detailed below and in Chapter 3, the sustainable intensification paradigm has 
gained significant traction within the context of European agricultural policy, as 
presenting a possible framework for meeting the limits to land conversion in the 
future. However, it is crucial to stress that although a certain level of intensification 
may be viable in some regions of the world (such as in the case of sub-Saharan Africa 
where agriculture continues to be characterised by low-intensive production) – 
European agriculture is already amongst the most intensive in the world. 65 Indeed, 
considering the exponential rates at which yields have risen in the past century, some 
have questioned the extent to which it is possible to continue to pursue this historically 
upward trajectory of agricultural output.66  
There are also indications that the high levels of yield growth experienced in 
recent decades are slowing down even in some of the world’s most productive regions. 
For instance, Ray et al have recently suggested that yield increases for staple crops 
such as wheat and maize have been reversed in certain European regions in recent 
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years.67 Thus, while crop demand is likely to increase globally, they suggest that 
productivity gains will ‘fail to keep pace with projected demands’.68 Similarly, 
Soussana and Lemaire have stressed that productivity is likely to be further ‘affected 
by climate change in most regions of the world’.69 With regards to Western European 
states, in particular, this could have implications for future food security considering 
that climate variability has been directly linked to yield variability for a number of 
staple crops including wheat.70 
Against the ostensible uncertainties involved with further intensifying 
production, recent academic and political attention has also been devoted to 
considering how non-production-related adaptation may contribute to reducing some 
of the pressures that are increasingly being placed on the ecological resource base. In 
particular, there has been a focus on the demand side and the potential benefits that 
may be derived from behavioural and consumer changes.  For instance, Tilman and 
Clark have recently highlighted the links between dietary choices, environmental 
sustainability and human health.71  They argue that altering global diets and reducing 
the demand for meat protein from ruminants (and other sources of high GHG 
emissions) could significantly mitigate the 80 per cent increase in GHG emissions 
which they expect will stem from food production over the coming decades.72 It 
follows that in the European context, where for example meat consumption is still far 
above the global average,73 alterations in diet could be particularly instrumental in 
reducing the ecological impact of agricultural consumption and production.74  
In the absence of such changes, however, there exist significant technological 
challenges that need to be overcome in order to deliver the efficiency gains necessary 
to ensure that increased output does not take place by putting additional pressures on 
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agricultural and ecological resources. In this light, the sustainable intensification 
paradigm can be seen as highly aspirational as it depends on the development of 
farming methods and management practices, which may not yet exist and, by 
definition, may have to be radically different from conventional ones if further outputs 
are to be attained without comparable externalities. Given the spirit of optimism 
(technological and otherwise) that underpins the sustainable intensification paradigm 
some have therefore cautioned that past ‘agricultural practices that have greatly 
increased global food supply have had inadvertent, detrimental impacts on the 
environment and on ecosystem services, highlighting the need for more sustainable 
agricultural methods’.75 Thus, there remains significant reservation as to the extent to 
which the ‘intensification of crop production on the land already under agriculture 
will be enough to produce the amount of food required and what that will imply in 
terms of soil, crop and water management’.76 
As will be further argued in the following chapter, it is also of critical 
importance to distinguish between projected increases in food demand, such as those 
attributable to the FAO, and the normative claim that agricultural output ‘needs’ to be 
raised in order to feed the growing population.77 Indeed, the former relies on statistical 
data to predict consumption patterns based on current trends and anticipated socio-
economic and demographic developments. In other words, aggregate projections such 
as the possible doubling of the global food demand before the end of the century 
reflect what could happen under specific modelling scenarios, but not what 
necessarily has to happen or how reality will actually play out.  
Thus, as outlined above, a number of options certainly exist for feeding the 
growing human population without having to double food production or to solely rely 
on the prospects of technological progress and solutions, which may or may not 
ultimately be realised. Key amongst these options is the possibility of decisively 
addressing the current and anticipated demand for livestock products, with a view to 
reversing the upward trajectory that is generally expected.78 On the one hand, this 
would require significant reductions in per capita consumption of animal products 
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where such intake is high (for instance in the EU and USA). With regards to many of 
the world’s developing and least developed nations on the other hand, the challenge 
arguably entails ensuring that their path towards greater material wealth and affluence 
does not replicate the historical dietary patterns of the West.  
Such changes could potentially also entail significant long-term benefits for 
public health compared to the default scenario projected by the FAO. For instance, 
Tilman and Clark have argued that in the absence of dietary changes the latter 
trajectory is likely to greatly increase the ‘global incidences of type II diabetes, cancer 
and coronary heart disease’.79 Most importantly, the reduced demand and 
consumption of foods derived from animal products would appear to be absolutely 
crucial to reducing the ecological footprint of agriculture, while at the same time 
freeing up land that could be converted to producing far more calorie-efficient 
commodities to feed the growing population.  
 
2.3.3 Understanding the Current and Projected Changes to the Earth System 
and the Wider Implications for Food Security 
In additional to the demographic and socio-economic changes mentioned above, food 
security is also expected to be affected by a number of fundamental changes to the 
bio-physical, chemical and ecological processes that enable food production and 
cultivation.80 Indeed, as noted in the introductory Chapter, the very nature of 
agricultural activity entails that it is inextricably linked to – and dependent on – the 
functioning of processes that affect phenomena such as climate, biodiversity, 
pollination and carbon sequestration amongst many others. Yet, there exists wide-
spread agreement that the stability of these and the ecological services that they 
provide are increasingly coming under threat as consequences of the anthropocentric 
development that has taken place over the past centuries. Indeed, these changes are 
considered to be so profound that they have given rise to the current geological epoch 
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characterised as the ‘Anthropocene’ and distinguishable from others by the extent of 
human impact on terrestrial systems, especially the climate and the environment.81  
Key to grasping the extent of these impacts has been the evolution of Earth 
sciences and the increased understanding of biophysical and biochemical systems that 
has taken place within these disciplines in recent years. Rockström et al, for instance, 
identify nine planetary systems which, together, affect the entire function of the Earth 
System and thereby the conditions for life itself, as they have been known throughout 
the Holocene period.82 These systems include; ‘the global biogeochemical cycles of 
nitrogen, phosphorus, carbon, and water; the major physical circulation systems of the 
planet (the climate, stratosphere, ocean systems); biophysical features of Earth that 
contribute to the underlying resilience of its self-regulatory capacity (marine and 
terrestrial biodiversity, land systems); and two critical features associated with 
anthropogenic global change (aerosol loading and chemical pollution)’.83  
Within each of these systems, Rockström et al point to the existence of critical 
thresholds beyond which underlying systemic functions risk becoming largely 
unstable and unpredictable.84 Indeed, of the nine overarching systems identified, three 
are considered to be in grave danger of transgressing the boundaries within which they 
have operated throughout the Holocene period. These pertain to the disruption of the 
nitrogen cycle and phosphorous flows (which are counted as a single system by the 
authors); the rate of biodiversity loss; and climate change. Importantly, all three are 
intimately connected with, and affected by, agricultural activity.85 The following 
sections will therefore outline each of these phenomena, before considering the extent 
to which they were reflected in the early discourse of the 2013 CAP reforms and, in 
particular, the Commission’s initial white paper, which served as a political roadmap 
for those reforms.  
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2.3.4 Disruption of Terrestrial Nitrogen and Phosphorous Cycles  
Conventional agricultural systems have been widely defined by the intensive use of 
inputs such as fertilisers and pesticides (both organic and inorganic), which have 
partly underpinned the vast productivity gains that have taken place over the course 
of the last century.86 In addition to high yields, however, they have long-since been 
recognised for their contribution to the pollution of natural waterways through 
eutrophication due to the run-off of surplus fertiliser application,87 as well as their 
risks to public health through the contamination of groundwater, with the latter 
constituting an important source of drinking water within the EU.88 Indeed, this was 
recognised in the Community’s very first Environmental Action Plan (EAP), which 
expressed its concern over the polluting effects of intensive agricultural production 
and the ‘use of certain persistent insecticides… herbicides…and certain fertilisers’ as 
early as 1971.89  
  In particular, such pollution has been linked to the excessive use of nitrogen 
fertilisers, as well as the subsequent mismanagement of waste and slurry,90 both of 
which remain primary sources of diffuse water pollution in the European context.91 In 
response, the EU has implemented a number of environmental directives, several of 
which have had implications for the way in which these inputs are managed, stored 
and applied by agricultural producers. These will be discussed in Chapter 3, but for 
present purposes it may be noted that the Nitrates Directive92, as well as Water 
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Framework Directive (WFD) have added important dimensions to the governance of 
water resources under the CAP.93  
 Notwithstanding these and other effort to curb pollution, as well as the use of 
harmful inputs, the European Environmental Agency (EEA) estimated that about 29 
per cent of European rivers94 had poor or bad ecological status with regards to nitrate 
levels in 2012, while 48 per cent of these were recorded as having moderate ecological 
status.95 Moreover, the Commission estimated that 40 per cent of EU agricultural land 
was vulnerable to nitrate pollution, posing further threat to water resources and human 
health.96 In recent years, however, there has been a growing appreciation of the wider 
impacts that have resulted as a consequence of this use and that extend far beyond 
localised pollution of waterways.97 Indeed, the abrupt changes to lakes and marine 
ecosystems in recent decades have significantly modified global phosphorous and 
nitrogen cycles, with human activities now accounting for the conversion of more 
nitrous oxide ‘from the atmosphere into reactive forms than all of the Earth’s 
terrestrial processes combined’.98  
 Importantly, moreover, Steffen et al have emphasised that the global 
disruptions to these biochemical flows have mainly stemmed from agricultural 
intensification in a limited number of regions, including Europe.99 And, in the case of 
nitrogen (N), Rockström et al have stressed that, ‘although the primary purpose of 
most of this new reactive N is to enhance food production via fertilization, much 
reactive N eventually ends up in the environment—polluting waterways and coastal 
zones, adding to the local and global pollution burden in the atmosphere, and 
accumulating in the biosphere’.100 This could, in turn, have unforeseeable 
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consequences for future food security, considering that nitrogen acts as a slow variable 
by ‘eroding the resilience of several sub-systems of the Earth System’.101  
 
2.3.5 The Impacts of the Loss of Biodiversity 
The accelerated loss of biodiversity that has taken place over the past decades has 
likewise been greatly attributed to agricultural intensification, which has given rise to 
land use changes and farm management practices that have caused both the 
destruction and fragmentation of wildlife habitats across Europe.102 Indeed, the crucial 
role that farmland plays for the provision of such habitats has long since led to the 
CAP being singled out as one of the flagship policies tasked with realising the EU’s 
commitments to halting biodiversity loss.103 However, despite an extensive history of 
ambitious strategies, targets and instruments recognising the existential importance of 
biodiversity, many indicators used to measure this phenomenon continue to show 
worrying signs of decline due to a set of complex pressures stemming largely, though 
not entirely, from agriculture.104  
 This decline has particularly affected species that otherwise depend on 
agricultural landscape features and the active management of farmland for habitat and 
space. And reports indicate that important populations, such as those of wild and 
farmland birds, continue to be negatively affected by agricultural practices despite the 
introduction of cross-compliance measures in 2005,105 which were partly motivated 
for their potential to contribute towards the EU’s biodiversity goals.106 
 However, given the reliance of agriculture on key ecosystem services provided 
by birds and other species, the loss of biodiversity goes beyond merely constituting 
an unfortunate testament to the anthropogenic impacts of modern development. 
Rather, as a general rule, ‘reductions in the number of genes, species and functional 
groups of organisms reduce the efficiency by which whole communities 
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capture…biologically essential resources, produce biomass, decompose and recycle 
biologically essential nutrients’.107 Moreover, persistent levels of biodiversity loss 
have the potential to impact upon the resilience and stability of agricultural systems 
that are relied on for food cultivation.108 Indeed, important ecosystem services such 
as ‘carbon sequestration, nutrient cycling, soil structure and functioning, water 
purification and pollination…rely on biological diversity’ for realising current levels 
of food production and outputs.109 Consequently, as much as 80 per cent of the crops 
grown for human consumption in the EU have been estimated to rely on wild 
pollinators for maintaining current yields.110 It is therefore particularly worrying that 
reports have continued to stress that many pollinating species are not merely in 
decline, as long-since indicated, but that these losses have accelerated despite the 
ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity more than twenty years ago.111  
 In the European context, the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature recently indicated that some bee population have declined by as much as 80 
per cent over the last decade alone.112 Specifically, the report suggested that these 
exacerbated rates of loss have stemmed from the adoption of agricultural management 
and production practices such as the growing trend to move from hay cropping to 
silage production, which is more intense and requires early – rather than – late season 
cropping.113 In addition, the damaging effects that the use of neonicotinoid 
insecticides have had on a number of native bee species have recently been 
documented114 and similar declines have been recorded pertaining to other pollinators 
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such as farmland butterflies.115 Indeed, this prompted the EU to take legal action in 
2013 by restricting the use of certain neonicotinoids, against significant opposition 
from farm interest groups.116 
 On the political level, this decline has been the cause of both wide-spread 
criticism and political failure, as the EU was unable to meet its own biodiversity 
targets for the year 2010.117 According to the Commission itself, this failure was 
clearly reflected in assessments indicating that ‘only 17 per cent of habitats and 11 
per cent of species of key ecosystems protected under EU legislation [were] in a 
favourable state’.118 Moreover, with regards to protected Natura 2000 sites, it noted 
that as much as ’40 to 85 per cent of habitats and 40 to 70 per cent species of European 
interest have an unfavourable conservation status’.119 Thus, in its subsequent White 
Paper on the EU’s biodiversity strategy, the Commission pointed out that the alarming 
rate at which biodiversity loss has occurred in recent decades makes it ‘the most 
critical global environmental threat alongside climate change.120  
 With regards to the global implications of reduced biodiversity, Rockström et 
al have stressed that ‘the world cannot sustain the current rate of loss of species 
without resulting in functional collapse’.121 This undoubtedly has specific 
implications for food security, considering the role that genetic diversity plays for the 
functioning of ecological services and processes, as already mentioned with regards 
to pollination and pest control.122 Importantly, a reduction of genetic diversity entails 
that future increases in global food demand will have to be met without the ecological 
resources that have been available to previous generations. As will be elaborated in 
Chapter 3, it therefore follows that meaningful attempts to sustain the basis for 
agricultural production must invariably also strive to protect the various elements of 
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biodiversity, which include the existence of diversity ‘within species (genetic 
diversity), between species (species diversity) and of ecosystems (ecosystem 
diversity)’.123 
 
2.3.6 The Impending Impacts of Climate Change 
Article 1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) defines climate change as ‘a change of climate which is attributed directly 
or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere 
and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time 
periods’. And, as discussed in the introductory Chapter, modern intensive agriculture 
constitutes one of the human activities that has contributed the most, both directly and 
indirectly, to the atmospheric loading of GHGs and the incremental changes to the 
Earth’s climatic patterns that have been brought about as a result.124  
 More specifically, the EU estimates that around ten per cent of its total GHG 
emissions stems from agricultural production and the release of Nitrous Oxide (N2O) 
and Methane (CH4), in particular, both of which have been overwhelmingly linked to 
livestock production and have climate-warming effects that are 310 and 21 times 
higher than Carbon Dioxide (CO2), respectively.
125 However, these figures arguably 
reflect a limited picture as they do not account for externalities associated with the 
production of animal feed and other inputs stemming from outside the EU. As a result, 
some argue that actual GHG emission for agriculture may be considerably higher than 
the official records suggest.126 
 Regardless of the accounting methods employed, it has long-since been clear 
that agricultural productivity stands to be particularly impacted by climatic changes, 
which are projected to have varying regional effects on agriculture across the EU.127 
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In Northern Europe, for instance, an increase in average temperatures and frost-free 
days is expected to extend growing periods and lead to an expansion of suitable 
cropping areas and greater productivity.128 Although these are often upheld as a 
‘positive’ features of climate change, it is important to note that the benefits of rising 
average temperatures are also likely to be constrained by projections of increased 
precipitation and flooding in the aforementioned regions.129 Likewise, the prevalence 
of pests and invasive species are expected to rise in parallel with average temperatures 
in the northern MSs. 
 The immediate outlook is even more troubling with regards to the EU’s 
southern regions where ‘the benefits of projected climate change will be limited, while 
the disadvantages will be prevalent’.130 Indeed, agricultural activity in these regions 
has already been affected by incidences of increased water stress and shortages, soil 
erosion, and more frequent extreme weather events, among others.131 Furthermore, 
current trends suggest that climate change is expected ‘to have a significant impact on 
crop yield potentials in Southern Europe, particularly in relation to water 
availability’.132 Certainly, this also has implications for the ‘increasing challenge of 
water scarcity and its impact on food production’.133 In other low-laying areas (such 
as the Netherlands), on the other hand, the risks of climate change and further sea-
level rise include the inundation of agricultural lands and salinization of otherwise 
productive soils.134 Needless to say, the impacts upon food production in these regions 
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are not likely to be favourable for ensuring long-term food security and are expected 
to further intensify regional disparities within the EU.135 
 Many of these changes are already being observed and experienced. For 
example, the IPCC has recently attributed to climatic variations the reductions in the 
output of grain, cereals and wheat which occurred in Southern Europe from 2003 to 
2010.136  Similarly, the sharp fluctuations in food prices that have been experienced 
in recent years have been regarded, at least in part, as stemming from the uncertainties 
and effects of climate change.137 As noted above, such volatility is expected to 
continue – thereby creating a particular threat to food security for low-income earners 
and households.138 Indeed, the IPCC has noted that ‘all aspects of food security are 
potentially affected by climate change, including food access, utilization, and price 
stability’.139 Moreover, there would appear to be limited ability to rely on the 
cultivation of biofuels to reduce agriculture’s carbon footprint, with the EESC noting 
that ‘the production of second generation biofuels that use wood and straw could 
remove carbon sinks and thus increase CO2 levels’.140 
 Against this background, it is crucial to note that the anthropogenic release of 
GHGs has not only been a historic driving force of climate change, but it is widely 
expected that this impact will continue to increase at the global level.141 Indeed, 
according to the IPCC, GHG emissions rose between the years 2000 to 2010 ‘despite 
a growing number of climate change mitigation polices, which have been 
implemented at various levels of governance’.142 With regards to the extent of these 
impacts, the Panel submitted that ‘the precise levels of climate change sufficient to 
trigger abrupt and irreversible change remain uncertain, but the risk associated with 
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crossing such thresholds increases with rising temperature (medium confidence)’.143 
This may, however, be contrasted with the opinion of Rockström et al, that the 
atmospheric loading of GHGs have already transgressed the thresholds beyond which 
they risk becoming highly unstable and unpredictable.144  
 Undoubtedly, this state of affairs is bound to entail large risks to global and 
regional food security, which is only likely to be exacerbated by the rising demand 
for food and the growing global population.145 What is perhaps most critical to stress 
in the context of the present discussion, however, is that climate change and other 
challenges to food security ‘partly arise because agriculture continues to undermine 
its own sustainability by degrading natural capital, pollinators, soil fertility, 
biodiversity, water and air quality’.146 In other words, the effects of current modes of 
production includes not only food, but also generates significant externalities that 
threaten the integrity of the very processes upon which future food cultivation 
depends, including the required climatic conditions.147 It follows that agriculture has 
a major role to play in not only meeting the world’s growing food demand, but also 
in ensuring that ecological resources are protected for the benefit of long-term food 
security.148 As will be submitted in the next Chapter, the latter reflects the 
intergenerational dimension of food security and hinges upon a duty to safeguard 
agricultural resources for the benefit of both current and future generations.149 
However, the extent to which these obligations are met will largely depend on the 
ambitions of agricultural policies and their ability to transpose this ethical imperative 
into ecologically sustainable production and management practices.  
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2.4 Setting the Tone of the Wider European Debate on Food 
Security  
In addition to the immediate responses to food price volatility outlined above, the 
2007-2008 crises and rising challenges to long-term agricultural productivity also 
sparked a wider debate on food security that had been relatively subdued during the 
preceding years of market over-production.150 Key aspects of this discussion took 
place at the institutional level of the EU and were expressed in numerous policy 
documents, statements and communications aimed at highlighting the strategic 
importance of long-term food security, as well as assessing the role of the CAP in 
pursuing this central objective. The EP was especially vocal and adopted several 
resolutions in the months and years following the crisis in which it clearly recognised 
food security as ‘the central challenge for agriculture not only in the EU but 
globally’.151 In particular, it called on other EU institutions to prioritise ‘immediate 
and continual action to ensure food security for EU citizens and at global levels’.152 
 That said, the Commission did indeed take such immediate action through the 
introduction of market measures in 2008 and 2009.153 However, before setting out its 
own vision for addressing long-term and systematic challenges to food security the 
Commission was keen to invite broader societal input by opening up a public 
consultation that formally initiated the latest CAP reform process in April 2010. As a 
novelty introduced by the Cioloș Commission, this public consultation took place 
online during the course of two months (until 10 June 2010) and sought to ‘give as 
many EU citizens, stakeholders, and think tanks, research institutes and others, as 
possible the opportunity to have their say early on in the reflection process about the 
future of the CAP’.154 In doing so, it covered a number of issues and compiled the 
submission of diverse opinions between the aforementioned groups as they related to 
the role of the CAP and the priorities of the reform process. Pertaining to the latter, 
the three groups largely agreed that a common EU policy was necessary for ensuring 
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food security for European citizens, but expressed wide-ranging views as to what the 
focus and future rational of the CAP should be. For instance, stakeholders such as 
producers were adamant to stress the importance of providing continued support for 
farmers and rural communities in order to ensure the existence of safe and reliable 
food sources.155 On the other hand, think-tanks and NGOs predominantly tended to 
highlight the need to prioritise the provision of public goods as the main rationale for 
future income support, while members of the general public were also inclined to 
stress the importance of ensuring access to – and the production of – high quality 
foods at affordable prices.156  
Respondents were particularly divided on the question of whether the reforms 
should seek to address food security from the point of internal sufficiency (a view 
mainly put forward by members of the general public) or to adopt a broader and more 
outward looking approach, as highlighted by many producers.157 Likewise, the EP 
addressed these points in the weeks and months following the public consultation, 
when it provided further details of its vision for CAP reform and the objectives that 
should underpin agricultural policy over the subsequent programming period and 
beyond. With regards to the internal dimensions of food security, for instance, it 
submitted ‘that a common agricultural policy is more relevant than ever before to 
ensure that the cross-border dimension of food supply…is guaranteed in a properly 
functioning Single Market’.158 However, the EP also stressed that the CAP should 
continue to play an important role at the international level and ‘contribute to meeting 
the increased demand for food globally’.159 Essentially, it underscored that regardless 
of the geopolitical direction of the reform process; the collective need for food 
security, safety and high nutritional contents of agricultural commodities ‘should 
continue to constitute the primary raison d'être for the CAP’.160 
It might be reiterated that these and other statements were not only important 
means of communicating immediate reactions to the global and systemic challenges 
to food security that came to a head in 2007-2008; they ultimately also served to reveal 
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the basic visions for CAP reform that each of the three main institutions would bring 
to the negotiating table once the so called trilogue discussions commenced in earnest. 
This disclosure was particularly welcome with regards to the EP as it engaged in the 
legislative process on an equal footing with the Council for the first time since the 
inception of the CAP in 1962, following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty.161 To this 
end, the publication of the so-called Lyon162 and Dess163 reports were both 
instrumental for laying the strategic positons that the EP could be expected to defend 
vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council in the upcoming negotiations.  
The Lyon report, in particular, provided an important means for indicating to 
the Commission some of the main policy positions that the EP would be defending 
over the following years, as it sought to negotiate the legal substance of existing and 
proposed CAP measures under the post- 2013 framework. A key focus of the report 
pertained to the link between food security and the ‘public goods’ discourse, which 
the EP argued should provide the basis for rationalising and justifying the continued 
relevance of the CAP. For instance, in its resolution of 8 July 2010 it stressed ‘that 
food is the most important public good produced by agriculture [and] … unless 
sustainable (economically, socially and environmentally viable in the long term) 
farming activity continues across the EU, the provision of public goods will be at 
risk’.164 Importantly, moreover, it drew a distinction between so called ‘first 
generation public goods’ with reference to food security and food safety, and ‘second 
generation public goods’, which largely pertained to non-productive outputs such as 
support for ecosystem services and land management practices.165 Indeed, the EP 
explicitly stressed that although the latter category of public goods have gained 
increased importance under the CAP in recent decades, they should be viewed as 
‘complementary to the first-generation goods and should therefore not replace 
them’.166 In other words, objectives such as environmental protection and animal 
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welfare should only be pursued to the extent that they do not affect production or the 
supply of food. 
As will be further elaborated below, this position was especially problematic 
as it indicated from the outset that the EP would be reluctant to support the 
introduction of policy instruments that could affect productivity and farm output. 
Indeed, in its resolution of 13 January 2009 it expressed concern over the prospects 
of introducing additional legal measures aimed at protecting ecological and 
agricultural resources as it feared these could have a ‘dramatic impact by reducing the 
tools available to farmers to maximise yields and may, in effect, lead to a dramatic 
reduction in EU farm output’.167 As will be seen in Chapter 4, this position was largely 
carried forward to the reform negotiations and, as pointed out by Hart, ultimately 
served to juxtapose the issues of productivity and environmental protection of 
agricultural resources in ways that could potentially serve to restrict the greening 
agenda subsequently put forward by the Commission.168  
Key to the current discussion and thesis, moreover, is the misleading 
distinction set by the EP’s rhetoric between the current societal needs for food security 
and the prospective need to preserve the ecological resources, systems and processes 
upon which agricultural production depends. As is extensively argued in Chapter 3, 
long-term and equitable food security requires both dimensions to be pursued, but is 
especially dependant on the latter if future generations are to benefit from the same 
resources as the present one in order to meet their own needs for food security and 
agricultural productivity. In particular, this ‘simplistic’ position served to create a 
false dichotomy between environmental protection and food security, based on the 
premise that the former would undermine the latter by reducing levels of output and 
income.169 Hence, rather than spurring a renewed commitment to the creation of agri-
environmental instruments capable of providing meaningful ecological protections 
and benefits, the experiences of recent food crises had the effect of encouraging 
measures aimed at ensuring or even boosting current levels of production with little 
regard for the long-term implications for food security. 
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Importantly, the EP’s deliberate convolution of the public goods debate and 
its choice to elevate the supply of food as the primary CAP objective also served to 
reveal a continuation of the EU’s long-standing approach to food security; centred 
upon meeting supply-side challenges with increased productivity and the stabilisation 
of food prices through support measures.170 As discussed in Chapter 1, this approach 
closely reflects the CAP Treaty objectives, which place considerable emphasis on 
attaining and maintaining high levels of productivity in order to ensure the supply of 
food for consumers, as well as the income of producers. Likewise, this embedded food 
security paradigm was firmly expressed in the aforementioned resolution ‘on the 
Common Agricultural Policy and Global Food Security’ where the EP specifically 
called ‘for food production to be stepped up in order to keep pace with increasing 
demand’.171 With reference to data from the FAO and projecting that rapidly changing 
consumer habits in emerging economies, increased wealth and population growth, it 
noted that these trends ‘will continue to drive the demand for agricultural goods and 
processed foods’.172 In response to these challenges, the EP submitted that ‘the CAP 
should play a significant role in the EU's foreign affairs and … besides securing the 
EU's food production, the CAP can contribute to meeting the increased demand for 
food globally’.173 
Undoubtedly, these and other EU institutional statements expressed optimism 
over the potential for long-term growth that the rising global food demand were 
expected to entail for European agricultural producers. With regards to struggling 
sectors within the dairy and livestock industries, for instance, the Commission 
anticipated that ample opportunities would avail themselves for EU producers to 
expand and export to new markets as demand for such products was expected to grow 
over the coming decades.174 However, the 2007-2008 food crises had also served to 
highlight a number of major and complex challenges to ensuring food security for a 
rapidly growing human population. In particular, projections of increased climate 
change, loss of biodiversity and other systemic changes to the Earth’s ecology 
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underscored the obstacles to meeting the ensuing demand for resource intensive 
commodities, such as animal products, with the historic modus operandi of 
intensification and increased output.  
In the European context, this raised important questions about the future role 
of the CAP and the extent to which it should be programmed to respond to these 
projections and the growing global demand for food. Consequently, this served to 
bring the issue of sustainability to the fore of the food security debate in a way that 
was unprecedented in previous CAP reforms. Before exploring the substance of the 
Commission’s long-term vision for food security under the CAP, the following 
sections consider some of the main challenges that are expected to affect long-term 
agricultural productivity. 
 
2.5 Meeting the Looming Challenges to Food Security: Outlining 
the Commission’s Initial Vision for CAP Reform 
Against the above discussed political background and impending challenges to food 
security, the inter-institutional legislative process formally began with the publication 
of the Commission’s white paper, The CAP Towards 2020: Meeting the Food, Natural 
Resources and Territorial Challenges of the Future, on 18 November 2010.175 
Bearing in mind the Commission’s role in the legislative process and, in particular, its 
central mandate to make legislative proposals, this communication was undoubtedly 
the most central policy document to be published prior to the unveiling of the legal 
proposals and accompanying impact assessments in 2011. Thus, as in the case of 
previous reforms, the Commission’s Communication did not only serve to outline the 
latter’s own vision for the future CAP – it was also fundamental for setting the basic 
parameters and direction of the inter-institutional negotiations that would 
subsequently determine the legislative outcomes of the 2013 reforms. The following 
subsections therefore outline the main elements of this initial document, before 
considering more closely the link between food security and the central objective to 
pursue sustainable agriculture. 
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2.5.1 Overarching Reform Objectives 
As outlined in the introductory Chapter, and revealed by its title, the communication 
focused on mapping the role of the CAP in meeting the main challenges to food 
production, natural resources and territorial cohesion during the 2013-2020 
programming period and beyond. In doing so, the Commission echoed many of the 
arguments and responses to the impending challenges to food security discussed 
above. For instance, it repeated the EP’s call to strengthen the CAP in order to 
contribute towards global food security and to ensure the supply of food, in 
particular.176 This entailed, according to the Commission, that the ‘environment, 
climate change and innovation should be guiding themes that steer the policy more 
than ever before’.177 Importantly, moreover, the communication sought to incorporate 
some of the main elements of the EU’s 2020 Strategy, including the aim that the CAP 
should contribute towards ‘sustainable, smarter and more inclusive growth for rural 
Europe’.178  
 In order to address these and other challenges, the Commission outlined three 
objectives that were intended to shape the contents of its forthcoming legal proposals, 
as well as the subsequent programming of the CAP framework. These were the goals 
of (i) viable food production; (ii); the sustainable management of natural resources 
and climate action and (iii) balanced territorial development.179 As will be seen, the 
first and second of these objectives (i) and (iii) primarily addressed the socio-
economic challenges to production agriculture in the European context. However, 
notwithstanding their central importance for supporting farmers and other agricultural 
land managers, the underlying aim of this thesis is to explore the role of the CAP in 
meeting the ecological challenges to long-term food security. The focus of the current 
discussion is therefore overwhelmingly on the second objective, and is carried 
forward in subsequent Chapters, which consider the extent to which the CAP 
framework has been able to provide meaningful responses to the imperative of 
ensuring the sustainable management of natural resources and climate action. 
Nonetheless, for the sake of providing a comprehensive overview of the 
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Commission’s reform agenda, each of these objectives are briefly outlined, before 
considering the wider implications of the second objective in Chapter 3. 
 
2.5.2 Viable Food Production 
This objective was largely aimed at maintaining the economic viability of farming, as 
well as ensuring the competitiveness of European agricultural sectors. Thus, in 
response to the anticipated increases in global food demand, in particular, the 
Commission argued that the EU should address these challenges by maintaining ‘its 
productive capacity…while respecting EU commitments in international trade and 
policy coherence for development’.180 With regards to trade, moreover, the 
Commission stressed that increased liberalisation and integration of the global 
economy had created a ‘considerably more competitive environment’, which has 
posed various challenges to the viability of farming structures and sectors in the 
European context.181 In this light, enhanced competiveness was considered to be key 
to placing farmers in a better position to face future market volatility and continued 
consolidation of the global economy.182 
Similar to the EP resolutions outlined above, the Commission contended that 
the ‘long-term competitiveness of the agricultural sector lies in its ability to overcome 
the challenge of climate change and the sustainable use of natural resources whilst at 
the same time being more productive’.183 In other words, while recognising that future 
agricultural activity and productivity are likely to be negatively affected in the absence 
of fundamental transformation of contemporary and intensive agricultural systems, 
the Commission nonetheless unwaveringly maintained that increased levels of 
productivity would be imperative. As already suggested, this position reflected the 
prevailing discourse of the sustainable intensification paradigm and the underlying 
notion that increased agricultural output will be fundamental to meeting future 
demand. 
 In this context, maintaining high levels of productivity was not only 
emphasised in terms of contributing to global food security. Indeed, as outlined above, 
                                                 
180 
Ibid, 4.
 
181
 Ibid. 
182
 Ibid, 5. 
183 
European Commission, Background Note: Commission Communication on the Future of the CAP, 
Memo/10/587 of 18 November 2010 (European Commission, Brussels) 1.
 
- 76 - 
it was seen as especially central to guaranteeing the incomes of the farmers and 
supporting the socio-economic structures of rural communities. Thus, the 
communication emphasised that ‘any significant cut back in European farming 
activity would in turn generate losses in GDP and jobs in linked economic sectors’.184 
As is further discussed in Chapter 4, such considerations were particularly 
instrumental for limiting the scope of the subsequently proposed greening measures, 
which were expressly formulated with a view to having minimal impact on farm 
incomes.185  
 
2.5.3 Balanced Territorial Development 
The third objective aimed at addressing a number of challenges that were outlined 
with regards to social and territorial cohesion between EU MSs. In particular, the 
Commission noted that considerable differences continued to exists between the 
functioning of the CAP in the EU-15 and the thirteen MSs that have joined since 
2004.186 Indeed, as noted in Chapter 1, the direct payments framework was based on 
historical reference periods and incomes in the case of old MSs, following the Mid-
term review in 2003. However, no such past equivalent existed for the newer ones, 
with the result being that a disproportionally large amount of the total Pillar I budget 
was awarded to the former during the 2005-2013 programming period, despite the 
accession of major agricultural producers such as Poland and Romania.  
 Under the leadership of Dacian Cioloș, the Commission contended that these 
inequalities were no longer tenable and argued that the notion of a ‘common’ 
agricultural policy could only be justified by seeking to attain a more acceptable status 
quo.187 One of the main strategic aims of the reforms was, therefore, to make CAP 
support more ‘equitable and balanced between Member States and farmers by 
reducing disparities between Member States’.188 And, with regards to the direct 
payments regime, in particular, this required adaptations relating to ‘redistribution, 
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redesign and better targeting of support’.189 It was thus clear from the outset that 
addressing the structural imbalances of the direct payments regime would be a key 
focus of the 2013 reforms.  
 
2.5.4 The Sustainable Management of Natural Resources and Climate Action 
Most importantly for present purposes, the Commission listed, as one of the primary 
reasons for the CAP 2020 reform, the need ‘to enhance the sustainable management 
of natural resources such as water, air, biodiversity and soil’.190 Indeed, it argued that 
this would be absolutely necessary in order ‘to preserve the food production potential 
on a sustainable basis throughout the EU, so as to guarantee long-term food security 
for European citizens and to contribute to growing world food demand’.191 In addition 
to the supply of food, moreover, the Commission noted that the active management 
of natural resources farmers remained essential in order to ‘maintain the rural 
landscape, to combat biodiversity loss and contributes to mitigate and to adapt to 
climate change’.192 Thus, given the unprecedented projections of increased food 
demand, a central challenge for the CAP over the 2013-2020 programming period 
would be to preserve the ‘capacity to produce quality products in sufficient quantities 
whilst at the same…encouraging sustainable production practices’.193 
 This echoed rhetoric espoused by the Commission in its 2009 Review of the 
EU Strategy for Sustainable Development, which explicitly recognised that in order 
to ‘achieve long-term food security, there is a need for future policies to take into 
account environmental concerns, such as water demand in agriculture, deforestation, 
soil degradation and climate change adaptation needs, employing science-based 
approaches and local indigenous knowledge’.194 Likewise, the EP stressed in its 
resolution of June 2010 that the provision of sustainable food security would be ‘at 
risk’ unless sustainable farming activity continued to be supported and prioritised 
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under the CAP framework.195 And, in 2011 it added that ‘a strong and sustainable 
agricultural sector across the EU and a thriving and sustainable rural environment, 
ensured by a strong CAP, are vital components of meeting the food security 
challenge’.196 As will be further discussed in the following Chapters, this potentially 
involved developing numerous aspects of the CAP framework, although enhanced 
environmental governance was definitely stressed as a key component in this regard. 
In particular, the communication elevated three subsidiary priorities that would be 
emphasised in pursuit of the objective of sustainable agriculture over the 2014-2020 
programming period: 
 
• To guarantee sustainable production practices and secure the 
enhanced provision of environmental public goods as many of the 
public benefits generated through agriculture are not remunerated 
through the normal functioning of markets.  
 
• To foster green growth through innovation which requires adopting 
new  technologies, developing new products, changing production 
processes, and supporting new patterns of demand, notably in the 
context of the emerging bio-economy;  
 
• To pursue climate change mitigation and adaptation actions thus 
enabling agriculture to respond to climate change. Because agriculture 
is particularly vulnerable to the impact of climate change, enabling the 
sector to better adapt to the effects of extreme weather fluctuations, 
can also reduce the negative effects of climate change.197   
 
Although the communication remained silent on the details of the Commission’s 
vision for reform, it did reveal a clear preference to pursue these objectives through 
the introduction of a mandatory greening component to be incorporated within the 
Pillar I direct payments regime. This measure ‘could take the form of simple, 
generalised, non-contractual and annual environmental actions’ and, importantly, 
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could ‘go beyond cross-compliance’.198 In doing so, moreover, the Communication 
clearly re-affirmed that the overall architecture of the CAP should remain the two 
pillar structure, with Pillar I encompassing support delivered to all farmers on an 
annual basis and Pillar II support being directed on a multiannual and contractual basis 
to deliver specific objectives identified in Member State programming.  Indeed, it was 
expressly declared that ‘the separation between the two pillars should bring about 
clarity, each pillar being complementary to the other without overlapping and 
focussing on efficiency’.199 
 The communication concluded by outlining three possible directions for the 
CAP to pursue post-2013; the adjustment, integration and refocusing scenarios. While 
adjustment would have centred largely on the issues of equity and the distribution of 
CAP funds, the integration scenario promised better targeting to ‘allow to address EU 
economic, environmental and social challenges and strengthen the contribution of 
agriculture and rural areas to the objectives of Europe 2020 of smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth’.200 The third option, however, was expected to entail the most ‘far 
reaching reform of the CAP with a strong focus on environmental and climate change 
objectives, while moving away gradually from income support and most market 
measures’.201 In consequence, markedly different policy measures and results could 
be expected under each of the outlined scenarios, with correspondingly varying 
environmental outcomes to be anticipated for the 2014-2020 programming period, 
depending on the preferred option of the Commission.  
 
2.6 Enhancing the CAP’s Environmental Dimensions: A Key 
Priority of the Cioloș Reforms  
Definitely, recent experiences of global market instability and food crises were 
instrumental in lifting the issue of food security to the top of the 2013 CAP reform 
agenda. EU institutions initially responded by taking direct actions to maintain the 
supply of food and lifting existing barriers to production, such as compulsory set-
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aside, in order to counterbalance the steep rises in food prices experienced from 
around 2007.202 In doing so, they demonstrated a continued reliance upon tested 
market mechanisms, aimed primarily at incentivising greater productivity and price 
stabilisation. However, although such responses were successful in providing a degree 
of immediate redress, there was also an increasing appreciation that they would be 
insufficient to address some of the overarching and structural challenges that were 
expected to affect food security in the longer term.  
 The food security debate was further impacted by a growing and diverse body 
of literature aimed at taking stock of the 2007-2008 food crisis, as well as highlighting 
the main risks to future volatility and instability. For instance, as noted in the 
introductory Chapter, a number of high impact reports were published in the aftermath 
of the crisis, which gained notable attention for their attempts at informing public 
policy and driving the general debate relating to food security. These included 
publications such as the Royal Society’s ‘Reaping the Benefits: Science and the 
Sustainable Intensification of Global Agriculture’,203 and the Foresight report ‘The 
Future of Food and Farming: Challenges and Choices for Global Sustainability’,204 
both of which stressed the environmental challenges of delivering food for a rapidly 
growing population with increased demands for resource-intensive foods and 
production practices. Importantly, moreover, they argued that the complex structures 
of the global food system, coupled with the unprecedented rise of climate change, 
amongst other looming factors, required policy-makers to fundamentally revise their 
approach to food security, as well as the role of agricultural systems, production 
methods and management practices.  
 In particular, there was explicit recognition that the historic method of 
boosting production and output would be insufficient for guaranteeing long-term food 
security. And, given the extraordinary externalities associated with intensive farming, 
such a productivity-driven framework would likely exacerbate many of the pressures 
that have already begun to manifest themselves, if based on current trends and 
consumption patterns. The broad consensus at both the scientific and political levels 
was therefore that the sector had a fundamental role to play in transitioning towards 
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sustainable production patterns for the purpose of meeting future needs and demands. 
This was definitely reflected in the guiding communication of 2010 in which the 
Commission explicitly outlined the sustainable management of natural resources and 
climate change as one of three overarching objectives of the Cioloș reforms. Before 
analysing the substantive and legal outcomes that were finalised in 2013, as well as 
the extent to which they correspond to the underlying objective of ‘sustainability’, the 
following Chapter therefore considers the concept of sustainable agriculture more 
closely.   
 
- 82 - 
Chapter 3  
Sustainable Agriculture: The Impacts and Limitations of 
the Current Development Paradigm 
3.1 Introduction  
Given the preceding discussion, it is clear that significant steps need to be taken to 
address the complex challenges that threaten to undermine agricultural productivity 
and future food security. As already pointed out, these changes have been caused by 
various drivers associated with human development and industrialisation, but the 
situation has undoubtedly been further compounded by the sheer environmental 
impact of modern agriculture. However, the externalities of agriculture are no longer 
limited to bringing about societal instability and collapse, as was the case in pre-
industrial times. Rather, as already suggested, there is ample reason to believe that the 
pervasive effects of ‘conventional’ agriculture have been extended to include the 
disruption of the very ecological systems and processes that have hitherto allowed 
agriculture to flourish.1 There has then, perhaps, never been more pressing reason to 
ensure the sustainability of agricultural systems and to consider the role of farming in 
preserving the ecological resource base that current and future generations depend on 
for food security.2 
 In the European context, the need to pursue sustainable agriculture was 
definitively acknowledged in the Community’s fifth environmental action programme 
(EAP), which stressed that the CAP should strike a more sustainable balance between 
agricultural activity and the natural resources of the environment.3 More importantly, 
the EAP also provided a decisive endorsement of the sustainable development 
paradigm, which has been central to defining the environmental scope of CAP policies 
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and objectives ever since.4 Yet, more than two decades after the adoption of 
sustainable development as the guiding growth paradigm – the ecological effects of 
agriculture remain significant, while reductions of its externalities continue to be 
incrementally integrated and pursued by the EU.5 In other words, although certain 
advancements have undoubtedly been made towards improving and expanding the 
CAP’s environmental framework, the practical outcomes would appear to fall 
considerably short of attaining the objective of sustainable agriculture. Consequently, 
many aspects of European agriculture continue to produce unsustainable outcomes, 
by way of their negative effects on natural ecosystems and the services provided by 
the latter.6 And, in 2010 the EEA concluded that ‘despite agricultural mitigation 
measures and steadily increasing organic farming…agriculture still exerts 
considerable pressure on the environment’.7  
 This Chapter traces the normative impact of the Sustainable Development 
paradigm and the role that it has played in framing the objective of sustainable 
agriculture and the process of Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) that has been 
pursued to this end. The importance of this normative framework cannot easily be 
overstated, as it has been fundamental in formulating both the teleological objectives 
of European agricultural policy, as well as the substance of agri-environmental 
measures aimed specifically at meeting these objectives. Indeed, as already intimated, 
the need to advance the overarching goal of sustainable development featured as a 
core justification for further EPI under the 2013 reforms and, as such, has continued 
to play a prominent role in defining the CAP’s environmental contents.8 It follows 
that in order to answer the main research questions and analyse the extent to which 
the 2013 reforms may contribute towards the central objective of sustainable 
agriculture, it is imperative to first consider the conceptual parameters of this objective 
within the context of the current development paradigm. 
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 The discussion is divided into two main parts. The first of these explores the 
objective of sustainable agriculture and its crucial role for ensuring food security in 
light of the growing global food demand and the highlighted risks to future 
productivity. In particular, it critically analyses how the sustainable development 
paradigm has impacted upon the policy formulation of sustainable agriculture and 
considers the centrality of the integration principle for implementing this objective.  
 The second part focuses on the process of EPI that has taken place under the 
CAP over the past decades and, which has provided the basic imperative to develop 
the policy’s environmental framework as a part of each successive reform. The aim 
of this discussion is to provide a detailed account of the agri-environmental legal 
architecture that was in place with respect to each of the two CAP pillars prior to the 
2013 reforms. In doing so, it considers the main measures that have been adopted as 
a result of EPI and also seeks to contextualise this ‘greening’ process as one of the 
key expressions of the EU’s sustainable development paradigm in the field of 
agriculture.9 Thus, whereas previous Chapters focused on market – and production – 
related measures adopted by the EU in its pursuit of food security, the current 
discussion provides a critical account of the incremental legal developments that have 
determined the CAP’S environmental framework and the potential implications for 
long-term food security. This is of central importance to the overall thesis, as many of 
the legal instruments discussed in connection with the greening of both pillars have 
collectively served to determine the environmental standards to which agricultural 
producers adhere and which directly determine the environmental outcomes of the 
policy.  
  
3.2 The Ecological and Perpetual Dimensions of Food Security: The 
Case for Sustainable Agriculture 
An extensive and diverse body of literature exists on the topic of ‘sustainable 
agriculture’ and an overview of the debate reveals that a multitude of actors, 
stakeholders and experts have contributed to it in various ways.10  With specific regard 
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to academic contributions, researchers have considered the issue from a wide range 
of disciplinary and inter-disciplinary perspectives.  Thus, commentary may be found 
in, for example, the fields of agro-ecology,11 environmental sciences more generally12 
and development studies13 to name but a few, with each discipline often employing its 
own methodological and epistemological approaches. And, although this has 
undoubtedly allowed the debate to flourish, it has also militated against any unified 
definition of ‘sustainable agriculture’ and arguably ‘rendered the discussion and 
implementation of this idea extremely difficult’.14   
 Notwithstanding the diverse landscape of academic commentary, a core 
presumption of this thesis is that long-term food security is absolutely tied to – and 
dependent on – sustainable agriculture.15 In this light, sustainable agriculture may be 
viewed as an operational concept, linking food security to the normative principle of 
sustainability. To explore and develop this position it is therefore necessary to briefly 
consider what constitutes sustainable agriculture and how the proposed understanding 
differs from other approaches? In answering this question, however, it must be 
stressed that the aim is not to prescribe or describe any particular form – or type – of 
agriculture as sustainable or otherwise. Rather, the intention is to tentatively outline 
the conceptual elements of sustainable agriculture, as they relate to food security in 
the present context. The discussion will then consider the central role that the 
sustainable development paradigm has played in framing this CAP objective and the 
legal measures that have been introduced in response to this imperative. 
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3.2.1 Sustaining the Ecological Resource Base for Present and Future 
Generations: The Basic Premise for long-term and Equitable Food Security  
In contrast with approaches of the recent past, which have mainly focused on 
addressing the production, supply and pricing-related aspects of food security in 
market-based economies, the suggestion here is that future challenges require a far 
more purposive and ecologically grounded approach than has hitherto been the case. 
In particular, given the potential gravity of these challenges it is argued that there is 
an urgent need to rethink and reformulate the conceptual link between food security 
and the environment.16 Indeed, if the primary purpose of agriculture is to provide food, 
and thereby food security, then the latter is, by definition, fundamentally dependent 
on the ecological services and functions that make agriculture and food cultivation 
possible in the first place. Seen in this light, it becomes almost impossible to separate 
long-term food security from the permanent wellbeing and protection of these 
resources. Thus, it is suggested that the most elementary tenet of sustainable 
agriculture relates to the protection and preservation of agricultural resources, 
reflecting the sheer necessity for humans to live within the ecological boundaries that 
support their very existence.17 
 This point is also intimately linked to the fundamental notion that long-term 
food security must be guaranteed and secured for an indefinite future. The latter can 
be said to reflect the perpetual or teleological dimension of food security and is based 
on the understanding that genuine attempts to attain equitable food security must 
include the protection of agricultural resources for the benefit of future life and 
generations.18 Indeed, in its seminal Communication on European agricultural policy, 
Direction towards Sustainable Agriculture, the Commission envisioned that 
‘sustainable agriculture would call for a management of natural resources in a way 
which ensures that the benefits are also available in the future’.19 Thus, sustainable 
agriculture can be said to be grounded in perspectives of intergenerational equity 
aimed at sustaining the integrity of ecological systems and processes that enable food 
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production.20 In other words, ensuring that food is steadily produced and supplied for 
current generations does not amount to food security if, in the process, the prospects 
of production are reduced for future ones. Indeed, as articulated in the EU’s fifth EAP, 
the link between sustainability and food security can be summarised by the simple 
admonition: ‘Don’t eat the seed corn that is needed to sow next year’s crop’.21  
 Failure to adhere to this imperative would reflect a conscious choice to secure 
access to food in the short run, at the potential risk of food (in)security in the long 
term.22 Consequently, it is suggested that the latter would be both unsustainable and 
incompatible with the teleological and inter-generational dimensions of food security 
highlighted throughout the current discussion. Moreover, it raises serious questions 
about the moral and legal duties owed to future generations as the continued 
destruction of natural resources deliberately ‘robs [them] of genetic material with 
which to improve crop varieties, to make them less vulnerable to weather stress, pest 
attacks and disease’.23  Indeed, given the historical context it is particularly pertinent 
to stress the temporal aspects of agricultural production since there is often a ‘delay 
between emission, deposition and environmental effect’.24  
 Take once again the situation in post WWII Europe where food was in short 
supply and the only thing that arguably mattered was to produce it by whatever means 
possible. This may have been a necessary position considering the dire needs that 
existed at the time. It was by all accounts also successful in eventually supplying 
Europeans with a constant flow of agricultural commodities, but in hindsight it has 
done so at immeasurable cost to the environment.25 The consequences of 
intensification have already been discussed, but the main point here is that 
conventional approaches to agriculture have often marginalised the importance of 
ecological systems and services within the food security matrix. In the process, 
agriculture has contributed to extensive environmental damage of the very foundation 
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of food production, which can hardly be seen as ensuring food security on a lasting 
basis.  
 Technological advancements during the past century have also resulted in 
agriculture becoming increasingly intrusive vis-à-vis nature, while simultaneously 
detaching itself more and more from its underpinning ecological processes. For 
instance, mechanisation and drainage technology has allowed large-scale conversions 
of wetlands and moorland into arable land.26 At the same time, the increased use of 
synthetic fertilizers and chemical pesticides has enabled cultivation on otherwise poor 
and unstable soils in many parts of Europe.27 In essence, such practices have 
continuously served to multiply yields, but have also changed the way in which food 
cultivation is negotiated with nature.28  
 In this context it is also difficult to overlook the heavy dependence on fossil 
fuels and other non-renewable resources that underpin many aspects of conventional 
agriculture. Indeed, as already seen, fossil fuels have played a central role along the 
entire food chain and been decisive for maintaining the high levels of outputs that 
Europeans have grown accustomed to and, which have served to feed an even-
increasing global population.29 However, it is submitted that the very idea of using 
non-renewable resources for short-term gains would appear contrary to the notions of 
long-term food security and sustainable agriculture, highlighted herein. Not only does 
their use create a host of environmental challenges for future agricultural productivity, 
but the fact that they cannot be replenished at their rate of extraction means that they 
will not even be available for future generations, which should be sufficient to limit 
their current use.30 As pointed out by Godfray et al, this stands in direct contrast to 
the principle of sustainability, which ‘implies the use of resources at rates that do not 
                                                 
26
 For a comprehensive overview see, B. Jack, Agriculture and EU Environmental Law, (Ashgate, 
Farnham, 2009). 
27
 B. T. van Zanten et al, ‘European Agricultural Landscapes, Common Agricultural Policy and 
Ecosystem Services: A Review’, (2014) 32 Agronomy for Sustainable Development 309, 310.  
28
 With regards to livestock, see, European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament on the implementation of Council Directive 91/676/EEC concerning the 
protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources based on Member 
State reports for the period 2008–2011 COM (2013) 683 final, 3. 
29
 C. Fowler and P. Mooney, Shattering: Food Politics and the Loss of Genetic Diversity (University 
of Arizona Press, 1990) 46-47. 
30
 R. Plate, Human Security and Resource Scarcity, in A. K. Lautensach, S. W. Lautensach (eds) 
Human Security in World Affairs: Problems and Opportunities, (Caesarpress, 2013) 201 – 225, 204. 
- 89 - 
exceed the capacity of the Earth to replace them’.31 Moreover, they unequivocally 
recognised that even against the backdrop of a growing global population 
‘dependency on non-renewable inputs are [by definition] unsustainable’.32  
 
3.2.2 The Long Road Ahead 
This reveals another central argument of the current discussion, namely that despite 
institutional claims and environmental ambitions – sustainable agriculture still 
remains a distant goal. Thus, although the literature on sustainable agriculture 
represents a diverse range of inputs and opinions, there would appear to be mounting 
agreement that European agriculture still has a long way to go before it can assert 
itself as being sustainable. For instance, Godfray et al have proposed that ‘a rapid 
transition to sustainable agriculture is essential’,33 suggesting current approaches may 
be largely unsustainable. Similar to what has been argued above, they have also 
submitted that the future requires a different approach to agriculture, ‘one that is 
capable of feeding humans but which does not damage biodiversity and ecosystem 
services upon which it ultimately depends’.34 Indeed, the Commission has 
acknowledged that in the global context '60 percent of the world’s ecosystems that 
produce food are under threat'.35 And, consequently, it has conceded that meeting 
world food demand based on current production methods is likely to undermine any 
positive results achieved with regards to the ‘sustainable’ management of natural 
resources and environmental preservation in recent years.36 Undoubtedly, then, the 
challenge to reduce the externalities of agriculture cannot be underestimated ‘because 
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in the long run, sustainable production requires it’.37 The pressing question is how to 
achieve this identified goal?  
 Considering the many uncertainties that face modern food production, it would 
perhaps not be too far-fetched to suggest that an appropriate response would be to 
safeguard and sustain the ecological foundation of agriculture. Failing to do so could 
entail that the possibilities of future generations to feed themselves may be reduced 
or threatened. However, taking such steps to safeguard environmental resources may 
also have direct consequences for present generations, as it could require taking land 
out of production, possibly causing the loss or adaptation of livelihoods, reduced 
output of primary products and higher commodity prices, to name a few possible 
outcomes. These sometimes conflicting dilemmas reveal some of the complex socio-
economic dynamics of agriculture and food production, as well as the competing 
interest and priorities that must be taken into account for the purpose of devising 
balanced and coherent agricultural policies. Likewise, they highlight the many 
difficulties that arise with regards to taking political and legal action at the EU level.  
 In practice, responding to these challenges may require a multitude of 
strategies and although there is general agreement with the proposition that 
approaches to sustainable agriculture should be ‘flexible and not prescribe a 
concretely defined set of technologies, practices or policies’,38 it is necessary to 
emphasise one major caveat in relation to the arguments submitted here; namely that 
these technologies, practices and policies must nonetheless be informed and 
underpinned by a moral and legal imperative to safeguard ecological resources for the 
benefit of food security for current and future generations.39 In other words, they must 
adhere to the fundamental principle of ecological sustainability, which has been 
described by Kim et al as a ‘Grundnorm’ of international environmental law that has 
the critical function of guiding the formation of law and governance.40 It follows that 
although sustainable agriculture is not envisioned along particular lines, such 
conceptual and practical flexibility must arguably be limited and shaped within the 
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bounds of what is ecologically viable and sustainable.41 As is further elaborated in the 
latter part of this Chapter, this would require an ecocentric focus that has thus far been 
lacking under the current development paradigm, which continues to endorse 
anthropocentric growth models and to emphasise the socio-economic dimensions of 
farming and food security. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to first explore 
the main elements of sustainable development and the impacts that they have had for 
the formulation of sustainable agriculture as the focal CAP objective tasked with 
striking a balance between production and environmental protection. 
 
3.2.3 Framing the Objective of Sustainable Agriculture under the Current 
Development Paradigm 
When EU institutions refer to sustainable agriculture, it is important to note the 
context in which the on-going ‘sustainability’ paradigm is anchored, namely that of 
sustainable development. Over the years, sustainable development goals have 
permeated most, if not all, fields of EU policy-making and the CAP has been no 
exception.42  The background leading up to the publication of the Bruntland report43 
and the EU’s subsequent endorsement of its formulation of sustainable development 
are well known.44  Yet, there has been limited debate about its wider implications for 
how the objective of sustainable agriculture has been adopted and pursued at EU 
level.45 This is of some potential significance, as the way in which this goal is 
formulated is likely to impact upon how legal instruments aimed at providing agri-
environmental pubic goods are designed and targeted under the CAP. Indeed, 
considering its geographical scope and coverage, environmental policy measures have 
                                                 
41
 H. C. J. Godfray et al (n31) 814. 
42
 For and overview of local and regional sustainable development plans, see, Research Institute for 
Managing Sustainability, Contributions of the Regional and Local Authorities to Sustainable 
Development Strategies (European Union, Brussels, 2009). 
43
Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (n 23). 
44
 The main definition of sustainable development being: ‘Development that meets the needs of the 
present, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’.  
45
 For recent contributions to the debate, see, T. Kaphengst, Towards a Defintion of Global 
Sustainable Land Use? A Discussion on Theory, Concepts and Implications for Governance, 
Discussion Paper (Global Lands, 2014); A. Buckwell et al, Sustainable Intensification of European 
Agriculture, (RISE Foundation, Brussels, 2013). 
- 92 - 
the potential to impact considerably on the land management and production practices 
of farmers across Europe (and beyond).46  
As already noted, the EU’s preoccupation with sustainable agriculture is often 
traced back to the 5th EAP of 1993, which attempted to lay down a road map towards 
more ‘sustainable’ development and singled out agriculture as a main source of 
environmental degradation and one of the sectors most in need of reform.47 As will be 
further detailed below, these changes have largely taken place since the 1980s through 
EPI, which requires that environmental protection be integrated ‘into the definition 
and implementation of the Union policies and activities, in particular with a view to 
promoting sustainable development’.48 Moreover, the EU’s first major sustainable 
development strategy, the so called Göteborg Strategy of 2001, stressed that the 
environmental integration plans of the various sectoral policies (including the CAP) 
‘should be consistent with the specific objectives of EU sustainable development 
strategy’.49  
It follows that the CAP, being one of the EU’s most important and long-
standing policies, has slowly come under pressure to contribute towards the goal of 
sustainable development by addressing the negative environmental costs of 
production agriculture.50 A key policy response to this imperative has been the 
formulation of sustainable agriculture, as the main CAP objective tasked with creating 
‘the desired relationship between agriculture and the environment’.51 Indeed, the 
Commission has clearly emphasised that the underlying notion of ‘sustainability’ in 
this context is directly linked to that of sustainable development.52 Accordingly, the 
objective of sustainable agriculture under the CAP framework has been described as 
being aimed at preserving ‘the overall balance and value of the natural capital stock 
and a redefinition of short, medium and long-term considerations to reflect real socio-
economic costs and benefits of consumption and conservation’.53  
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This position also reflects one of the core conceptual features of the 
sustainable development paradigm, namely the notion that the social, economic and 
environmental challenges of contemporary society may be balanced to create 
‘sustainable’ outcomes and continued growth-based development. 54 Consequently, 
one of the central questions surrounding the three-part concept has been how to 
actually carry out this balancing act in environmentally meaningful ways. In legal 
terms, such concerns have partially been addressed by environmental legislation, as 
well as the development and recognition of principles such as the polluter pays 
principle, the principles of prevention, precaution, and inter-generational equity.55 
However, Avilés has pointed out that these principles have been of limited use in 
striking such balances, due, in part, to their inherent contradictions and uncertainty as 
to which considerations that should bear the greatest weight.56 Furthermore, important 
legal and conceptual questions remain as to what constitutes ‘a high level’ of 
environmental protection; the circumstances under which environmental concerns 
ought to outweigh economic and social ones; and how these should be measured and 
prioritised? 
There are few EU policy areas in which these three elements of sustainable 
development appear to be in such potential conflict as under the CAP. Indeed, as 
already seen, Article 39(1) TFEU tasks the EU institutions with realising the socio-
economic objectives of the CAP including; increasing agricultural productivity, 
stabilising markets and ensuring that products reach consumers at reasonable prices, 
while also providing a fair standard of living for the farming community. Importantly, 
the provision makes no mention of environmental aims or considerations, with the 
effect that the fundamental Treaty objectives of the CAP, remain highly committed to 
the economic and social aspects of EU agricultural policy.57 As will be seen below, 
however, these tendencies have definitely been tempered by the integration principle, 
                                                 
54
 See, eg, Council of the European Union, Review of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy: 
Renewed Strategy, 2006 10917/06, 6; S. Baker, ‘Sustainable Development as Symbolic Commitment: 
Declaratory Politics and the Seductive Appeal of Ecological Modernisation in the European Union’ 
(2007) 16(2) Environmental Politics 297, 299. 
55
 Gilroy for instance argues that sustainable development is operationalised through a number of 
sub-principles. See, J. M. Gillroy, ‘Adjudication Norms, Dispute Settlement Regimes and 
International Tribunals: The Status of “Environmental Sustainability” in International Jurisprudence’, 
(2006) 42 (1) Stanford Journal of International Law 1, 2. 
56
  L. A. Avilés, ‘Sustainable Development and the Legal Protection of the Environment in Europe’ 
(2013) 12 (3) Sustainable Development Law and Policy 29, 30.  
57
 Article 39 TFEU.  
- 94 - 
which has been growing feature of EU law since the mid-1980s.58 In order to further 
develop this argument, the following section explore the main legal and normative 
dimensions of sustainable development before considering the process of EPI, which 
has been a primary vehicle for the concrete implementation and transposition of the 
current development paradigm within the context of the CAP framework. 
 
3.3 The Imperative of Sustainable Development: A Driving Force 
behind the Integration of Environmental Objectives into the CAP 
The principle of sustainable development has been one of the most defining features 
of European environmental law and policy since the late 1980s. Following its 
inclusion in the Treaty of Amsterdam, it has asserted its position as a fundamental 
principle of EU law and been ascribed a ‘VIP position’ at the very front of the Treaties, 
by virtue of Article 3 TEU.59 According to subsection (3) of that provision, the internal 
market: 
 
‘shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on 
balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive 
social market economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality 
of the environment’. 
 
In addition to the internal focus of sustainable development, Article 3(5) TEU states 
that the Union shall contribute to nothing less than ‘the sustainable development of 
the earth’, which gives expression to the external dimensions of the objective.60 
Hence, as already intimated, the Treaty basis for sustainable development has played 
a fundamental role in defining both the external and internal polices of the EU, such 
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as the CAP. However, Article 3 does not specify how sustainable development 
objectives relate to such policies, nor does it provide a detailed definition to clarify 
the legal scope of the concept. For these reasons, among others, it is necessary to look 
to additional Treaty provisions, as well as some relevant case law providing guidance 
on how the objective may be transposed into secondary law and policy.  
 In particular, it is necessary to consider Article 11 TFEU, which has been the 
main vehicle for operationalising the general Treaty objective of sustainable 
development set out in Article 3 TFEU. Commonly referred to as the integration 
principle, Article 11 TFEU, gives expression to a general principle of EU law and 
states that:  
 
‘Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the 
definition and implementation of the Community policies and 
activities referred to in Article 3, in particular with a view to promoting 
sustainable development’. 
 
As will be further discussed below, the integration principle was conceived at an early 
point in European environmental policy-making and was formally incorporated into 
EU law in 1985, under Article 130(r) of the Single European Act.61 However, its real 
utility has arguably been propelled by its specific use as a legal mechanism and 
principle aimed at achieving the Treaty objective of sustainable development. Indeed, 
European institutions have often highlighted that the ‘integration of environmental 
protection requirements into other policy areas is regarded as a key means of 
achieving sustainable development’.62 Thus, together with other EU environmental 
principles, such as that of precaution, prevention and the polluter pays,63 the principle 
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of integration has been a main Treaty source of environmental protection for the 
purposes of ‘promoting sustainable development’. 
 Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon has added a further dimension by virtue of 
Article 6(1) TEU, which incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights and thereby 
Article 37 of the Charter.64  This echoes the contents of Article 11 TFEU in the human 
rights context by stipulating that ‘[a] high level of environmental protection and the 
improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of 
the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development’.65 
However, despite the elevated status of environmental protection as a core feature of 
the EU’s sustainable development paradigm, a few issues remain problematic with 
regards to the level of protection that has thus far been (un)attained by way of EPI 
under the CAP and other EU policies.   
 First, it must be stressed that the integration of environmental concerns into 
EU policies does not automatically guarantee environmental protection. This point is 
particularly illustrated by the lack of hierarchy that exists between the integration 
principle and other general principles of EU law.66 In other words, the requirement to 
integrate environmental protection and considerations into EU policies does not 
necessarily take precedence over other legal principles or Treaty objectives.67 Hence, 
the CJEU has held that – with regards to what is now Article 11 TFEU – it ‘does not 
provide that Community environmental policy is to take precedence over other 
Community policies in the event of a conflict between them’.68 However, the Court 
has also clearly explained that environmental policy considerations may nonetheless 
be prioritised and implemented through legal measures that conform to general 
principles of EU law, such as non-discrimination.69  
  In the context of the CAP, this position was elaborated in The Queen (on the 
application of Mark Horvath) v. Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural 
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Affairs.70 The case involved the question of whether England, in implementing the 
SFP and cross-compliance in particular, could impose agri-environmental measures 
that went beyond the corresponding obligations of recipients in other parts of the UK. 
Amongst other things the claimant, Mr. Horvarth, argued that the requirement to 
maintain public rights of way was discriminatory, as it went beyond the minimum 
standards set for farmers by the devolved governments of Northern Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales.71 However, both the Court and the Advocate General (AG) decisively 
rejected the claim and, in so doing, also clarified the scope of the integration principle 
as the basis for implementing legal measures intended to provide the environmental 
framework of EU policies.   
 For instance, AG Trstenjak reiterated the instrumental role of Article 11 TFEU 
for achieving the aims set out in Article 3 TEU (including sustainable development).72 
Not least, given the importance of the integration principle he argued that it ‘cannot 
be ruled out that in certain situations the protection of the environment can take 
precedence over the other aims of the CAP on the basis of that Treaty provision’.73 
Likewise, the CJEU concluded that environmental protection, by virtue of article 11 
TFEU, forms a part of the CAP and that the EU ‘legislature may therefore on the basis 
of Articles 36 EC and 37 EC [now Articles 42 and 43 TFEU], decide to promote 
environmental protection’.74 Furthermore, it added that measures aimed at achieving 
such protection and adopted under the agricultural title, were ‘not restricted to those 
pursuing agricultural objectives’.75  
 These judicial clarifications are important in that they not only underscore that 
environmental concerns must be integrated into EU policies as a matter of law, but 
also that they may take precedence over social and economic considerations in order 
to give effect to the Treaty objectives expressed in Article 3 TEU. However, as already 
indicated, this does not settle the question of hierarchy and whether environmental 
protection should take precedence when such considerations clash with socio-
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economic demands and objectives. Thus, even though there is a requirement to 
integrate environmental concerns into EU policies, this does not guarantee that such 
concerns will take priority in cases where competing social and economic objectives 
may exist or stand in direct conflict with environmental ones.76 This raises serious 
questions about the effectiveness of environmental integration and its ability to ensure 
the level of protection that is needed to secure ecological and agricultural resources 
for the benefit of long-term food security. As will be elaborated in the final part of the 
current chapter, the suggestion is not that environmental considerations should in any 
way take automatic precedence in cases of conflict. Rather, the main argument is that 
despite the conceptual equivalence that has been created by the sustainable 
development paradigm between environmental, social and economic considerations – 
the sobering reality is that ecological conditions provide the foundation for socio-
economic ones and not the other way around.77 
 In connection with the above made points, a central submission of the current 
thesis is that the integration – rather than prioritisation – of environmental concerns 
has been indicative of the limited, or ‘weak’, commitment to ecological sustainability 
that is inherent to the sustainable development paradigm and enshrined in the EU 
Treaties.78 This argument will be further elaborated throughout the chapter, but at 
present it may be noted that although the normative framework of sustainable 
development has provided a basis from which to pursue and formulate environmental 
protection measures, the paradigm remains strongly committed to the growth-driven 
models of development that have accelerated the anthropocentric impacts to the 
Earth’s ecological systems.79 Consequently, EPI has not infrequently been hailed for 
its potential to spur economic growth and provide new ‘green’ market opportunities, 
which has prompted some to question ‘whether the integration process leads to 
[genuine] sustainable development or just to better coordination’.80  
 In this light, the choice to adopt policy integration as the main approach to 
environmental protection must also be placed within the wider context of what was 
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originally the Common Market. Considering that these objectives were largely 
pursued through economic integration from an early point, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that a similar approach was adopted in in the field of environmental policy. For 
instance, it has been suggested that the ‘[h]armonisation of environmental standards 
reflect[ed] the need to avoid green trade barriers and the perception that unregulated 
environmental externalities constituted an unfair source competitive advantage for 
polluting states’.81 Indeed, as is further discussed below, the very purpose of European 
environmental policy prior the Single European Act (SEA) was to contribute towards 
the ‘harmonious development of economic activities and a continuous and balanced 
expansion’.82 One interpretation, therefore, is that the choice to pursue integration 
does not flow from a genuine or principled commitment to environmental protection. 
Instead it may be argued that the integration of environmental objectives and the 
harmonisation of environmental legal standards may largely be seen as stemming 
from a political will to deepen the overall level of economic integration between EEC 
MSs.83  
 Undoubtedly, this is relevant to the way in which environmental policy has 
been pursued and the question of whether integration has been able to address 
agricultural externalities in a meaningful way. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the 
aforementioned criticisms, EPI has played a fundamental role in shaping the CAP 
over the past decades and was arguably of central importance for determining the 
basic structure of the agri-environmental measures proposed by the Commission 
during the course of the Cioloș reforms.84 As will be detailed in Chapters 4, the 
decision to pursue further EPI through the introduction of various ‘greening’ measures 
was by far one of the most contentious and debated issues of the entire negotiation 
process.85 In order to fully assess the substance of the final regulations it is therefore 
imperative to first take account of some of the major political and legal developments 
that paved the way for these outcomes. Against this background, the following 
sections offer a detailed account of EPI under the CAP and the agri-environmental 
framework that was established and developed prior to the 2013 CAP reforms. The 
                                                 
81
 J. Golub, Global Competition and EU Environmental Policy (Taylor and Francis, 2002) 2. 
82
 Article 2 EEC. 
83
 See generally, J. Scott, EU Environmental Law (Longmans, London, 2001). 
84
 See, eg, European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment: Common 
Agricultural Policy Towards 2020 (Impact Assessment), SEC (2011) 1153. 
85
 See Chapter 4. 
- 100 - 
discussion will then focus on the extent to which this framework has contributed 
towards the objective of sustainable agriculture and long-term food security, before 
considering the details of how sustainability was incorporated in the legislative 
proposals that were delivered by the Commission in 2011. 
 
3.4 Environmental Policy Integration under the CAP: (Re)Linking 
Agricultural Policy to the ‘Environment’?  
The notion of environmental – in addition to market - integration can be tentatively 
traced back to the early 1970s when the Community published its very first 
communication on environmental policy.86 Even though this initial document did not 
make specific reference to the terms EPI or greening, it did indeed propose that 
environmental considerations should constitute a primary and integrated aspect of the 
development of economic policies throughout the Community.87 Thus, even at this 
early stage in environmental policy-making, the Community revealed a clear 
preference for the integration principle as a means of reaching its stated objectives.  
 The first environmental Communication also alluded to some of the main 
obstacles to imposing environmental obligations on European farmers. For instance, 
with regards to the prospects of creating instruments aimed at curbing agricultural 
pollution, the Communication stressed that it would be of utmost priority that such 
Community-wide action be ‘allied with a thorough appraisal of ways of offsetting the 
resultant additional costs for agricultural producers’.88 As will be further discussed at 
various points below, this very early enunciation is indicative of the conflicting 
considerations that have faced every subsequent introduction of environmental 
measures under the CAP – namely the question of how to balance the genuine need 
to regulate the environmental impacts of agriculture, while also ensuring that the cost 
of compliance is economically viable for farmers.89 
 The initial Communication was followed by an invitation from the European 
heads of state at the Paris Summit of 1972 for the Community to adopt its first 
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environmental action program (EAP),90 which was delivered the following year in the 
wake of the UN’s Stockholm Declaration.91 The latter constituted one of the first 
major international attempts to coordinate environmental policy and established a 
form of road map aimed at providing nothing less than ‘inspiration and guidelines to 
the governments and peoples of the world’92 in response to an increasing number of 
global environmental problems.93 Indeed, the European institutions would appear to 
have been highly susceptible to the inspirational tone of the Declaration, considering 
that the first EAP mirrored several of the principles contained therein. For instance, 
the EAP incorporated Article 13 of the Declaration, which provided that ‘[s]tates 
should adopt an integrated and coordinated approach to their development planning 
so as to ensure that development is compatible with the need to protect and improve 
the environment’.94  
 With regards to the transposition of these principles, the first piece of 
legislation to expressly mention the link between agricultural activity and the 
environment was Directive 75/268/EEC, also known as the Less Favoured Area 
(LFA) directive.95 It is, however, important to note that despite the explicit 
acknowledgement of this link, the Directive did not ‘represent a break-through in 
terms of integrating environmental objectives into the CAP’.96 Rather, the basic 
framework of the Directive had been negotiated by the UK as part of its accession 
agreement and was exclusively aimed at compensating farmers operating in areas 
where ‘natural handicaps’ prevented the high levels of productivity and output that 
served to maintain farm incomes in other parts of the Community. 97 Thus, any 
positive environmental outcomes must, arguably, be regarded as incidental.  
 Notwithstanding the potential environmental benefits of implementing the 
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LFA directive, little else happened by way of EPI under the CAP until the mid-1980s. 
One major exception, however, stemmed from the obligation to implement Council 
Directive 79/409/EEC, on the protection of wild birds (the Wild Birds Directive) 
throughout the Community.98 As the first piece of conservation legislation, it aimed 
at harmonising the protection of wild birds across the EEC territory and required MSs 
to take a number of steps to this effect. Importantly, it obliged MSs to ‘to preserve, 
maintain or re-establish a sufficient diversity and area of habitats for all the species’99 
of naturally occurring wild birds.100 Moreover, this objective was mainly to be 
pursued through the creation of special protection areas (SPA) in which ‘appropriate 
steps to avoid pollution or deterioration of habitats or any disturbances affecting the 
birds’ had to be taken.101 It followed that the accurate transposition of these objectives 
and, especially, the creation of SPAs, would have to ensure that farming – and land 
use – practices adhered to the conservatory measures prescribed by the EEC 
institutions.102  
 Although the Directive did not specifically mention the role of agriculture, the 
point had been raised in the Community’s first EAP, which formally invited the 
Commission to draw up the first piece of conservation legislation. In particular, it 
noted that the alarming decline in bird populations could lead to the proliferation of 
crop parasites, which, in turn, could induce the increased use of insecticides ‘harmful 
to man and the natural environment.’103 Consequently, the EAP explicitly highlighted 
the vital ecological functions of birds in the context of farming and envisaged that 
their protection would have a positive effect on the environmental resources relied 
upon for food production. In doing so, it also recognised the environmentally 
damaging effects of agriculture, which were becoming increasingly apparent.  
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 Unfortunately, however, the Wild Birds Directive had little immediate effect 
on farming, as EU MSs were very slow to transpose it into national legislation.104 As 
late as 1993 the Commission recognised that ‘inadequate protection of habitats 
[constituted] the most serious problem met in applying Directive 79/409/EEC’.105 
Indeed, it noted that more than a decade past the implementation deadline only 
Denmark appeared to be in, more or less, full compliance with the directive.106 And, 
although it was subsequently complemented by the Habitats Directive,107 the lack of 
proper implementation of the Wild Birds Directive by most MSs entailed that many 
European farmers remained largely unaffected by its obligations until the introduction 
of compulsory cross-compliance in 2005.108  
 In addition to the slow pace of transposition, moreover, environmental 
harmonisation during this period also suffered from the lack of explicit legal 
competences as the basis for such action. Indeed, the EEC Treaty merely referred to 
the need to ensure the ‘harmonious development of economic activities…and a 
continuous and balanced expansion’ but did not mention the environment.109 Thus, 
Community action in this field often relied upon Articles 100 EEC and 235 EEC (now 
Articles 115 and 253 TFEU), which were mainly concerned with the proper 
functioning of the internal market, rather than environmental protection per se. 
Although several important pieces of legislation including the Wild Birds Directive 
were adopted under these two Articles,110 the obvious lack of a Treaty basis arguably 
prevented the Community from pursuing more far-reaching harmonisation. 
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3.4.1 The Single European Act: Getting the Community’s Environmental Act 
Together 
This situation was fundamentally altered by the ratification of the SEA in 1985, 
signalling the official start to European environmental policy.111 It had taken almost 
three decades to muster the political will to amend the Treaty of Rome and provide 
explicit competencies to the Community in the field of environmental protection. The 
outcome was a new title on the environment, which entailed that environmental 
regulation could, from then on, be pursued without the need to justify such action as 
harmonising measures. Importantly, the new title included Article 130(r)(2), which 
essentially codified the previously non-binding integration principle by requiring that 
‘[e]nvironmental protection requirements shall be a component of the Community’s 
other policies’.112  
 However, Sands has insisted that this formulation went beyond the mere 
codification of existing environmental law. Instead, he argues that it ‘established a 
firm legal basis for its future development, in effect bringing the whole of the EC’s 
economic activities within the potential scope of environmental law-making’.113 
Specifically, Article 130(r)(1) provided that EC action relating to the environment 
must have the objective to; (i) preserve, protect and improve the quality of the 
environment; (ii) contribute towards protecting human health and; (iii) to ensure a 
prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources.114 
 With regards to agricultural policy, the extended scope of EC’s environmental 
mandate was certainly echoed by the Commission in a 1985 Green Paper, which not 
only focused on the control of harmful substances in the context of agriculture, but 
also highlighted the need to promote agricultural practices of benefit to the 
environment.115 This growth in environmental awareness also led to the introduction 
of a raft of environmental legislation affecting agricultural practices. One important 
example was the Nitrates Directive, which was itself adopted on the basis of Article 
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130(r).116 Indeed, as already noted in Chapter 1, the legislation was passed in response 
to the environmental, as well as, health risks posed by intensive farming and the heavy 
use of nitrogen fertilisers that had been part and parcel of agricultural intensification. 
In particular, it was hailed for unequivocally introducing the polluter pays principle 
in the field of agriculture, in order to secure the reduction of water pollution caused 
by nitrates from agricultural sources, as well as, the prevention of such pollution.117 
Hence, MSs were required to identify and designate so-called nitrate vulnerable zones 
(NVZ) within their territory.118 Alternatively, MSs could choose to designate their 
entire territory as NVZs, which was the preferred choice of the Netherlands, Denmark, 
and Finland, among others.119 The Directive also required MSs to establish national 
codes of good agricultural practice, but maintained that these would be voluntary for 
farmers to adhere to and therefore beyond the scope of punitive action for non-
compliance.120  
 As in the case of the Wild Birds Directive, however, the Nitrates Directive was 
haunted with problems of implementation and transposition from its adoption. For 
instance, the Commission voiced its concerns at an early point over the difficulties in 
monitoring the progress and outcomes of national implementation due to the very 
limited – and often entirely lacking – data provided by a significant number of MSs 
for monitoring purposes.121 These and other issues have resulted in high volumes of 
litigation over the years and the ECA recently noted that infringement proceedings 
regarding the proper application of the Nitrates Directive, as well as, cases challenging 
the appropriateness of action programs were open against eight MSs as late as in 2013 
– twenty years after its adoption.122 Moreover, the ECA had earlier pointed out that 
the lack of implementation by MSs, as well as ‘the absence of adequate Codes of 
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Good Agricultural Practice for much of Europe’s farmland, create a risk of widespread 
local incompatibility…with the EC Treaty’s polluter pays principle, ie the European 
taxpayer is meeting some costs which should properly be borne by the farmer’.123  
 The Nitrates Directive also included a number of concessions, such as the 
ability to make compensation payments aimed at supporting farmers that incur 
expenses as a consequence of complying with national implementing rules. However, 
despite the potential to cast doubt on the operation of the polluter pays principle, some 
have argued that without them, the establishment of water protection zones ‘would 
have been very difficult’.124 As will be further discussed below, the general 
implementation of the Nitrates Directive was enhanced by the subsequent introduction 
of cross-compliance, but serious shortcomings remain with regards to the outcomes 
of these measures and the actual targets that must be met in order to reduce the harmful 
effects of diffuse nitrate pollution. 
 Notwithstanding the importance of the aforementioned directives that were 
adopted following the ratification of the SEA and aimed at curbing the environmental 
effects of agriculture, environmental integration under the CAP arguably remained 
somewhat limited in character. For instance, Council Regulation 797/85 on improving 
the efficiency of agricultural structures125 authorised MSs ‘to introduce special 
national schemes in environmentally sensitive areas’.126 It also specified that the 
EAGF aid would apply in cases where production was carried out in sensitive areas, 
as long as production was not further intensified ‘and that the stock density and the 
level of intensity of agricultural production [was] compatible with the specific 
environmental needs of the area concerned’.127 Research has pointed out the difficulty 
in estimating the environmental outcomes of such measures due to unreliable and 
limited data collection128 and, in reality, it would appear that potential benefits would 
depend on determinations of stock density and level of intensification not being set to 
high. Either way, payments for these services would be likely to return marginal 
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environmental benefits, as high thresholds may require only minimal effort by the 
farmer and little in the way of real change. 
 Thus, despite the reference to environmental protection, the main aim of 
Council Regulation 797/85 was clearly to address various structural challenges to 
farming, and it furthermore failed to specify the financial arrangements of the 
environmentally focused schemes. Although this shortcoming was partly addressed 
by Council Regulation 1760/87 – by allowing co-financing for such measures – the 
uptake remained restricted to a small number of MSs.129 Against this background, 
Lenschow has pointed out that these structural regulations not only constituted ‘a 
minimal counterweight to the environment unfriendly guarantee section of the CAP 
[but they also] suffered from a northern bias by focusing on side-effects of intensive 
production and neglecting issues such as soil erosion, desertification and forest fires 
which were concerned primarily with southern MSs’.130 Moreover, she argued that 
the failure to genuinely prioritise environmental measures within the CAP framework, 
at the time, could be explained ‘by the firmly institutionalised traditional structure of 
the CAP, preventing the radical reform necessary to remove the policy’s negative 
environmental externalities, and by the limited funds and political support for 
expanding structural adjustment measures targeted at environmental objectives’.131  
 At the same time, public opinion was becoming increasingly critical of the 
CAP’s environmental costs, as well as its default propensity to account for the single 
largest portion of the Community budget.132 Not least, the desire to green the CAP 
was viewed by some as little more than ‘an attempt at repackaging a policy under 
attack into one acceptable to the growing policy community that demanded a say with 
respect to the CAP’s future’.133 Furthermore, Baldock and Lowe have pointed out that 
there was a need to give some ‘substance to the formal commitments made in various 
policy documents to integrate environmental considerations into agricultural 
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policy’.134 The response by Community institutions was to develop the CAP’s agri-
environmental instruments through successive rounds of policy reform, with each of 
these providing novel opportunities to justify continued support to agricultural 
producers based on their central role in delivering the public goods at the heart of the 
CAP’s environmental objectives. 
 
3.4.2 Building the Foundation of the CAP’s Agri-Environmental Framework: 
The Opportunities of Early Reform  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the MacSharry reforms of 1992 were largely aimed at 
reducing the CAPs budgetary burden by restructuring many of the policy’s market 
regimes. In addition to this internal impetus, moreover, the first major overhaul of the 
Community’s agricultural policy was seen as a necessary response to the external 
pressures that had been mounting from international trading partners for several years, 
most notably from the United States.135 To this effect, the main outcome of the reforms 
was to reduce the level of guaranteed price support, while increasing the level of 
producer support in the form of direct and coupled payments.136 
 The reform package was also accompanied by Council Regulation 2078/92 on 
agricultural production methods compatible with the requirements of the protection 
of the environment and the maintenance of the countryside.137 In contrast with the 
structural regulations of the 1980s, however, Regulation 2078/92 made it compulsory 
for MSs to implement agri-environmental plans across their territory for the first time.  
Article 1 of the agri-environmental regulation listed seven objectives that national or 
regional schemes could be designed to achieve.138 These included the reduction of 
agricultural pollution; extensification of arable, sheep and cattle farming; improved 
land use practices; addressing land abandonment; long-term set-aside; improved land 
management for public access and leisure, as well as; training and education for 
farmers involved in certain types of farming. In all cases, except for that of set-aside, 
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enrolment required farmers to commit to the program objectives for a period of 5 
years. In contrast, Article 4 specified that farmers seeking remuneration for setting 
aside land would have to undertake to do so for a period of no less than 20 years. 
Moreover, regulation 2078/92 also improved the financial arrangements for 
supporting agri-environmental measures by committing the Community to cover 50 
percent or 75 percent of the cost, depending on the region in question.139 
 Despite these financial incentives, however, the uptake by farmers remained 
low in several parts of the Community, severely limiting the reach of the agri-
environmental programs.140 With regards to the set-aside objective, for instance, the 
Commission noted that the 20-year obligation to take land out of production served to 
dissuade enrolment where such schemes were offered.141 Furthermore, concerning 
those schemes that were able to attract enrolment by farmers, many questions 
remained about their environmental benefits. In particular, it became apparent that 
considerable differences existed regarding the efforts required by farmers in order to 
fulfil the objectives of individual schemes. Potter, for instance, argued that many 
programs had been defined by broad measures, which allowed farmers to claim 
compensation in return for minimal efforts and without any meaningful consideration 
of the environmental outcomes of such enrolment.142 This stood in sharp contrast to 
the Commission’s claims that the ‘premia should be regarded as compensation for the 
costs of delivering environmental public goods and [could] not be regarded as 
subsidies in an economic sense’.143 
 Notwithstanding such criticism, the EU continued to emphasise Regulation 
2078/92 as constituting an important step towards improving the environmental 
performance of the CAP.144  In real terms, however, the environmental outcome of 
1992 reforms were arguably limited in that, while MSs were required to establish agri-
environmental schemes on the one hand, it remained completely voluntary for farmers 
to enrol and, thereby, subject themselves to the relevant obligations. This prompted 
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some to argue that despite price cuts, the MacSharry reforms and its corresponding 
regulations were nonetheless committed to ‘paying off farmers for any concessions 
on their part’ rather than achieving tangible environmental outcomes.145  
 As already indicated, another important outcome was the introduction of 
compulsory set aside schemes under Council Regulation 1765/92.146 These 
obligations mainly targeted large-scale arable farmers by compensating them for 
setting aside a fixed proportion of their land in an attempt to reduce their level of 
production. However, despite successfully tempering the output of cereals,147 in 
particular, it was relatively apparent that environmental concerns did not figure 
prominently in the design of the schemes. For instance, Jack has noted that the 
implementing regulation allowed for rotational set aside with short duration times, 
which may have had fewer environmental benefits than taking land out of production 
on a long-term basis.148 Moreover, despite being required to ‘apply appropriate 
measures in favour of the environment that correspond to the specific situation in the 
area set aside’,149 he argued that MSs were given too much discretion for this 
obligation to bear meaningful weight.150  
 
3.4.3 Deepening the Level of Environmental Policy Integration and Enforcing 
the Commitment to Sustainable Development 
Starting in 1992, the same year as the MacSharry reforms, the international and 
political impetus to increase the CAP’s environmental dividends was significantly 
propelled by the adoption of the Rio Declaration and the near universal endorsement 
of the sustainable development principle expressed therein.151 As mentioned in the 
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introductory Chapter, the latter placed a direct obligation on contracting parties to 
integrate the objectives of sustainable development at every feasible level of 
governance and area of policy. In the European context such was reflected by the 
inclusion of sustainable development as one of the Union’s overarching objectives 
following the constitutional amendments made by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. 
Moreover, the imperative to integrate environmental considerations within the 
framework of EU policies was decisively formulated by the Council when it met in 
Cardiff the following year.152 In particular, it endorsed the principle that all major 
policy proposals submitted by the European Commission should include a 
comprehensive environmental assessment of their impact.153 It also called for the 
various Council formations to devise their own strategies for pursuing the goals of 
sustainable development and environmental policy integration.154 The Agricultural 
Council, being one of the most important of these formations was requested to initiate 
this process as it engaged in the Agenda 2000 negotiations – the outcome of which 
would determine the CAP framework for the subsequent programming period and 
beyond. 
  Undoubtedly, the Cardiff mandate set in motion a political process that was 
instrumental in translating the EU’s international commitment to sustainable 
development into concrete and strategic policy objectives. This was furthered under 
the banner of Agenda 2000, which broadly sought to adapt Community policies to 
meet a number of external and internal changes, as well as making the necessary 
structural adjustments to accommodate the approaching Eastern accession to the 
Common Market. In this light, the CAP was a particularly important area of reform 
and although the Commission recognised the need to address a number of these 
structural issues, it sought the creation of ‘agri-environmental instruments to support 
a sustainable development of rural areas and respond to society’s increasing demand 
for environmental services’.155  
 Notwithstanding the green rhetoric that accompanied the institutional 
negotiations of Agenda 2000, the legal outcomes pertaining to the CAP may, in many 
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ways, be seen as no more than an extension of the process of market reorientation that 
was initiated during the MacSharry reform.156 For instance, Council Regulation 
1253/99157 further lowered the intervention price for cereals, while Council 
Regulation 1254/99158 aimed to reduce the oversupply of beef by lowering the basic 
price in that sector. Likewise, the extension of milk levies and quotas featured 
prominently, as the need to curb overproduction in this sector remained a central 
challenge to widespread market reform.159 At the same time, the reforms sought to 
expand the framework of direct support, as a continuation of the move from price to 
producer support that was initiated in the early 1990s. Indeed, there was a sustained 
focus on meeting the Community’s obligations to liberalise agricultural trade under 
the WTO agreements, which was similarly the case during the previous reform, as 
discussed in Chapter 1.160 However, despite its main market foci, the Agenda 2000 
reforms also introduced a number of notable changes to the CAP’s environmental 
orientation.  
 For instance, with regard to rural development, Council Regulation 1257/99 
constituted the formal introduction of the CAP’s second Pillar, which consolidated 
several of the previous structural policies, as well as LFA payments161 and support for 
agri-environmental measures aimed at pursuing a broad range of Community 
objectives relating to agriculture and the environment.162 This was in line with prior 
proposals by the Commission to evolve the Community’s rural development policy to 
create a greater ‘balance between agricultural activity, other forms of rural 
development and the conservation of natural resources’.163 Likewise, the Commission 
sought to justify its continued support for LFA measures with reference to their role 
in maintaining threatened agricultural systems in marginal areas where such activity 
would otherwise cease. In particular, it stressed that the agri-environmental measures 
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under the second pillar were envisaged as forming a key part of efforts to preserve 
and protect farm dependent biodiversity in these areas.164 
 In order to meet the objectives of the Community’s rural development policy, 
and in line with the principle of subsidiarity, MSs were allowed considerable 
flexibility in designing their rural development programs (RDPs). This was, in part, 
down to a larger move to decentralise the management of the EAGGF and give the 
MSs an increased role in determining how to spend the contents of their national 
envelopes for Pillar I and Pillar II measures. However, notwithstanding the 
administrative and managerial powers that were extended to national authorities under 
Regulation 1257/1999, Article 43(2) of the same regulation served to limit this 
discretion with regards to agri-environmental measures, by requiring MSs to apply 
them ‘throughout their territories and in accordance with their specific needs’.165 
Thus, without exception, RDPs designed at national or regional level had to include 
agri-environmental schemes as part of the programming offered to farmers on a five-
year contractual basis, starting in the year 2000.166 As a continuation of earlier policy, 
the Community sought to offset some of the costs to MSs by offering to co-finance 
agri-environmental measures at a rate of up to 75 per cent in so-called Objective 1 
areas and 50 per cent elsewhere. 167 However, Article 35 specified that Community 
support would be provided from the Guarantee – rather than Guidance – section of 
the EAGGF, which ultimately served to blur the lines between the funding and 
objectives of the two pillars.168 
 The Agenda 2000 reforms also sought to address the relationship between 
direct payments, under the CAP’s first pillar, and the environmental outcomes of 
subsidised agricultural production. To this effect, Council Regulation (EC) 1259/1999 
(the Horizontal Regulation)169 established common rules for direct support and was 
hailed as an important milestone in EU law-making. This was particularly due to its 
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successful introduction of horizontal principles, which past attempts had ‘failed to 
deliver’.170 Importantly, they allowed MSs to introduce ‘environmental measures they 
consider[ed] to be appropriate in view of the situation of the agricultural land used or 
the production concerned and which reflect the potential environmental effects’.171 
More specifically, Article 3 offered MSs three options for linking such measures to 
direct payments.  
 The first of these allowed MSs to provide support to farmers, in the form of 
direct payments, in return for agri-environmental commitments established on a 
national or regional scale. This option relied on farmers to enrol in agri-environmental 
schemes on a voluntary basis, which was essentially identical to the conditions under 
which such schemes were offered as part of the RDPs under Pillar II. Secondly, MSs 
could opt to forgo the contractual approach and, instead, impose general mandatory 
environmental requirements, applicable to all recipients of direct payments. And, 
thirdly, MSs could choose to impose ‘specific environmental requirements 
constituting a condition for direct payments’. In sum, these three options comprised 
the main effort to green direct payments under Pillar I and were – together with the 
mandatory inclusion of agri-environmental measures under Pillar II – attributed by 
many commentators as signalling ‘the real start to the process of integrating 
environmental objectives into the agricultural policy’.172  
 Notwithstanding the considerable political efforts made by EU institutions – 
particularly the Commission – to bring environmental protection to the fore of the 
Agenda 2000 process, the final agri-environmental measures left much to be desired 
in terms of their expected practical impacts and outcomes. In the case of Pillar I 
payments, the main shortcoming was arguably that the Agenda 2000 reforms had 
failed, once again, to impose a compulsory environmental baseline that farmers would 
have to observe in return for direct payments. Instead, the approach of the Horizontal 
regulation was to allow MSs considerable discretion in determining the type of 
environmental measures that they, themselves, deemed to be appropriate. As one 
commentator put it, ‘[t]he most important omission [was] that Member States [were] 
                                                 
170
 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Council, ‘Partnership for Integration: A Strategy for Integrating Environment into EU 
Policies’, COM (1998) 333 final, 6. 
171
 Article 3 Council Regulation (EC) 1259/1999 (n 169). 
172
 A. Matthews, ‘Greening agricultural payments in the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy’, (2013) 
2(1) Bio-based and Applied Economics 1, 6. 
- 115 - 
free to introduce or not to introduce environmental protection requirements’ under 
Article 3 of the horizontal regulation.173 In cases where such measures were not 
introduced, it followed that there was no means of inducing compliance with 
European environmental law because a mechanism for enforcement – by reducing 
their payments in instances of non-compliance – simply had not been created.174 
However, even in the case of such punitive measures being introduced some 
commentators have been careful to stress that ‘[f]ailure to obtain payments should not 
be a reason for non-compliance with environmental legislation’.175 In other words, a 
loss of payment should not in any way reduce or diminish the basic obligations that 
farmers are required to comply with as a matter of EU law. 
 The continued lack of enforcement was a particularly unfortunate outcome of 
the reforms, considering the unsatisfactory levels of transposition that had so far been 
achieved for a number of directives affecting agricultural land use. As discussed 
above, several key pieces of environmental legislation had consistently failed to be 
fully, or even partially, transposed numerous years past their initial deadlines. 
Consequently, many of the environmentally damaging effects of agricultural land use 
practices had persisted, despite direct Community attempts at regulating such 
practices and their outcomes. For instance, the fifth EAP highlighted that, 
notwithstanding, the Wild Birds Directive and the conventions of Bonn and Bern, ‘the 
pressures on unique or endangered biota and their habitats [were] increasing’.176 
Moreover, it specified that intensified agriculture continued to be ‘one of the most 
important causes of reduction in biological diversity’.177 Thus, unless EU regulators 
took action to induce compliance by farmers, it was highly unlikely that MSs would 
do so voluntarily, after failing to comply with their own obligations of transposition.  
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3.4.4 The Introduction of Mandatory Environmental Standards 
The status quo was considerably altered following the subsequent Mid-Term Review 
(MTR), which for the first time introduced mandatory agri-environmental standards 
that were tied to the receipt of EU funds. This had been largely facilitated by the 
development of the direct payments regime and the successive shift from price support 
to producer support during previous reforms, which ‘provided an important 
opportunity to ensure that farmers fulfilled more specific environmental 
obligations’.178 Thus, although the MTR addressed a number of significant structural 
and market-related issues, as noted in Chapter 1, the introduction of cross-compliance 
under Regulation 1782/2003 was arguably the most significant addition to the CAP’s 
environmental framework at the time.  
 This change had been partly driven by the strong internal impetus to deliver 
greater environmental dividends following the outcomes of Agenda 2000 and its 
failure to impose minimum environmental standards. For instance, the EEA suggested 
that although progress towards internalisation in agriculture had been ‘moving in the 
right direction by reducing environmentally damaging subsidies’, it was nonetheless 
doing so at a markedly slow pace.179 Moreover, it argued that ‘integration with a real 
and large scale effect on the environment has yet still to be realised’.180 This sentiment 
was likewise echoed by the EU in its sixth EAP, which reiterated the centrality of the 
integration principle and proposed that EPI should be deepened as a key aim of the 
next programming period.181  
 A key indication of the Commission’s response was delivered in the seminal 
1999 Communication, Directions Towards Sustainable Agriculture, which envisaged 
that the greening of direct payment through cross-compliance had the potential to 
‘contribute to environmental improvement and sustainable development in 
agriculture’ if well implemented by MSs.182 Not least, these obligations promised to 
be implemented across a substantial proportion of EU agricultural land, given the 
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widespread cover of Pillar I payments. 
 In devising these measures, moreover, the Commission argued that two main 
considerations ought to be taken into account. First, it stressed the need to ensure that 
environmental instruments did not undermine competition by unduly burdening 
recipients of direct payments.183 This was, in its opinion, particularly important 
considering the failure of markets to reward farmers for undertaking environmentally 
beneficial production and management practices that went beyond the legal 
baseline.184 Secondly, the Commission underscored the need to take into account the 
societal demands for environmental protection and the reasonable expectation that the 
polluter pays principle should apply equally to agricultural sectors.185 As will be 
further explored, this point was central to ensuring the CAP’s legitimacy, as it 
continued to consume the largest share of the EU budget. In doing so, moreover, the 
Commission drew a clear distinction between obligations up to a defined baseline of 
good agricultural practice, where the polluter pays principle would fully apply, and 
obligations going beyond such a baseline, in which case the ‘provider gets’ principle 
can more accurately be said to apply.186   
 The Commission’s position was further detailed in its main reform 
Communication, which described the MTR as an opportunity to ensure that the CAP 
‘better meet’ the sustainable development gaols adopted under the Agenda 2000 and 
Göteborg strategies.187 This included taking further steps ‘in the field of environment 
to reinforce compliance, reduce negative pressures of support mechanisms, and 
strengthen the provision of services’.188 Moreover, it stressed the need for animal 
health and welfare concerns to be fully integrated within the CAP, as well as the 
importance of creating greater balance between the two pillars.189  
 With regards to Pillar I, the communication suggested that the full granting of 
direct payments should become ‘conditional on the respect of certain number of 
statutory environmental, food safety and animal health and welfare standards’.190 In 
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particular, the Commission underscored that the focus of these requirements would 
be to support ‘the enforcement of good farming practices defined as encompassing 
mandatory standards’.191 It also provided some preliminary details about the practical 
implementation of the envisioned measures, which would be applied on a ‘whole-
farm’ basis and further require recipients of direct payments to maintain both used 
and un-used agricultural land in ‘good agricultural condition’.192 Failure to observe 
the cross-compliance obligations would result in a reduction of direct payments 
proportional to the breach in question. 
 Pertaining to the rural development framework, the Commission proposed that 
it be consolidated and strengthened by increasing the scope of the accompanying 
measures to better address concerns about (i) food safety and quality; (ii) to help 
farmers to adapt to the introduction of demanding standards, and; (iii) to promote 
animal welfare’.193 With regards to the first of these, the communication 
recommended encouraging farmers to participate in certification schemes and 
producer groups that promote quality assurance or certification schemes as means of 
ensuring safe food standards.194 Secondly, the Commission suggested that financial 
payments be made to assist farmers in meeting ‘demanding standards based on 
Community legislation in the fields of environment, food safety, animal welfare and 
occupational safety standards’.195 Thirdly, the Commission offered the possibility to 
make animal welfare payments that went beyond the mandatory reference level 
applicable to Pillar II agri-environmental payments, by 10 percent.196 This would 
entail an increase in community contributions from 75 percent to 85 percent for so 
called objective one areas, and from 50 percent to 60 percent for other areas.197  
 
3.4.5 The Cross-Compliance Framework 
As already outlined, one the most significant changes to the CAP’s environmental 
framework was the introduction of cross-compliance measures under Regulation 
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1782/2003, which established the rules for the new direct payments regime.198 In 
keeping with the Commission’s initial proposals, the final regulation divided these 
obligations into two distinct groups; statutory management requirements (SMR) and 
requirements to keep land in good agricultural and environmental condition 
(GAEC).199 With regards to the SMRs, Annex III of the regulation specified the 
relevant provisions of Community acts that would be applicable to recipients of direct 
payments in the field of (i) environment; (ii) public, animal and plant health and; (iii) 
animal welfare.200 These included long-standing EU directives, such as the Wild Birds 
Directive;201 the Groundwater Directive;202 the Sewage Sludge Directive;203 the 
Nitrates Directive;204 and the Habitats Directive.205 And, as already noted, horizontal 
enforceability of these acts had previously depended on MSs to transpose their 
objectives into concrete national rules, as is generally the case for the implementation 
of directives.206 By virtue of Article 4(2), however, specific provisions of these acts 
became directly enforceable as part of the new cross-compliance regime, which 
primarily addressed the impact of land use and management practices upon 
biodiversity (wildlife and habitat) and environmental pollution (particularly water 
pollution). 
 The second dimension of cross-compliance was to ‘ensure that all agricultural 
land, especially land which is no longer used for production purposes, is maintained 
in good agricultural and environmental condition’.207 This required MSs to define, at 
national or regional level, minimum requirements for GAEC ’taking into account the 
specific characteristics of the areas concerned, including soil and climatic condition, 
existing farming systems, land use, crop rotation, farming practices, and farm 
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structures’.208 The framework for defining these requirements was set out in Annex 
IV of the regulation and based on four thematic issues covering soil erosion, soil 
organic matter, soil structure, and a minimum level of maintenance.209 Furthermore, 
each of these issues were accompanied by a list of minimum standards that MSs were 
obliged to implement through their own GAECs.  
 First, for the purpose of addressing soil erosion MSs were required to ensure 
minimum soil cover, minimum land management reflecting site-specific conditions 
and the retention of terraces.210 Secondly, they had to safeguard soil organic matter 
levels through appropriate practices by setting standards for crop rotation where 
applicable and arable stub management. Thirdly, the annex specified that standards 
for appropriate machinery use were to be implemented with the aim of maintaining 
soil structure. And fourthly, MSs were required to implement standards pertaining to 
minimum livestock stocking rates, the protection of permanent pasture, retention of 
landscape features and the evasion of encroachment of unwanted vegetation on 
agricultural land, with the aim of ensuring a minimum level of maintenance and 
avoiding the deterioration of habitats. 
 As affirmed by the CJEU in The Queen (on the application of Mark Horvath) 
v. Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, MSs enjoyed 
significant discretion when specifying and implementing requirements for GAECs.211 
Indeed, it may be recalled that in that particular case there was little question by the 
Court that the devolved English administration was well within its remit to require 
recipients of direct payments to maintain public rights of way, as part of their efforts 
to retain landscape features.212 This is an important dimension of cross-compliance, 
as it allowed for the ability to formulate minimum environmental standards that take 
into account conditions on the national or sub-national level. However, as already 
indicated, the real key to cross-compliance was the possibility of sanctioning non-
compliance.213 Thus, Article 6 provided that in cases where non-compliance with 
SMRs and GAECs resulted from actions or omissions that were directly attributable 
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to the farmer, the total amount of direct payments would be ‘reduced or cancelled’.214 
This related to all agricultural land belonging to the holding, including parcels set-
aside.215 Moreover, Article 7(2) detailed that farmers could be subject to reductions 
of between 5 to 15 percent of their direct payment entitlements in cases of negligence 
and repeat negligence, respectively. In cases of intentional non-compliance, Article 
7(3) ensured that the percentage of reduction would ‘not in principle be less than 20 
percent and may go as far as total exclusion from one or several aid schemes and apply 
for one or more calendar years’. As has frequently been the case with CAP regulations, 
these seemingly straightforward provisions required further detailed rules on 
enforcement and monitoring in order to ensure their uniform application across the 
EU. Consequently, much of the detail surrounding the practical implementation of 
cross-compliance was provided in subsequent Commission regulations.216 
 Finally, with regards to Pillar I reform, the MTR introduced changes to the 
rules on set-aside with the intention of ‘reinforcing its environmental benefits under 
the new system of support’.217 In particular, the Commission expected a reduction in 
nitrate surplus to stem from the shift towards rotational set-aside that was pursued 
under the MTR.218 This partly addressed the ECA’s prior criticism of Agenda 2000 
for its failure to ‘address the serious nitrate pollution problems in regions of intensive 
pig and poultry production due to inadequate waste disposals’.219 For instance, it noted 
that the situation had been ‘aggravated by the unsatisfactory application of the 
Community’s Nitrates Directive by Member States’.220 In addition, it may also be 
noted that, Article 56(4) of Regulation 1782/2003 incentivised the cultivation of 
biomass on land under set-aside by allowing MSs to meet up to 50 percent of the costs 
associated with establishing these multiannual crops on set-aside land and energy 
                                                 
214
 This applied to the direct payments listed in Annex I of Council Regulation (EC) 1782/2003 
[2003] OJ L270/1. 
215
 Article 6(2)(b). 
216
 Commission Regulation (EC) No 796/2004 of 21 April 2004 laying down detailed rules for the 
implementation of cross-compliance, modulation and the integrated administration and control 
system provided for in of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for 
direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support 
schemes for farmers [2004] OJ L 141/18. 
217
 Council Regulation (EC) 1782/2003 (n 214) Preamble (32). 
218
 In particular, Article 56(2) provides MSs with the possibility of introducing mandatory rotation 
as a condition for meeting the set-aside requirements. 
219
 European Court of Auditors (n123) 2. 
220
 Ibid. 
- 122 - 
crops accounted for the largest non-food production on set-aside land.221 
 
3.4.6 Expanding the Agri-Environmental Framework under the Second Pillar 
The division of Pillar II into four so called axes added further weight to the MTR and 
expanded the environmental scope of the CAP’s rural development policy by 
dedicating the second of these to ‘improving the environment and the countryside’.222 
Overall, these changes were aligned with those made to Pillar I and aimed amongst 
other things at promoting ‘a more rapid implementation by farmers of demanding 
standards based on Community legislation concerning the environment, public health, 
animal and plant health, animal welfare and occupational safety and the respect of 
those standards by farmers’.223 Furthermore, with regards to rural development, the 
Preamble to Regulation 1698/2005 specified that support for certain land management 
practices was intended to contribute to sustainable development and the preservation 
of the ‘natural environment and landscape’, as well as the protection and improvement 
of natural resources.224 This included addressing key issues such as ‘biodiversity, 
Natura 2000 site management, the protection of water and soil, climate change 
mitigation including the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the reduction of 
ammonia emissions and the sustainable use of pesticides’.225 Thus, as indicated by the 
Commission in its initial Communication, agri-environmental payments were 
expected to ‘continue to play a prominent role in supporting the sustainable 
development of rural areas and in responding to society’s increasing demand for 
environmental services’.226  
 Definitely, the improvement of the agri-environmental framework under Pillar 
II was merely one aspect of the MTR, which pursued numerous other objectives 
within the context of rural development. These were set out in Article 4(1) of 
Regulation 1698/2005 and focused on improving (i) the competitiveness of 
agriculture and forestry; (ii) the environment and the countryside through support for 
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land management and; (iii) the quality of life in rural areas and encouraging 
diversification of economic activity. Each of these three objectives corresponded to a 
so called thematic axis and was further complemented by a fourth methodological axis 
based on the so called ‘Leader’ approach. As already indicated, Article 4(2) required 
MSs to implement the aforementioned objectives along these four axes. However, the 
measures implemented under the second axis are of central interest to the current 
discussion given their aim to improve the environment and the countryside, through 
payments ‘targeting the sustainable use of agricultural land’.227  
 In particular, the addition of the environmental axis was intended to support 
‘the sustainable development of rural areas and [respond] to society’s increasing 
demand for environmental services’.228 Thus, the Preamble to Regulation 1698/2005 
highlighted the need for such payments to ‘encourage farmers and other land 
managers to serve society as a whole by introducing or continuing to apply 
agricultural production methods compatible with the protection and improvement of 
the environment, the landscape and its features, natural resources, the soil and genetic 
diversity’.229 The importance of these objectives were especially underscored by the 
legal requirement for MSs to ring-fence a minimum of 25 per cent of their EAFRD 
entitlements for the funding of axis two measures.230 These were further divided into 
two main categories covering measures targeting the sustainable use of agricultural 
land231 and the sustainable use of forestry land.232 The remainder of this section 
exclusively focuses on the prior of these categories, which listed six measures 
contained in Articles 37-41 of the Rural Development Regulation. 
 The first axis two measure provided for compensatory payments to be made 
to farmers whose land and productivity was affected by (i) natural handicaps or (ii) 
located in mountainous areas.233 This represented an important overhaul and was 
intended to eventually replace the LFA scheme that had been a focal point of the EU’s 
rural development policy since the mid-1970s. In doing so, these changes also 
responded to a number of criticisms that had been levelled against the underlying 
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rational of the LFA framework in the run-up to the MTR. For instance, in 2003 the 
ECA released a scathing report in which it raised serious concerns over the criteria 
used to determine eligibility for LFA payments.234  In particular, it noted that while 
56 percent of the EU’s total utilised agricultural area (UAA) was designated as less 
favourable at the time, the indicators used to determine this classification differed 
widely between individual MSs and were recurrently based on outdated socio-
economic data.235 This not only threatened the equitable implementation of the LFA 
framework throughout the EU,236 but also raised questions about its compatibility with 
WTO rules, which required regional assistance programs to be applied based on 
‘neutral and objective criteria clearly spelled out in law or regulation and indicating 
that the region’s difficulties arise out of more than temporary circumstances’.237 The 
revised formulation under Article 37 was therefore particularly important for ensuring 
that the new payments were eligible for ‘green box’ inclusion, amongst other 
motivations.238  
 With regards to the level of annual payments, moreover, the regulation 
specified that these should reflect ‘additional costs and income forgone related to the 
handicap for agricultural production in the area concerned’.239 In addition, it clearly 
emphasised the centrality of the polluter-pays principle and the need to ensure that 
such payments would only be made in exchange for commitments that went ‘beyond 
the relevant mandatory standards’.240  
 The second axis two measure was covered under Article 38 of the Rural 
Development Regulation sought to provide compensatory payments to farmers 
operating within designated Natura 2000 areas and areas that were subject to river 
basin management programs under the EU’s Water Framework Directive (WFD).241 
Specifically, these payments were to be ‘granted annually and per hectare of UAA to 
farmers in order to compensate for costs incurred and income foregone resulting from 
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disadvantages in the areas concerned related to the implementation of Directives 
79/409/EEC, 92/43/EEC and 2000/60/EC’.242 To ensure no double funding, 
moreover, Commission Regulation 1974/2006 (the main implementing act) added that 
recipients of these compensatory payments were precluded from claiming payments 
under Article 31 of the main Regulation ‘as regards the implementation of Council 
Directives 79/409/EEC and 92/43/EEC’.243 As already noted, Article 31 sought to 
compensate farmers for the cost of complying with EU standards. And, since the latter 
did not preclude environmental standards, it would have been possible for MSs to 
introduce compensatory payments linked to the aforementioned directives under 
Article 31 and, thereby, entail that applicants could essentially be paid twice for 
fulfilling the same compliance measure.  
 The third Axis two measure was detailed in Article 39 and required MSs to 
introduce agri-environmental payments ‘throughout their territories, and in 
accordance with their specific needs’.244 As a general rule these contractual 
commitments were to be undertaken for a period of between five and seven years and 
exclusively covered measures that went beyond the cross-compliance obligations set 
out in Regulation 1782/2003 ‘as well as minimum requirements for fertiliser and plant 
protection product use and other relevant mandatory requirements established by 
national legislation and identified in the programme’.245 With regards to the latter, the 
implementing regulation added that ‘[c]ommitments to limit the use of fertilisers, 
plant protection products or other inputs shall be accepted only if such limitations can 
be assessed in a way that provides reasonable assurance about compliance with those 
commitments’.246 To ensure greater flexibility it also provided for ‘agri-environment 
or animal welfare commitments to be adjusted during the period for which they apply, 
provided that the approved rural development programme includes scope for such 
adjustment and that the adjustment is duly justified having regard to the objectives of 
the commitment’.247 
 The fourth measure set out under axis two covered payments for animal 
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welfare commitments that went beyond the mandatory standards listed in Annex III 
of regulation 1782/2003. These were contained in Article 40 and intended to be made 
up of annual payments requiring commitments of between five and seven years.248 
The implementing regulation provided important details of the type of measure 
covered and specified that all animal welfare commitment formulated pursuant to 
Article 40 of Regulation 1698/2005 were required to provide upgraded standards in 
at least one of six listed areas.249 These included measures aimed at ensuring (a) water 
and feed closer to their natural needs; (b) housing conditions, such as space 
allowances, bedding, natural light; (c) outdoor access; (d) absence of systematic 
mutilations, isolation or permanent tethering; (e) prevention of pathologies mainly 
determined by farming practices or/and keeping conditions.250 
 The fifth, and final agri-environmental measure listen in the main regulation, 
provided for MSs to grant support payments for non-productive investments made by 
farmers. This applied to certain on-farm investment that enhanced ‘the public amenity 
value of a Natura 2000 area or other high nature value areas…defined in the 
programme’.251 Moreover, the implementing regulation specified that these non-
productive investments only covered investments that did ‘not lead to any significant 
increase in the value or profitability of the agricultural…holding’.252 In accordance 
with the wording of Article 41(b) of the main regulation, this restriction was intended 
to ensure that the benefits stemming from such investments were of a public, rather 
than private nature. 
 However, although the aim of axis two payments was essentially to induce 
land management practices capable of providing tangible public goods and 
environmental benefits, it is important to note that measures implemented under the 
CAP’s second pillar continued to depend on the voluntary uptake of farmers. In other 
words, even though MSs were obliged to devote an unprecedented level of resources 
towards the funding and implementation of agri-environmental schemes as part of 
their RDPs, the choice of enrolment and participation remained firmly with the 
individual farmer. Furthermore, it may be reiterated that the funding arrangements for 
Pillar II measures only provided for partial funding from the EU budget, with MSs 
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having to draw the balance from their national funds. It follows that both the 
willingness of farmers to enrol and MSs to commit to developing meaningful and 
effectively targeted agri-environmental measures, varied widely across the EU.253 In 
response, the MTR increased the EU’s contribution to national public expenditure 
associated with the implementation of axis two measures. This included contributions 
of up to 80 percent in regions eligible under the so called convergence objective, and 
55 percent of qualified public expenditure in other regions.254 
 Notwithstanding, the increased budgetary commitments to rural development 
under the MTR, one of the main contentions since the creation of the two pillar system 
regarded the level of funding disparity that continued to exist between Pillar I and 
two. This has of course also had an effect on the level of funding devoted to agri-
environmental measures under the second pillar and was partly addressed by the 
practice of modulation, which was first introduced on a voluntary basis with the aim 
of securing increased funding for rural development under Regulation 1259/1999.255 
However, although there was some expectation that these transfers could play an 
influential role ‘in combating negative externalities in agriculture’, some have argued 
that this optimism was certainly tempered by the requirement of national co-funding, 
as already indicated.256 Consequently, only three MSs ultimately made use of this 
option when it was first offered.257  
 In an effort to strengthen the CAP’s RDPs, compulsory modulation was 
therefore introduced by Regulation 1782/2003, which set out the basic conditions 
under which MSs were required to transfer funding from the first to the second 
pillar.258 The Commission was especially responsible for driving the process and 
viewed these financial transfers ‘as a first step in the necessary reinforcement of rural 
development’.259 Moreover, it underscored the role of these changes in achieving ‘a 
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better balance between policy tools designed to promote sustainable agriculture 
[under Pillar I] and those designed to promote rural development’.260 However, as will 
be further discussed in the following Chapters, the issue of funding continued to affect 
the underlying resources and commitments made by MSs to developing RDPs with 
targeted and well-designed agri-environmental schemes. 
 
3.4.7 The Health Check 
Compared to the significant reforms introduced under the MTR, the 2008 Health 
Check was definitely more modest both in terms of its scope and ambition. Indeed as 
outlined in Chapter 1, it primarily sought to ‘modernise, simplify and streamline the 
CAP and remove restrictions on farmers, thus helping them to respond better to 
signals from the market’.261 In particular, this included further decoupling of direct 
aid to farmers and incorporating such payments into the SFP although, as is seen in 
Chapter 5, some types of coupled support were maintained.262 For present purposes, 
moreover, the reforms included a number of measures that served to improve the 
quality of environmental governance under the CAP. Three of these may be 
highlighted as part the current discussion.  
 First, the Health Check abolished the requirement for farmers to set aside 10 
per cent of their arable land. Indeed, as outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, this was partly 
in response to the volatility experienced on global food markets during 2007-2008 and 
was thus intended to enable farmers to ‘to maximise their production potential’.263 In 
doing so, however, the Preamble to direct payments regulation stressed that the 
abolition of the set-aside requirement ‘could in certain cases have adverse effects on 
the environment, in particular as regards certain landscape features’.264 Thus, the new 
framework attempted to take this into account by reinforcing EU provisions aimed at 
                                                 
260
 Ibid, 15. 
261
 European Commission, Overview of the CAP Health Check and the European Economic 
Recovery Plan Modification of the RDPs, Fact Sheet (European Commission, Brussels, 2009), 2. 
262
 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment: Common 
Agricultural Policy Towards 2020, SEC (2011) 1153, 11. 
263
 European Commission, Agriculture: CAP Health Check will Help Farmers Meet New Challenges, 
Press Release IP/08/1749 of 20 November 2008 (European Commission, Brussels, 2008). 
264
 Council Regulation (EC) 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support 
schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes 
for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, [2009] OJ L30/16, Preamble (5). 
- 129 - 
protecting specified landscape features, as well as allowing MSs to provide for the 
establishment and/or retention of habitats.265  
 Secondly, Regulation 73/2009 introduced changes aimed at adjusting the 
scope of the cross-compliance framework.266 In particular, the Commission’s initial 
reform Communication highlighted the need for simplification of the scheme by 
amending the list of GAECs and SMRs where appropriate, as well as excluding 
elements that were no longer deemed to be directly relevant to the objectives of cross-
compliance measure.267 Moreover, the pressure to address weaknesses of the regime 
were further highlighted in a 2008 report by the ECA, which identified a number of 
issues that threatened to undermine the explicit aim of cross-compliance to contribute 
to ‘sustainable agriculture’.268  
 For instance, the Report criticised the design of the regime on the basis that 
the achievements of cross-compliance were incapable of being precisely monitored 
due to the absence of reliable and comprehensive ‘objectives, performance, indicators 
and baseline levels’.269 Indeed, the ECA found that a number of measures were of 
very limited use and should be viewed as mere formalities, as opposed to conferring 
meaningful obligations upon farmers.270 This was also echoed by the IEEP, which 
noted that the added administrative burdens and cost associated with the introduction 
of cross-compliance resulted in some MSs setting ‘light standard’ as a means of 
reducing the cost of implementation.271 This was further undermined by a weak – and 
in many cases non-existent – system of compliance monitoring, with the ECA noting 
that not a single breach of the Habitats and Wild Birds Directives had been recorded 
by MSs during the between 2005-2008.272 Thus, the report concluded that although 
cross-compliance was an essential part of the CAP framework, it would certainly need 
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to be designed in a clearer and measurable way in order for it to reach its full 
potential.273 
 In light of these and other criticisms, the 2008 reforms introduced a number of 
changes to the system of cross-compliance aimed at making ‘the CAP more 
compatible with the expectations of society at large’.274 For instance, they withdrew 
certain provisions previously enforced under SMR 6, pertaining to the identification 
and registration of animals.275 Moreover, as already indicated, there was some concern 
that certain environmental benefits could be lost as a result of the abolition of 
compulsory set-aside in 2008. The Health Check sought to address this risk by 
introducing an additional GAEC, which required buffer strips to be stablished along 
water courses.276 Further, the focus on water management was strengthened by the 
adoption of a second novel GAEC standard requiring authorisation procedures to be 
established for the use of water for irrigation.277 In addition, the cross-compliance 
regime was complemented by the introduction of a new optional GAEC standard on 
the establishment and/or retention of habitats.278 
 Thirdly, and lastly for present purposes, it may be noted that the Health Check 
sought to promote a broader role for rural development both for the purpose of 
supporting existing EU policies on sustainable water management and biodiversity, 
as well as for meeting future challenges to agriculture, such as climate change.279 In 
practical terms, this direction of travel was partly funded by maintaining the system 
of compulsory progressive reduction of direct payments, ie modulation, established 
under the MTR. Thus, modulation rates were increased to seven per cent in 2009, with 
an additional one per cent being transferred from the direct payments budget on an 
annual basis until 2012.280 Moreover, a further four per cent modulation rate was 
imposed in each of the four years on farmers whose direct payments entitlements were 
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in excess of 300 000 Euros.281 And it may be noted that voluntary modulation had 
also been introduced under Regulation Council Regulation 1782/2007, which allowed 
MS to transfer up to 20 per cent of their direct payments budgets towards funding for 
rural development.282 
 
3.5 Taking Stock of the Strides made prior to the 2013 Reforms 
In addition to expanding the CAP’s environmental framework, EPI has also been 
instrumental for maintaining its legitimacy and political support. Not least, the 
introduction of cross-compliance was intended to make ‘the CAP more compatible 
with the expectations of society at large’.283 Arguably, this should not be easily 
overlooked, as it may be recalled that although the proportion of EU expenditure has 
incrementally declined, it has remained the single largest policy and accounted for 
nearly half of the EU budget in 2010, when the CAP 2020 negotiations were slated to 
begin.284 Thus, in addition to building upon the CAP’s agri-environmental framework, 
EPI has provided a useful mechanism for justifying continued levels of decoupled 
income support earmarked for farmers. In this light Baldock et al have pointed out 
that although it is not the primary role of the CAP to set environmental standards ‘it 
can contribute significantly to their enforcement and the adjustment of the farm sector 
to society’s changing expectations and requirements on the environment’.285  
 However, neither the introduction in 2005, nor the fortification of the cross-
compliance regime under the Health Check, came without considerable criticism over 
its perceived lack of ambition and limited environmental outcomes. With regard to 
the former, for instance, it has already been seen that the SMRs were based on pre-
existing legislation, which essentially meant that a sizable part of the Commission’s 
effort to ‘green’ the CAP rested on compensating farmers to follow the law. This not 
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only appeared illogical from an economic perspective,286 but there were also concerns 
that it could conflict with the polluter pays principle, which clearly required the 
producer to bear the costs of operating in compliance with basic legal obligations. 
Indeed, as pointed out by the ECA, this created considerable overlap between the 
cross-compliance measures and EU directives.287 Moreover, some of the directives 
already, technically, required implementation to be completed, with the relevant 
obligations intended to be imposed upon farmers years before the introduction of 
cross-compliance. To this effect, Söderberg has described cross-compliance primarily 
as an instrument for accelerating compliance and the transposition by MSs of EU 
environmental directives into national law.288 
 The environmental benefits of cross-compliance have also varied 
considerably, depending on the type of farming involved.289 And, a particularly 
challenging aspect of cross-compliance has been how to empirically evaluate the 
outcomes of these policy measures.  This was pointed out by the ECA in 2008, which 
stressed that the achievements of cross-compliance were incapable of being precisely 
monitored due to the absence of reliable and comprehensive ‘objectives, performance, 
indicators and baseline levels’.290 Likewise, Birdlife International and other 
environmental organisations, have noted the difficulties in evaluating policy 
instruments that they consider to be poorly designed and implemented.291 Needless to 
say, this has complicated efforts to measure the practical outcomes of cross-
compliance against the Commission’s initial claims that it was expected to contribute 
towards the development of sustainable agriculture.292  
 Shortcomings were also highlighted pertaining to the outcomes of the rural 
development framework. Indeed, during the 2007-3013 programming period, 
BirdLife International identified two main problems relating to agri-environmental 
measures. First, it concluded that RDPs often suffered from a lack of synergy and 
coordination between the various programs. Not only could such incoherence risk 
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undermining the CAPs environmental objectives, but was also perceived as being 
‘inherently contradictory’.293 For instance, the report found that Axis I measures in 
Latvia and Portugal focused solely on competitiveness, with no consideration of 
environmental objectives. This could have a distorting effect in cases where 
‘modernisation measures fund the destruction of the same [High Nature Value] 
habitats that some Axis 2 measures seek to protect’.294  
 Secondly, the report identified ‘the necessity for a much more rigorous set of 
environmental safeguards’ to ensure that the rural development policy would not run 
contrary to the EU’s biodiversity objectives.295 In particular, it noted that following 
the adoption of the Health Check, these safeguards were mainly applicable to Natura 
2000 management plans under the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive,296 
but that this was not sufficient to offer adequate protection for land beyond the Natura 
2000 networks. Rather, in those cases, RDPs may well have been funding projects, 
such as infrastructure developments, where the lack of environmental safeguards 
made it impossible to estimate their potential impact upon habitats and wildlife. This, 
in turn, entailed that such unassessed programs risked producing environmental 
outcomes that ran contrary to the EU’s own conservation and biodiversity 
strategies.297  
 In addition, other commentators strongly argued that the voluntary nature of 
Pillar II measures did not guarantee long-term or proper protection of the rural areas 
or the natural environment.298 And, of the instruments reviewed under Regulation 
1698/2005, the ECA specifically found agri-environmental measures to be the most 
error-prone, accounting for over one eighth of the observed infringements during the 
previous programming period.299 
                                                 
293
 Birdlife International, Could do Better: How is EU Rural Development Policy Delivering for 
Biodiversity? (BirdLife International, Brussels, 2009) 11. 
294
 Ibid. 
295
 Ibid. 
296
 Ibid, 13. 
297
 Ibid.  
298
 This has for instance been argued by Bugge with regards to the Norwegian example, where such 
protection is largely determined by contractual arrangements between farmers and various authorities. 
See, H. C. Bugge, ‘Vern av verdifulle kulturlandskap: Har vi de rettslige redskapene som trengs? 
Utvalgte kulturlandskap i jordbruket i rettslig lys’, (2013) 1 Utmark: Tidsskrift for utmarksforskning 
1. 
299
 European Court of Auditors, Errors in Rural Development Spending: What are the Causes, and 
how are they being addressed? Special Report No 23 (European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg, 
2014), paragraphs 56-57. 
- 134 - 
 Following the completion of the MTR and Health Check reforms there 
undoubtedly remained a gap between the outcomes of the CAP’s environmental 
framework and the long-term objective to attain sustainable forms of agriculture. 
Indeed, in 2007 the Commission expressed its concern that the EU was not yet fully 
‘on the path towards a genuinely sustainable future’.300 Thus, almost two decades after 
the sustainable development agenda was first prioritised, it was clear that agri-
environmental measures had only had a limited effect on reducing agricultural 
externalities. It would therefore be left to subsequent reforms to continue to address 
these shortcomings.
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Chapter 4 
Delivering and Negotiating the 2013 CAP Reforms: An 
Overview of the Basic Legal Framework 
4.1 Introduction 
Following the initial consultation process and publication of the Commission’s main 
reform Communication, outlined in Chapter 2, the legislative process duly took off in 
October 2011 when the latter unveiled the contents of its legal proposals. The reform 
package included four basic regulations, as well as transitional rules for the year 2014 
and a comprehensive Impact Assessment of the proposed acts, which provided the 
initial point of departure for the inter-institutional negotiations that followed. 
Definitely, a number of contentious issues and diverging positions between EU 
institutions, as well as stakeholders, were exposed during the course of these 
negotiations. These included the expansion and introduction of obligations intended 
to address the impacts of agriculture upon the environment and climate.  
 Ultimately, these differences became focal points of the Cioloș reforms and 
undoubtedly had direct impacts upon the formulation of the final measures agreed in 
June 2013. However, before analysing the specific regulations that resulted from this 
agreement, the current Chapter provides an overview of the proposed legal 
framework, as well as the political negotiations that served to shape the substantive 
outcomes of the reform. In particular, it explores the extent to which this process 
impacted upon the scope and ambition of those instruments intended to address 
agricultural externalities and increase the environmental dividends delivered under 
the CAP. For the purposes of the current thesis this includes gaining further 
understanding of the institutional stances on the CAP’s role in meeting the ecological 
challenges to food security, many of which were persistently highlighted throughout 
the course of the negotiations. Moreover, the discussion takes account of the wider 
political context of which these negotiations were part and the implications that this 
had for reform objectives. 
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4.2 The 2011 Impacts Assessment and Legislative Proposals  
As has been the case in every previous instance of CAP reform, the Commission 
played a central role in determining the basic framework of the latest round of 
negotiations. Not least, this was due to the exclusive mandate to initiate legislation in 
the field of agriculture, which gave it a considerable command in influencing both the 
direction and substance of the inter-institutional dialogue, based on the contents of its 
legal proposals.1 However, despite this powerful prerogative it is important to 
underscore that the Commission remains restrained, both in theory and practice, by 
the political influence that the EP and Council wields over the subsequent legislative 
process under the ordinary legislative procedure.2 Thus, the Commission may be 
expected to take account of what is politically viable and acceptable when framing its 
proposals, rather than use its powers to promote measures expected to gain limited 
political approval. This includes assessing the overall socio-economic context in 
which the CAP operates, as well as the societal demands and expectations of this 
flagship policy.  
 Against this background, the legislative proposals published by the 
Commission on 12 October 2011 represented carefully weighed political calculations 
to pursue a defined direction of travel towards 2020 and beyond. Much of the 
overarching vision had been flagged up during the initial political debates and came 
as little surprise.3 For instance, as noted in Chapter 2, the Commission articulated in 
its main reform communication a clear preference for maintaining the two-pillar 
structure and the basic distinctions underpinning this division.4 Hence, it highlighted 
the need to develop the direct payments regime in order to attain better redistribution 
and targeting, as well as greater value and quality in return for EU funding.5 In 
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pursuing these changes, the Commission added that ‘criteria should be both economic, 
in order to fulfil the basic income function of direct payments, and environmental, so 
as to support for the provision of public goods’.6  
 Moreover, with regard to rural development, it may be recalled that the 
communication largely supported the structure of existing Pillar II measures, but 
stressed the importance of the environment, climate change and innovation to act as 
guiding themes in the following programming period.7 Likewise, on the issue of 
market reform, which had been a major aspect of previous reforms, it endorsed a 
continuation of the CAP’s overall market orientation, while expressing the need to 
make further adaptations aimed at streamlining and simplifying the legal framework, 
as well as improving the food supply chain.8 
 The impact assessment provided further input on the overall direction of the 
2013 CAP reforms, as well as concrete justifications for the legislative proposals made 
to this end. Importantly it considered each of the three policy options outlined in the 
main 2010 communication. These included the co called adjustment, integration and 
re-focusing scenarios. Based on the outcome of its assessment, the Commission 
expressed a clear preference to pursue the so called integration scenario and 
considered it to be the ‘most balanced in progressively aligning the CAP with the EU's 
strategic objectives’.9 In doing so it rejected, on the one hand, the adjustment scenario 
for being too limited in its approach to policy development and, on the other, the re-
focusing model for being too far-reaching in its aim of expanding the CAP’s 
environmental framework.10  
 In support of this decision, the impact assessment stressed that the integration 
scenario provided, in the view of the Commission, instruments that were capable of 
mobilising ‘the necessary resources to increase productivity through innovation and 
to pool knowledge and resources through collaborative actions among the farmers and 
in the food supply chain’.11 As is further explored below, these and other statements 
offered important insights into the food security paradigm under which the EU 
operated – and continues to operate – and revealed some of the underlying political 
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motivations that served to shape the framework and contents of the negotiations. In 
particular, the emphasis on increasing productivity is relevant to both the main 
analysis of the existing legislative framework, as well as having broader implications 
for the direction of the CAP beyond the current programming period.12 
 The concrete measures were contained in three proposed regulations 
pertaining to direct payments, rural development and the Single CMO. And, similarly 
to previous reforms, these were also accompanied by a fourth horizontal regulation, 
which established a common monitoring and evaluation framework with a view to 
measuring the performance of the CAP.13 Together, as the Commission clarified, the 
proposed regulations sought, amongst other things, to pursue the objectives of the 
CAP 2020 by focusing on enhanced competitiveness, improved sustainability and 
greater effectiveness.14 And it may be highlighted that three of the four regulations, 
except for the CMO regulation, sought to implement measures specifically aimed at 
environmental protection. An overview of the main elements relating to each of these 
proposed regulations is therefore offered, before considering the political reactions 
and negotiations that served to shape the final measures that are the focus of Chapters 
5 and 6. 
 
4.3 The Direct Payments Regulation 
As already noted, the Commission made it clear from the outset that a major part of 
its reform effort would be focused on overhauling the existing direct payment regime 
with the general aim of making it fairer and more targeted across the 28 MSs. This 
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was reiterated in the proposals, which stressed the need to build on previous reforms 
and address some of the main funding disparities that continued to exist following the 
conclusion of the Health Check.15 For instance, the Preamble to the proposed direct 
payments regulation noted that the distribution of direct income support among 
farmers was ‘characterised by the allocation of disproportionate amounts of payments 
to a rather small number of large beneficiaries’.16 This not only created an unfair 
advantage for larger farms, but was also a subject of widespread public criticism and 
attention.17 Moreover, the Preamble emphasised that it was becoming increasingly 
difficult to justify and maintain the funding disparities that continued to exist between 
regions and MSs. Thus, one of the main long-term visions of the Ciolos reform was 
‘to pave the way for convergence of the level of support within and across Member 
States’.18 
 Against this background, the Commission proposed replacing the SFP with a 
new framework for direct payments. This regime was to be centred upon a so called 
basic payment and entailed ‘the expiry of payment entitlements obtained under 
[previous] regulations and the allocation of new ones’.19 Crucially, this approach 
provided the Commission with an opportunity to redefine the basis of payment 
entitlements, as well as the conditions for their receipt.20 For instance, with regards to 
eligibility, the Commission proposed detailed rules on the meaning of ‘active farmer’ 
to ensure the proper targeting of EU funds and support.21 In addition, the new 
framework also provided the ability to introduce new environmental measures that 
farmers would be required to observe in return for basic income support. And, in 
concrete terms, the Commission submitted that this would entail the introduction of a 
mandatory ‘greening’ component linked to direct payments and intended to support 
‘agricultural practices beneficial for the climate and the environment applicable 
throughout the Union’.22 
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 At first glance, this approach was largely in keeping with the EP’s previous 
support for the ‘introduction, through a greening component, of an EU-wide incentive 
scheme with the objective of ensuring farm sustainability and long-term food security 
through effective management of scarce resources (water, energy, soil) while reducing 
production costs in the long term by reducing input use’.23 As will be further discussed 
below, however, the practical details of these measures proved to be some of the 
toughest sticking points of the legislative negotiations. But first there will be 
consideration of the main elements of the greening component, as well as the general 
framework for direct payments proposed by the Commission. 
 
4.3.1 The Greening Component  
The choice to focus its greening efforts on Pillar I undoubtedly reflected an intention 
to pursue broad measures that would be uniformly applied and implemented across 
its 28 MSs.24 Indeed, the Commission stressed the importance of introducing ‘a strong 
greening component into the first pillar of the CAP for the first time thus ensuring that 
all European Union farmers in receipt of support go beyond the requirements of cross-
compliance and deliver environmental and climate benefits as part of their everyday 
activities’.25 To this effect, each holding in receipt of the basic payment would obtain 
an additional payment per hectare for ‘compulsory practices to be followed by farmers 
addressing, as a priority, both climate and environment policy goals’.26  
 These measures were to ‘take the form of simple, generalised, non-contractual 
and annual actions that [went] beyond cross-compliance and…linked to agriculture 
such as crop diversification, maintenance of permanent grassland and ecological focus 
areas’.27 According to the Commission, payments for these three measures would 
ensure ‘that all farms deliver environmental and climate benefits through the retention 
                                                 
23
 European Parliament, Resolution of 23 June 2011 on the CAP Towards 2020: Meeting the Food, 
Natural Resources and Territorial Challenges of the Future, (2011/2051(INI)), paragraph 30.  The 
resolution drew upon the February 2011 ‘Dess Report’ on ‘The CAP Towards 2020: Meeting the  
Food, Natural Resources and Territorial Challenges of the Future’, prepared for COMAGRI (Albert 
Dess MEP being the Rapporteur) (available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/agri/pr/857/857600/857600en.pdf, 
last accessed on 27 June 2017). 
24
 B. Jack, ‘Ecosystem Services and the Rural Environment: Reforming European Agricultural Law’, 
(2012) 21 European Energy and Environmental Law Review 258, 261. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 European Commission, COM (2011) 625 (n 13) Preamble (26). 
27
 Ibid. 
- 141 - 
of soil carbon and grassland habitats associated with permanent pasture, the delivery 
of water and habitat protection by the establishment of ecological focus areas and 
improvement of the resilience of soil and ecosystems through crop diversification’.28 
Furthermore, they were defended on the basis that they would serve to reinforce the 
ability of agricultural ‘land and ecosystems’ to contribute to flagship EU objectives, 
such as those relating to biodiversity and climate change adaptation.29 
 The specific rules on the payment for agricultural practices beneficial for the 
environment and the climate was detailed in Chapter 2 of the proposed direct 
payments regulation. The first of the three measures was governed by Article 30, 
which comprised the rules relating to crop diversification. All holdings consisting of 
more than three hectares of arable land would be required to cultivate at least three 
crops on the arable land. In addition, it specified that none of the three crops was to 
cover less than five per cent of the arable land or exceed a maximum of 70 per cent 
for the largest crop. This measures would not apply to land that was entirely used for 
grass production, entirely left fallow or cultivated with crops under water for a 
significant part of the year.30  
 Secondly, Article 31 aimed to protect existing permanent grasslands by 
requiring that farmers maintain as permanent grassland areas of their holdings that 
were declared as such in 2014.31 They would, on the other hand, be permitted to 
convert a maximum of five per cent of their ‘reference area’ under permanent 
grasslands, while still complying with the greening component.32 Thus, based on these 
two short provisions, compliance did not appear to require positive action on the part 
of farmers, but would essentially be satisfied by them refraining from converting more 
than five per cent of the permanent grassland belonging to the holding in 2014. In 
addition, this measure was to be applied at farm level. 
 Thirdly, Article 32 required that recipients of direct payments devote at least 
seven per cent of their eligible hectares, not including land classed as permanent 
                                                 
28
 Ibid, Explanatory Memorandum, 3. 
29
 Ibid.  
30
 Ibid, Article 30(1). 
31
 Ibid, Article 31(1). Further, Article 4(h) defined permanent grassland as ‘land used to grow grasses 
or other herbaceous forage naturally (self-seeded) or through cultivation (sown) and that has not been 
included in the crop rotation of the holding for five years or longer; it may include other species 
suitable for grazing provided that the grasses and other herbaceous forage remain predominant’. 
32
 Ibid, Article 31(2). 
- 142 - 
grassland, towards the establishment of ecological focus areas (EFA).33 To this end, 
beneficiaries were able to include ‘land left fallow, terraces, landscape features, buffer 
strips and afforested areas as referred to in article 25(2)(b)(ii)’ in the calculation of 
the required minimum area under EFA, but the provision clearly allowed for this list 
to be extended.34 Indeed, as was the case with regards to all three elements of the 
greening component, little detail was provided, which indicated that the practical 
aspects of implementation would be extensively assigned to the Commission through 
the use of delegated powers.35  
 The regulation also outlined the financial arrangements, which required MSs 
to use 30 per cent of their annual budgets, set out in Annex II of the proposed 
regulation, towards funding the implementation of the greening component.36 With 
regards to the cost of compliance for farmers, the Commission argued, on the basis of 
its Impacts Assessment, that greening was possible ‘at a reasonable cost to farmers 
although some administrative burden cannot be avoided’.37 Undoubtedly, the latter 
was a central consideration for the Commission when it formulated the three new 
measures and, as will be seen below, continued to be the focus of attention during the 
negotiations by both farm interest groups and its institutional counterparts. Moreover, 
the question would subsequently arise as to whether these costs would generate 
meaningful environmental outcomes when compared to the administrative 
expenditure.  
    
4.3.2 Other Forms of Direct Payments  
In addition to the basic payment and greening component, the proposals included six 
other forms of direct payments that were intended to complement the direct payments 
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regime.38 These were to be implemented on a voluntary basis, with the exception of 
the payment to young farmers, which required MSs to commit up to 2 per cent of their 
annual direct payments budgets to young farmers entitled to payment under the basic 
payment scheme. 39 In doing so, the measure expressly sought to ‘facilitate the initial 
establishment of young farmers and the structural adjustment of their holdings after 
the initial setting up’40 and was further supported under the second pillar, which 
provided for thematic sub-programs to focus on the issues relating to the support of 
young farmer.41 
 The regulation also introduced a new voluntary simplified small farmer 
scheme under which participating MSs would be required to offer a lump sum 
payment to existing small holders in place of other direct payments. This included, 
inter alia, reducing ‘the obligations imposed on small farmers such as those related to 
the application for support, to agricultural practices beneficial for the climate and the 
environment, to cross-compliance and to controls’.42 Thus, although compliance with 
basic EU environmental standards would not be directly enforced under the proposed 
scheme, the simplification of applicable requirements and procedures were supported 
by the Commission on the basis that they would ‘reduce the red tape on small farmers 
and enhance their competitiveness’.43 And, to this effect it might be added that Article 
92 of the proposed Horizontal Regulation explicitly exempted participators of the 
small farmer scheme from the obligations imposed under cross-compliance and the 
controls linked to their implementation.44 Moreover, the exemption of small farmers 
was further justified on the basis that it would lessen the burdens that were otherwise 
associated with the administration of the direct payment regime and associated 
environmental standards.45  
 Other voluntary payments were essentially intended to function as top-up 
payments offered in addition to the basic and greening payments and covered a 
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payment for areas with natural restraints,46 voluntary coupled support payments47 and 
a crop specific payment for cotton.48 The first two of there are shortly outlined, before 
considering the proposal for the rural development regulation. 
 The payment for areas with natural constraints was a continuation of previous 
measures implemented with the intention of providing additional income support and 
maintaining the presence of farming in areas facing specific natural constraints, as 
well as complementing existing support under rural development.49 Thus, with a view 
to promoting ‘sustainable development’ in these areas, MSs would be able to ‘use part 
of their national ceilings for direct payments to grant an annual area-based payment, 
on top of the basic payment’.50 As pointed out by Mahé, moreover, the proposed 
classification of these areas was based on agronomic and biophysical features ‘rather 
than the former (absurd) definition which led some very fertile land to be classified 
as less-favoured’.51  
 The proposed regulation also included measures relating to coupled support 
payments, which continued to exist despite successive reductions in the use of such 
instruments following each round of CAP reform. These measures would enable MSs 
to extend payments to sectors or regions ‘where specific types of farming or specific 
agricultural sectors undergo certain difficulties and are particularly important for 
economic and/or social and/or environmental reasons’.52 To this effect the regulation 
listed 21 sectors and primary production that would be eligible for coupled support, 
but added that it could ‘only be granted to the extent necessary to create an incentive 
to maintain current levels of production in the regions concerned’.53 Moreover, with 
regards to financing, each MSs would be free to allocate a maximum of five per cent 
of their annual direct payments budget towards funding coupled payments, as set out 
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in Annex II of the proposed regulation.54 On the other hand, a number of exceptions 
were provided to allow for MSs to increase this figure beyond ten per cent.55 
 In addition to the specific payments that were proposed for the 2014-2020 
programming period, the regulation also included measures covering notifications and 
emergency,56 delegation of power and implementing provisions,57 as well as 
transitional rules, which empowered the commission to adopt temporary measures to 
ensure a smooth changeover from the pre-existing framework.58 With regards to the 
first of these, the Commission was furthermore empowered to respond to emergencies 
by way of implementing acts aimed at resolving specific problems and crisis.59 When 
acting under such powers, it would expressly be permitted to derogate from the 
provisions of the direct payments regulation provided that it was both necessary and 
justifiable.60 An example of a recent situation warranting such and intervention was 
the 2011 outbreak of foodborne illness in Germany (primarily) where at least 53 
people were estimated to have died and several thousand affected following 
consumption of infected vegetable products.61 Moreover, serious economic hardship 
was experienced by farmers in other parts of the EU due to widespread uncertainty 
and unfounded initial claims about the source of the outbreak.62 The proposed 
regulation would therefore give the Commission a clear mandate to intervene in such 
situations by imposing temporary emergency measures in order to address the 
emergence of sudden crisis. 
 Finally, it should also be noted that the proposed regulation addressed the issue 
of modulation, which has historically been used to progressively transfer funds from 
the first to the second pillar. To this effect Article 14(1) permitted MSs to transfer up 
to ten per cent of their direct payments budgets towards funding rural development 
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measures. However, this flexibility not only extended the option to transfer funds from 
Pillar I to Pillar II, but also provided for defined levels of so called reverse modulation 
to be made in MSs where the level of direct payments remained below 90 per cent of 
the EU average.63 As will be seen below, the latter was unsurprisingly met with 
considerable scepticism from those interest groups and stakeholders that had 
continuously supported the reduction of Pillar I funding, for the benefit or more 
funding for targeted support under the rural development framework. 
 
4.4 The Rural Development Regulation 
In order to provide the full context of the proposal for rural development, it should be 
noted that this part of the CAP framework is embedded within the EU’s broader 
cohesion policy, aimed essentially at addressing social and economic disparities 
between and within the various regions.64 Thus, the proposed rural development 
regulation was part of a larger set of initiatives setting out shared rules for all funds 
operating under this common strategic framework.65 This was for instance reflected 
in its mission statement which, in addition to the three main CAP objectives outlined 
by the Commission, stressed the role of the EAFRD in contributing to the Europe 
2020 Strategy ‘by promoting sustainable rural development throughout the Union in 
a complementary manner to the other instruments of the common agricultural 
policy…to cohesion policy and to the common fisheries policy’.66  
 Given these multiple and intersectional objectives of rural development 
policy, the proposal called for the second pillar to focus on a number of core priorities 
‘relating to knowledge transfer and innovation in  agriculture, forestry and rural areas, 
the competitiveness of all types of agriculture and  farm viability, food chain 
organisation and risk management in agriculture, restoring, preserving and enhancing 
ecosystems dependant on agriculture and forestry, resource efficiency and the shift 
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towards a low carbon economy in the agricultural, food and forestry sectors, and 
promoting social inclusion, poverty reduction and the economic development of rural 
areas’.67 Considering the sheer breadth of these priorities, the current discussion is 
limited to highlighting a number of them in passing, instead focusing on those 
instruments aimed directly or indirectly at remunerating practices beneficial to the 
environment and the climate. 
 With regards to the general contents of RDPs, the regulation proposed that 
measures should be formulated to pursue six thematic priorities aimed at (i) fostering 
knowledge transfer and innovation in agriculture, forestry, and rural areas; (ii) 
enhancing competitiveness of all types of agriculture and enhancing farm viability; 
(iii) promoting food chain organisation and risk management in agriculture; (iv)  
restoring, preserving and enhancing ecosystems dependent on agriculture and 
forestry; (v) restoring, preserving and enhancing ecosystems dependent on agriculture 
and forestry, and; (vi) promoting social inclusion poverty reduction and economic 
development in rural areas, with a focus on the following areas.68 Together, these 
priorities sought to streamline the measures introduced under the CAP’s second pillar 
and effectively meant the abolishment of the four axes that had steered programming 
objectives during the 2007-2013 period.69 In particular, the Commission noted that 
the potential overlap between different axes made it unsuitable for priorities to 
continue to be grouped along these lines.70 
 Consequently, the proposed framework entailed that agri-environmental 
measures could be formulated to pursue a number of the six intersectional priorities. 
In particular, this pertained to the fourth and fifth of these, although there was nothing 
to prevent measures with an environmental focus or impact from being formulated 
under any of the aforementioned headings. Indeed, Article 14 of the proposed 
regulation explicitly provided for all second pillar measures to pursue one or more of 
the Union’s priorities for rural development. Moreover, the Commission reiterated the 
important of the CAP’s rural development priorities to be ‘pursued in the framework 
of sustainable development and the Union's promotion of the aim of protecting and 
improving the environment as set out in Articles 11 and 19 of the Treaty, taking into 
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account the polluter pays principle’.71 Thus, as already seen in the context of previous 
reforms, agri-environmental measures were definitely envisaged as central 
contributions to the advancement of EPI under the 2020 agenda. 
 With reference to sustainable farming, the following measures were proposed. 
First, required MSs were required to formulate and implement agri-environment-
climate payments based on their national, regional and local needs and concerns.72 
These were intended to replace the former ‘agri-environmental’ instruments and, as 
under previous regulations, were to be granted on a contractual basis for a period of 
five to seven years and covering ‘commitments going beyond the relevant mandatory 
standards…relevant minimum requirements for fertiliser and plant protection 
products use as well as other relevant mandatory requirements established by national 
legislation’.73  
 Secondly, the proposed regulation sought to introduce a dedicated payments, 
to be granted on a per hectare of UAA basis, to producers that undertake organic 
farming practices and methods as defined in Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007.74  
 Thirdly, Article 31 provided for special payments to be made to farmers 
operating within designated Natura 2000 areas, as well as those required to take action 
in order to meet the objectives of the EU’s WFD. With regards to the latter, in 
particular, support was to be granted in cases where river basin management plans 
imposed obligations that went beyond basic EU environmental standards75 or the 
SMRs and GAECs that constituted the cross-compliance regime.76 Likewise, 
payments were to be authorised where such plans pursuant to the WFD served to 
impose ‘major changes in land use, and/or major restrictions in farming practice 
resulting in a significant loss of income’.77 
 In addition, Article 32 was intended to allow MSs to provide specific payments 
to areas facing natural or other specific constraints on the basis that ‘land management 
should be continued in order to conserve or improve the environment, maintain the 
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countryside and preserve the tourist potential of the area or in order to protect the 
coastline’.78 Thus, environmental considerations would not be mandated, but may 
form one of several justifications for determining the type of land defined as facing 
natural or specific constraints.  
 The proposed framework also included other measures that had previously 
been contained under axis two of Regulation 1698/2005, such as payments to farmers 
who undertake animal welfare commitments beyond the basic cross-compliance 
obligations. However, having called for an end to the axis approach, the proposal also 
sought to introduce new tools aimed at enhancing the environmental dimensions of 
the EU’s rural development policy. For instance, it emphasised the importance of 
establishing – and building upon – EU-wide networks capable of facilitating useful 
exchanges and cooperation between actors and stakeholders.79 In particular, it 
required that a network be established to support the European Innovative Partnership 
(EIP) for agricultural productivity and sustainability.80 This was set out under Title 
IV and intended to (i) promote a resource efficient, productive, low emission, climate 
friendly and resilient agricultural sector, working in harmony with the essential 
natural resources on which farming depends; (ii) help deliver a steady supply of food, 
feed and biomaterials, both existing and new ones; (iii) improve processes to preserve 
the environment, adapt to climate change and mitigate it and; (iv) build bridges 
between cutting-edge research knowledge and technology and farmers, businesses 
and advisory services.81As highlighted in connection with the proposed direct 
payment regulation, the Europe 2020 strategy was central to shifting the emphasis of 
Pillar II measures towards a renewed focus on innovation and partnership. And, as is 
seen in Chapter 6, much of the practical detail pertaining to implementation would 
ultimately have to be fleshed out by the Commission in the form of delegated acts.    
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4.5 Regulation on the Financing, Management and Monitoring of 
the Common Agricultural Policy 
The proposed Horizontal Regulation, was intended to replace Council Regulation 
1290/200582 with a revised financing, management and monitoring framework 
covering both pillars of the CAP. In particular, the new system was formulated with 
a view towards meeting the targets of the 2020 strategy and its overarching guidelines 
on EU policy formulation and sectoral objectives.83 This included the central aims of 
increasing the efficiency of policy measures, as well as creating effective monitoring 
and evaluation mechanisms for the purpose of measuring their performance over the 
coming programming period.84  
 On the part of the Commission, this was translated into a concrete imperative 
to ensure that the outcomes of CAP instruments were in line with the policy’s broader 
objectives. Hence, it stressed the importance of establishing a common monitoring 
and evaluation framework aimed at ensuring among other things ‘that relevant data, 
including information from Member States is available in a timely manner’. 85 In 
practical terms, moreover, this required strategic changes to be made in order to bring 
the horizontal framework closer in line with the 2020 mandate, as well as to ensure 
greater coherence between the two pillars.  
 Against this background, the proposal encompassed a comprehensive 
framework aimed at ensuring, in quantifiable ways, the compatibility of CAP 
measures with basic regulatory standards and overarching EU objectives and 
principles. In particular, this had been a central critique of the cross-compliance 
regime, which according to the ECA not only weakened certain aspects of the rural 
development framework,86 but also required considerably improved structures for 
monitoring and measuring its performance.87 Thus, the most significant aspect of the 
proposed regulation, for present purposes, relates to the introduction of the cross-
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compliance regime under the horizontal title and the consequent changes that were 
made with the intention of streamlining and creating greater consistency between 
Pillar I and Pillar II agri-environmental measures.88  
 
4.5.1 Cross-Compliance 
As already noted, the decision to include cross-compliance under the horizontal 
regulation was mainly aimed at improving the coherence between CAP measures and 
the monitoring and evaluation framework that was set forth therein. To this effect, the 
Commission affirmed that cross-compliance should remain an integral part of the 
CAP structure and contribute ‘to the development of a sustainable agriculture through 
a better awareness of beneficiaries of the need to respect those basic standards’.89 
Indeed, this was considered to be especially important for ensuring continued public 
and political support for the CAP,90 although other motivations, such as the 
reoccurring theme of simplification, were also influential in determining the reform 
agenda in this area.91 In particular, the Preamble to the regulation  underscored that 
the reformed framework should comprise ‘rules to better address water, soil, carbon 
stock, biodiversity and landscape issues as well as minimum level of maintenance of 
the land’.92 
 In concrete terms, the Commission proposed that the separate lists of existing 
SMRs and GAECs should be revised and ‘streamlined so that its consistency [would 
be] ensured and made more visible’.93 Hence, the main structural change proposed by 
the regulation was the organisation of these measures into groups within a single list.94 
The relevant provisions were to be found in Annex II, which laid down four thematic 
issues that fell within the broad area of ‘environment, climate change and good 
agricultural condition of the land’. The first pertained to water and required 
compliance with Articles 4 and 5 of the Nitrates Directive, as well as three GAECs 
relating to the establishment of buffer strips, irrigation use and the protection of 
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groundwater against direct and indirect pollution.95 The second addressed ‘soil and 
carbon stock’ and covered four GAECs regarding minimal soil cover, land 
management, soil protection and the protection of wetlands and other carbon rich 
soils.96 The third governed biodiversity, which required compliance with a number of 
provisions under the Wild Birds and Habitats Directives.97 And, the forth covered 
‘landscape and minimum level of maintenance’, which was linked to GAEC 8 and 
required the retention of a number of landscape features.  
 The revised measures undoubtedly presented a simplified break-down of the 
cross-compliance obligations, compared to that of Regulation 73/2009.98 Moreover, 
the proposed framework effectively reduced or eliminated a number of the GAECs 
and SMRs that existed under that piece of legislation. Arguably, however, surprisingly 
little was added in terms of substance. For instance, despite the importance of 
agriculture and the CAP for meeting the objectives of the EU’s WFD, the relevant 
provisions of this directive were not included as basic SMRs that recipients of CAP 
funding would have to comply with over the 2013-2020 programming period. 
Similarly, the regulation failed to include directly implementable requirements to 
comply with appropriate provisions of the Pesticide Directive despite its obvious 
implications for agriculture.  
 Instead, the regulation provided that the two directives would only be included 
in the Annex once they were ‘implemented by all MSs and the obligations directly 
applicable to farmers [had] been identified’.99 To this effect, the Commission would 
be empowered to amend the Annex by way of delegated acts in order include the 
relevant provisions of the two directives.100 It should, however, be noted that the 
deadline for the implementation of the WFD was set for the end of 2013.101 And, 
considering that the reformed measures were not expected to take full effect before 
2015, it was not entirely clear why the Commission would be reluctant to include the 
relevant provisions of the directive from the outset. Indeed, Mahé noted that this was 
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particularly regrettable considering that the cross-compliance regime had so far ‘had 
little impact on reducing pollution’.102 Moreover, as seen in relation to other 
directives, numerous MSs were expected to fall short of meeting the official deadline, 
which would materially delay the inclusion of the relevant measures as part of the 
Union-wide cross-compliance regime. 
 Furthermore, the Commission was empowered to ensure that measures were 
taken ‘to maintain the land under permanent grassland at the level of farmers, 
including individual obligations to be respected such as obligation to reconvert areas 
into permanent grassland where it is established that the ratio of land under permanent 
grassland is decreasing’.103 Undoubtedly, there was a level of overlap with the 
permanent grassland measure that formed part of the greening component set out in 
the direct payments regulation.  
 
4.6 Negotiating the Final Measures 
The publication of the proposed regulations set in motion the formal negotiation 
process, which sought to reach political agreement between the Commission, EP and 
Council on the framework intended to govern the CAP during the 2013-2020 
programming period, including transitional provisions for 2014.104 However, it also 
sparked a much wider debate, inviting input from a range of institutional and non-
governmental actors, as well as stakeholders, academics and interest groups offering 
alternative perspectives for the reforms. And, from the outset, it was apparent that the 
Commission would be intensely challenged on a number of key issues. The opposition 
came from several sources, but for present purposes, the inter-institutional trilogue 
discussions were especially important for understanding the negotiations between the 
EP and Council, and which ultimately served to affect the substance and ambition of 
the measures that were adopted in December 2013.105 This was not least the case with 
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regard to the greening and environmental components, which proved from an early 
point to be a major matter of contention that demanded considerable effort and 
negotiation before a political agreement was reached.106  
 The remaining sections of this Chapter consider some of the main features of 
these negotiations, as they relate to the environmental elements of the Commission’s 
proposals, before undertaking a more detailed analysis of the substantive legislative 
outcomes in the following Chapters.  
  
4.6.1 Political Responses to the Commission’s Proposals 
As already indicated, much of the political and academic commentary focused on the 
formulation of the proposed greening component, which was effectively the main new 
contribution towards furthering the process of EPI under the leadership of 
Commissioner Cioloș. Indeed, these measures were considered to be particularly 
central to maintaining the policy’s overall legitimacy and support.107 However, it was 
received with differing responses, ranging from arguments in favour of further 
strengthening the three proposed measures, to those opposed to the idea of imposing 
additional obligations on farmers. On the whole, though, Hart has argued that 
regardless of orientation or agenda, the greening proposals ‘were met with widespread 
criticism from the majority of actors’.108 
 With regards to the EU institutions, the proposals were likewise received with 
mixed reviews, although some analysists suggest that the EP and Council essentially 
held very similar positions regarding key components.109 However, this did not 
prevent them from developing differentiated negotiating mandates, which 
undoubtedly served to complicate the process and the prospects for agreement. In 
relation to the greening measures, in particular, both actors entered the negotiations 
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with long lists of amendments and political demands aimed at limiting their scope. 
Many of these are beyond the current discussion, but some of the main positions 
deserve further consideration in order to fully understand the context in which the 
final measures were formulated and agreed.  
 Turning to the specific components, it may be recalled, firstly, that with regard 
to crop diversification, the proposed measure was intended to apply to recipients of 
direct payments with holdings consisting of three hectares or more. However, both 
the EP and the Council insisted that the threshold be raised to at least ten hectares – 
with the latter additionally calling for exceptions to crop diversification for a number 
of specific farm types.110 Moreover, both institutions took the position that the three 
crop minimum should only be applied to holdings with more than 30 hectares, 
whereas smaller farms would only be required to grow two crops.111 It should also be 
noted that they argued for the maximum and minimum ratios to be relaxed. Combined, 
these amendments effectively entailed that the coverage of the proposed measure 
would be considerably reduced if these changes were to be adopted. 
 Pertaining to the permanent grassland measures, on the other hand, there was 
less controversy and the main input from both the EP and Council was for the measure 
to be applied at national or regional level, as opposed to farm level as originally 
proposed. This meant that farmers would merely be required to take action if more 
than five per cent of the national or regional ratio of the permanent grassland 
registered in 2014 were to be converted thereafter. In such cases, MSs would have to 
ensure that those farmers responsible for this conversion be placed under an obligation 
to restore pre-existing grasslands.    
 By far the most contentious aspect of the negotiations related to the proposed 
EFA measure, which had been hailed, not least by the Commission itself, as the most 
promising aspect of the reforms.112 Indeed, compared to the crop diversification and 
permanent grassland measures, the EFA measure, as first envisioned, was broad in 
scope in that it required recipients of direct payments to designate seven per cent of 
their holding towards the establishment of these areas. Moreover, the wording of the 
proposal indicated that the measure would apply equally to all farms, with no mention 
having been made of differentiated thresholds according to farm size (although, as 
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already highlighted, farmers enrolled under the small farmer scheme would not be 
expected to comply with the greening requirements). 
 Notwithstanding this exemption, the adoption of the proposed measure would 
have entailed that a significant portion of EU agricultural land would be ‘focused’ 
towards providing water and habitat protection, as part of the broader objective of 
improving biodiversity.113 However, the Commission was adamant to stress that this 
was not a reversion to ‘set-aside’, which had primarily been introduced to address 
overproduction.114 Consequently, the proposed direct payment regulation stipulated 
that EFAs could be made up of a number of different elements including land left 
fallow, terraces and landscape features, such as hedges, ponds, ditches, trees in a line, 
in a group or isolated field margins.115 Moreover, buffer strips could be counted, 
provided that no production take place on the designated areas.116 This element was 
especially stressed by the Commission, in its 2012 communication A Blueprint to 
Safeguard Europe’s Waters, for its potential to contribute towards the objectives of 
the WFD, by providing a natural water retention measure as part of wider effort to 
create ‘a type of Green Infrastructure’.117 Finally, areas afforested with funding from 
EAFRD would likewise be able to be counted towards this end.118  
 Despite these efforts of the Commission to provide for flexibility regarding 
the implementation of the proposed EFA measure, the measure was fiercely opposed 
on the basis that it would serve to limit agricultural output, by placing restrictions on 
land use and management practices.119 Indeed, as may be recalled from the discussion 
in the preceding Chapters, the experiences of the 2007-2008 food crisis had served to 
shape the tone of the CAP reform in a number of ways. Not least, an increasingly 
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productivist narrative was furthered at institutional level, which proposed meeting the 
challenges of food security with growing productivity and output. Against this 
background, Swinnen argued that the increases in commodity prices associated with 
the crisis gave ‘strength to the productionist argument that the food supply should not 
be constrained by extra regulations’.120 He also noted that this argument had found 
considerable support amongst the members of the Council, where it was used to 
weaken important elements of the Commission’s greening proposals.121 Thus, with 
the aim of reducing the requirements linked to EFAs, the German Agriculture 
Minister, and member of the Council, expressed that it would be ‘absurd to leave 
seven per cent of land fallow’ given the global demand for food.122 
 Consequently, the overall aim of both the Council and the EP would be to add 
greater flexibility to the application of the EFA measure.123 This was done in a number 
of ways. For instance, they sought to reduce the percentage of land necessary to fulfil 
the EFA requirement to five and three per cent, respectively. Moreover, they both 
strongly attempted to limit its application by insisting that farms consisting of less 
than 10 or 15 hectares, again respectively, would be exempt from the measure 
altogether. It should also be highlighted that their negotiating positions entailed that, 
even in cases where the EFA would require basic compliance, a long list of 
amendments was made to extend the types of land use that could be carried out, as 
well as the features that could be counted as part of the EFA. Importantly, several of 
these uses involved production, for instance of nitrogen fixing crops, and were 
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subsequently contained in the final measures. Thus, for the sake of avoiding 
unnecessary repetition, the details will be spared for further discussion in the 
following Chapters.  
 The issue of equivalence was another major negotiating point driven by the 
Council, which proposed that MSs should be permitted to use national certification 
schemes in place of the Commission’s greening measures.124 In other words, the idea 
was to allow national schemes, mainly under Pillar II, to be counted as equivalent to 
the latter and would, therefore, be sufficient to satisfy these obligations. In practice, 
the Commission had already provided for such equivalence, for instance, with regards 
to farmers who fulfilled the conditions laid down in Council Regulation 834/2007 on 
organic production and labelling of organic products.125 Indeed, the Preamble to the 
proposed direct payment regulation suggested that given the recognised 
environmental benefits of these farming systems, organically certified producers 
would not be required to undertake any further action to comply with the greening 
measures.126  
 MSs such as the UK, however, strongly argued for this list to be extended ‘as 
a means of introducing more flexible ways of implementing greening with the ability 
to tailor the measures to local circumstances’.127 Though, it should be added that this 
flexibility was viewed by others ‘as a potential loophole though which MSs would 
seek to avoid the greening requirements’.128 As pointed out by Hart and Manadue, it 
was also likely to add significant complexity and cost to the implementation of the 
new framework, given the number of certification schemes that would potentially be 
eligible (they estimated 67 schemes in four different MSs).129 To reduce the risk of 
such an outcome, the Commission responded by delivering a list of practices that 
could be considered equivalent to the greening measures.130 
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 The issue of equivalence had also raised concern over the potential for the new 
greening measures to overlap with those managed under the second pillar.131 In 
particular, this fluidity created potential conflicts with regards to double funding – a 
practice that goes against the legal and financial principles of both the EU and the 
WTO.132 And, perhaps with a view to pre-empting such outcomes, the proposed 
horizontal regulation explicitly included a provision prohibiting double funding of 
CAP measures.133 However, this did not prevent the Council from submitting a 
number of amendments that effectively enabled farmers to be paid twice – first under 
the second pillar and secondly by way of the greening payment – for the same service. 
The absurdity of this situation was not lost on the EP which, to its credit, remained 
adamantly opposed to the idea of making concessions on double funding.134 And this 
position ultimately defeated the proposals levelled by the Commission.
 Notwithstanding this positive effort to maintain the effectiveness of the 
greening payment, the overall approach of both the Council and the EP was arguably 
to limit, rather than strengthen, the potential benefits of the greening measures by 
insisting on changes that would essentially entail that the majority of concerned 
farmers would, in one way or another, either comply by default or be exempt from 
compliance. This was especially surprising with regards to the EP, considering its 
initial support for enhancing the protection of agricultural resources beyond that 
provided under cross-compliance.135 Thus, pertaining to the fate of the greening 
measures, Bureau and Mahé noted that although the draft legislation would have 
provided much needed protection of biodiversity, the Committee on Agriculture and 
Rural Development (COMAGRI) played a central role in diluting the strongest 
elements of the Commission’s initial proposals.136 
 However, this mandate was not necessarily supported by all factions of the EP 
and Hart has suggested that the institutional dialogue within the EP was characterised 
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by ‘the divide between those seeking to improve the environmental benefits that could 
be achieved through [greening] … and a larger group who wanted to maintain the 
status quo and minimise the degree to which the measures impinged upon productive 
farm activities’.137 According to Bureau and Mahé this alignment could partly be 
explained by the underlying composition of COMAGRI, which was dominated by 
farm interests, partly because of the close connection of many of its MEPs to farming 
and ‘because CAP technicalities put off other MEPs’.138 The latter is of particular 
importance, as it arguably allowed a political vacuum to be filled by ‘MEPs taking 
stances in favour of the farm sector, basically arguing for the status quo and for the 
upgrading of payment rates per hectare in the new member states’.139  
 Moreover, the domination by farm interests allowed for the internal EP 
discussion to be reduced to a ‘simplistic, production-focused view of European food 
security [that] was never really challenged’.140 Indeed, as already seen, these 
arguments were carried forward in the context of the main negotiations and ultimately 
‘changed the terms of the debate on the future CAP by elevating the food security 
argument at the expense of the public goods one’.141 Consequently, Erjavec et al have 
argued that ‘the dominant role of productivist political setting and discourse was to 
turn greening into a greenwash strategy’.142  
 
4.6.2 Inputs from Civil Society  
The productivist tone of the negotiations arguably thus reflected a highly problematic 
dichotomy between environmental protection and food security, based on the premise 
that the former would undermine the latter by reducing levels of output and income. 
This undoubtedly served to embolden traditional farm interest and lobby groups, 
many of which were intent on opposing even modest attempts to impose additional 
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obligations on farmers in receipt for direct payments. Indeed, such a state of affairs 
was particularly evident with regards to the position taken by one of the main farm 
interest organisations, Copa Cogeca, which suggested that the introduction of 
environmental measures could threaten food security and entail higher food prices for 
consumers if they had the effect of restricting production.143  
 It was thus clear from the outset that aspects of the proposals that were 
perceived to affect either output or productivity would be fiercely resisted by farm 
groups. Indeed, Copa Cogeca, unequivocally opposed the imposition of mandatory 
greening measures on the grounds that they would ‘undermine the ability of the agri-
food sector to be competitive, efficient and to achieve sustainable growth’.144 
Presumably, this agenda was further powered by the increased profitability that had 
been observed in, for instance, the cereal sector (with cereals being produced on 
almost half of EU farms) in previous years, as this would presumably provide a 
financial incentive to resist incursions on production through the introduction of land 
use measures.145  Moreover, Matthews has pointed out that such sentiment was 
particularly critical of the EFA element of the greening component, since it was 
viewed in terms of its potential to threaten production.146 As will be seen, however, 
this concern was addressed by the direct payment regulation as finally enacted by 
allowing considerable possibilities for cultivation on EFAs.147 
 Against this background, the position of many environmental organisations 
differed significantly to those detailed above.148 Indeed, rather than criticising the 
Commission for imposing additional obligations upon farmers, these actors 
questioned whether the Commission had gone far enough and whether the costs would 
even be worth the final product.149 So stark a contrast was especially reflected with 
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regards to food security and the role that the CAP was envisaged to play in meeting 
the long-term ecological challenges outlined in Chapter 2. Thus, while the EP and 
Council, as well as the main farm interest groups had fiercely defended the need to 
maintain or even increase productivity as a pre-requisite for food security, 
environmental organisations, in particular, argued that the most pressing issue was to 
ensure that natural resources and agricultural systems were protected with a view to 
ensuring long-term sustainability of agricultural resources.  
 In doing so, NGOs such as BirdLife International did not exclude the 
possibility of limiting production in areas where the ecological benefits of doing so 
would outweigh those of production.150 Hence, some commentators even proposed 
designating up to 10 per cent of eligible hectares on each holding for ecological 
purposes, rather than the 7 per cent that had been proposed for the implementation of 
the EFA measure.151 And it may be noted that comparable measures had already been 
implemented in Switzerland under the framework for ‘Biodiversity Promoting Areas’, 
which has been a compulsory aspect of agricultural policy since 1993 and currently 
comprises 13 per cent of Swiss farmland.152  
 Similarly, the proposed crop diversification measures was strongly criticised 
by environmental groups for being insufficient to meet the basic objective of 
improving the resilience of soil and ecosystems.153 Instead, they lobbied from an early 
point that crop rotation would have been a better alternative, with greater potential to 
provide environmental benefits.154 This view was, likewise, shared by the Committee 
on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, which argued that the crop 
rotation had the advantage of preventing monoculture, improving biodiversity and 
lowering the need for pesticide use.155 This had also been acknowledged by the 
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commission in its 2010 communication on the future of the CAP,156 but was later 
dropped in favour of diversification and maintaining levels of productivity. 
 
4.7 Reaching Agreement in Times of Uncertainty: The Wider 
Context of the Negotiations 
With regards to the wider context of the CAP negotiations, it may be recalled that they 
not only took place in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 food crisis, but that they also 
coincided with the start of one of the most challenging economic crises to hit the EU 
and its MSs in recent years. Indeed, the Commission’s impact assessment was 
expressly formulated to take account of the policy impact of ‘the economic crisis and 
the pressure on public finances’ in each of proposed policy scenarios.157 In other 
words, environmental measures that could increase the CAP budget were very likely 
to be opposed by most political factions at both EU and national levels.158  
 This was particularly evident in the context of the, then, ongoing MFF 
negotiations during which the Prime Minister of the UK, David Cameron, penned an 
open letter to the president of the Commission, Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, urging 
the EU to consider the strained economic circumstances of its MSs when determining 
the budget and spending allocations for the 2014-2020 period.159 Specifically, 
Cameron and his co-signatories called for the budget not to exceed 2013 levels or to 
grow beyond the prevailing rate of inflation. However, Matthews pointed out that this 
would have entailed a decrease of the annual budget in real terms ‘and even more as 
a share of EU gross national income’.160 Moreover, the EP did not share the idea of 
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freezing or reducing overall CAP spending and had in fact suggested that at least a 
five per cent increase would be required to properly fund the policy.161 
 Numerous commentators have since argued that the effect of the general 
economic climate was to put additional pressure on policymakers to maintain the 
status quo, and of dissuading them from supporting reform measures that would imply 
an increase in CAP funding.162 Moreover, it served to place a considerable emphasis 
on socio-economic impacts and indicators, which had a tangible effect on the scope 
and formulation of specific agri-environmental instruments.163 Indeed, with regards 
to the EFA measure in particular, the Commission was under pressure from the 
Council to give assurances that it would be ‘implemented in ways that do not require 
the land in question to be taken out of production and that avoids unjustified losses in 
the income of farmers’.164 Not least, in justifying the formulation of its crop 
diversification measure, the Commission expressly cited the individual cost of 
implementation as a main reason for not pursuing more ambitious targets.165  
 As already outlined, second pillar funding was, likewise, affected by the 
prevailing budgetary constraints. And, although, the EP successfully managed to 
maintain EU contributions to the EAFRD, it was nonetheless unable to secure 
increased support for rural development, which had been an implicit expectation of 
the two previous CAP reforms.166 Moreover, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, the 
adopted framework provided additional scope for MSs to reduce their rural 
development spending by affording them considerable flexibility to transfer funds 
between pillars.  
 Against this background, the following two Chapters will consider the main 
outcomes of the most recent round of CAP negotiations and the extent to which the 
final measures reflect the environmental objectives that were stated at the outset of 
the reform process (as discussed in Chapter 2). More specifically, Chapter 5 analyses 
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the new direct payments regime, which arguably underwent the greatest 
transformation, while Chapter 6 critically assesses the principal changes made to the 
rural development and cross-compliance. In doing so, the discussion aims to provide 
an initial overview of the impacts that the post-2014 framework is expected to have 
upon the protection of the natural resources and ecosystems services that underpin 
agricultural productivity and long-term food security.
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Chapter 5 
The Post-2014 Direct Payments Regime 
5.1 Introduction  
The main elements of the new direct payments regime were adopted in December 
2013 under Regulation 1307/2013 and took effect on 1 January 2015.1 Overall, the 
architecture of the Commission’s initial proposals remained largely intact following 
the inputs of the institutional reform process. However, the final measures, as 
formulated and enacted, also revealed additional changes that are of relevance to the 
current thesis, given their potential implications for the management of ecological 
resources and, thereby, long-term food security. 
 As is seen below, some of these changes, such as those relating to the new 
greening measures, had obvious environmental implications. Others aspects of the 
new system of direct payments, on the other hand, were afforded considerably less 
attention during the course of the negotiations, but may nonetheless be expected to 
have a notable impact on the environmental scope of Pillar I payments over course of 
the 2014-2020 programming period. For instance, notwithstanding the introduction of 
the highly publicised greening payment, Regulation 1307/2013 does not require 
compliance with these and other basic EU environmental obligations by small 
farmers.2 As will be further discussed below, it also enabled the continuation and 
expansion of voluntary coupled payments, which may undoubtedly be seen as a clear 
departure from previous reform agendas.3 Indeed, the latter represents a particularly 
surprising outcome, the full effects of which were only fully known once MSs had 
notified the Commission of their individual preferences of implementation in late 
2014.  
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 A key feature of the new system is the level of flexibility and choice that has 
been afforded to MSs in their implementation of direct payments. This was especially 
apparent following the publication of the Commission’s delegated and implementing 
acts in March and June of 2014, which sought to complement the framework laid out 
in the basic regulation. However, these supplementing acts did not only serve to 
clarify essential details, but arguably also added a level of complexity to what had, 
until that point, been presented as fairly straightforward measures.4 Indeed, as will be 
extensively discussed below, this not only affected crucial elements of the new 
greening measures, but also had implications for the implementation of other Pillar I 
payments.  
  Against this background, the current Chapter analyses the system of direct 
payments that is set to be in operation until 2020 and the extent to which it might be 
expected to contribute towards meeting the environmental objectives and challenges 
of the CAP. Undoubtedly, similar questions have been raised in connection with 
previous reforms and are likely to invite further inquiry given the current role of direct 
payments. Indeed, following the implementation of the new framework, these 
payments continue to absorb the vast majority of the CAP budget (just under 70 per 
cent of the total CAP budget and about a quarter of the total EU budget), with the 
basic payment being the most widely applied CAP measure and accounting for almost 
55 per cent of the total direct payments budget in 2015.5 Thus, given its direct link to 
the area of land under agricultural use (ie the payment depends on the existence of 
eligible hectares), the basic payment operates over an extensive portion of the EU’s 
territory with the potential to affect the management of important ecological systems 
and resources.6 
 
5.2 An Overview of the Main Elements 
The new system of direct payments consists of nine substantive measures laid down 
in Annex I of Regulation 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council (the 
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basic act).7  Each of these are linked to specific objectives and include the (i) basic 
payment scheme; (ii) single area payment scheme (SAPS); (iii) redistributive 
payment; (iv) payment for practices beneficial to the environment and the climate; (v) 
payment for areas with natural constraints; (vi) payment for young farmers; (vii) 
voluntary coupled support; (viii) crop specific payment for cotton and; (ix) small 
farmer scheme. Five of the nine schemes are entirely voluntary, while (i) or (ii), (iv) 
and (vi) must be applied by all MS and are intended to provide a uniform basis for the 
transfer of payments made by the EU to its farmers. 
 As already indicated, the centrepiece of this framework was the introduction 
of a new basic payment, which replaced the former SFP in most MSs at the start of 
2015.8 This basic payment provides farmers a fundamental layer of income support 
subject to determined criteria, including fulfilment of the ‘active farmer’ clause and 
having at their disposal a minimum amount of eligible land.9 In addition, Article 36 
of Regulation 1307/2013 provides for the continued operation of the single area 
payment scheme (SAPS) which was previously implemented by newer MSs most 
recently under Regulation 73/2009. Consequently, excluding Croatia, Malta and 
Slovenia, the single area payment scheme (SAPS) will continue to run until 2020 in 
ten of the thirteen MSs that joined the EU since 2004.  
 Certainly, the main novelty for present purposes was the mandatory 
attachment of the payment for practices beneficial to the environment and the climate 
to the basic payment (SAPS where applicable), which entailed that receipt would be 
directly linked – and dependent on – compliance with the greening measures.  These 
will be extensively discussed below. However, apart from the greening payment and 
the payment to young farmers (vi) – which requires all MSs to allocate up to two per 
cent of their direct payment budgets towards providing a top-up payment to new 
operators under the age of 40 – the remaining schemes are voluntary and depend on 
the preferences of individual MSs and their willingness to allocate resources from 
their national ‘envelopes’ to fund these. As already noted, this flexibility undoubtedly 
gives MSs a degree of choice in applying Pillar I measures, as well as the possibility 
of taking national circumstances and farming conditions into account when deciding 
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on whether or not to include certain schemes as part of their national and/or regional 
frameworks. However, an overview of MS notifications reveal that most of the 
payment schemes listed above will undoubtedly have very limited application 
throughout the present programming period. Indeed, while the special payment for 
areas with natural constraints (v) will only be applied by Denmark, the crop specific 
payment for cotton (viii) will, for obvious reasons, only apply to a minority of 
southern MSs where such production is undertaken and will not be subject to further 
analysis.10  
 On the other hand, the notifications submitted to the Commission also reveal 
noteworthy uptakes of other schemes. For instance, the small farmer scheme (ix) has 
been implemented in a total of 15 MSs where payments between 500-1250 Euros have 
been offered to eligible farmers in place of the basic payment.11 And, as pointed out 
above, claimants under the simplified small farmer scheme will not be required to 
observe the agri-environmental measures that are otherwise mandatory with regards 
to direct payments.12 In other words, neither the greening measures, nor the rules on 
cross-compliance will be applicable against participants of the small farmer scheme.13 
Thus, as will be seen in the context of implementation, this exemption has, together 
with other factors, affected the coverage and outcomes of these basic environmental 
provisions, given the large proportion of small farmers that operate in several of the 
MSs that have opted to implement the scheme.  
 Perhaps the most significant revelation of MS notifications regards the 
widespread implementation of voluntary coupled support (VCS), as provided for in 
Chapter I of Title IV of the basic regulation. Under these rules, MS are permitted to 
divert different percentages of their direct payment budgets toward granting coupled 
support ‘where specific types of farming or specific agricultural sectors that are 
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particularly important for economic, social or environmental reasons undergo certain 
difficulties’.14 This freedom of choice has resulted in all but one MS, Germany,15 
opting to introduce payments that are directly linked to production in a total of 18 out 
of the 21 eligible sectors.16 Moreover, the notifications reveal that 11 MSs have opted 
to transfer the maximum 13 per cent of their direct payment budget towards funding 
VCS, while four of these have even been granted special approval by the Commission 
to extend coupled payments well beyond this maximum limit.17  
 In order to further explore the environmental outcomes and implications of the 
new direct payments framework, the following sections consider those measures that 
will be most widely applied (in terms of territorial coverage) and attract the greatest 
levels of EU funding over the course of the current programming period. As already 
suggested, this includes a detailed analysis of the payment for practices beneficial to 
the environment and the climate, as well as the use of coupled support payments 
during the current programming period. In addition to the above mentioned direct 
payments, it should be noted that the new regime provided for the voluntary transfer 
of funds between the CAP pillars. However, it may be recalled that this flexibility was 
not limited to transfers from Pillar I to Pillar II, as during previous programming 
periods. Rather, the new framework has also enabled reverse modulation, which has 
ultimately impacted on the overall level of funding available for agri-environmental 
measures under the second pillar. This will be discussed in the following Chapter. 
 
5.3 Payment for Agricultural Practices Beneficial for the Climate 
and the Environment 
As seen in connection with previous reforms, the incremental integration of 
environmental policy measures has been central to the implementation of the EU’s 
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sustainable development strategy and resulted in structural changes to both pillars of 
the CAP. And definitely a number of these changes, such as the introduction of cross-
compliance under Pillar I and the minimum financing requirements imposed to secure 
the prioritisation of agri-environmental measures under Pillar II, have partly been 
formulated with the intension of increasing the environmental benefits of EU-funded 
farming activity. Indeed, in the context of the 2013 reforms, the Commission 
expressed its expectation that these measures would contribute towards meeting the 
CAP’s main environmental objectives by accelerating ‘the process of integration of 
environmental requirements…and reinforce[ing] the ability of land and natural 
ecosystems to…address major EU biodiversity and climate change adaptation 
objectives’.18 Likewise commentary from the General Secretariat of the Council 
underscored that the ‘coherence and consistency of the greening model is essential in 
order to ensure…more sustainable agriculture’.19  
 However, it is also important to reiterate that these changes have been vital for 
maintaining public and political support for the continuation of the vast transfer of 
payments that are made in the form of direct payments to farmers. Thus, by adding 
environmental conditions and obligations to the receipt of these payments, the 
intention has been to address agricultural externalities, as well as ensuring the 
provision of a minimum level of public goods. In this light, the decision to link direct 
payments to greater environmental services and benefits was crucial for ensuring 
continued support for the CAP.20 Indeed, as highlighted at numerous points above, the 
choice of the Commission to focus its reform efforts on changing the basis and 
structure of Pillar I payments was accompanied by a corresponding attempt to ensure 
that these payments delivered improved environmental dividends.21 This was 
particularly important given the widespread territorial coverage and substantial 
budgetary allocation attributed to the basic payment. In reflection of its significant 
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application, the approach under the new framework has therefore been to attach 
mandatory practices to the receipt of basic income support.  
 As originally proposed by the Commission, Regulation 1307/2013 requires 
MSs to grant, on top of the basic payment, ‘an annual payment which may take 
account of internal convergence in the Member State or region, for compulsory 
practices to be followed by farmers addressing, as a priority, both climate and 
environment policy goals’.22 Consequently, MSs have had to commit 30 per cent of 
their direct payments budgets towards funding the ‘greening component’, which is 
currently second only to the basic payment in terms of overall spending.23  
 The decision by the Commission to focus its efforts on greening the first pillar 
was, as already highlighted, primarily defended on the basis that it would ensure the 
greatest possible coverage of additional environmental measures due to the high 
uptake of basic income support (formerly under the SFP and SAPS) among EU 
farmers. Indeed, the underlying rationale was that the three greening measures were 
to apply on a general basis to all recipients of basic income support, which would 
certainly have added to the environmental obligations of a sizable portion of EU 
farmers. However, as already indicated, the new framework has also been 
accompanied by a degree of flexibility that has effected the application of the greening 
measures in a number of ways. Against this background, the following sections 
examine each of the three greening measures and consider the extent to which they 
may be expected to meet initial assurances of improved environmental protection and 
management of resources by recipients of the basic payment.       
 
5.3.1 Crop Diversification 
The obligations relating to crop diversification are set out in Article 44 of Regulation 
1307/2013 and further supplemented by detailed rules on implementation under 
Delegated Regulation 639/2014.24 The new framework requires recipients of the basic 
payment whose arable land is not ‘entirely cultivated with crops under water for a 
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significant part of the year or for a significant part of the crop cycle’ to cultivate at 
least two crops if they operate on holdings of between 10–30 hectares, whereas 
holdings consisting of over 30 hectares are required to grow at least three crops. In 
addition, farmers subject to a two crop minimum must ensure that the main crop does 
not cover more than 75 per cent of the arable land, and in cases where the holding is 
subject to a three crop minimum requirement, the two main crops shall not cover more 
than 95 per cent of the total arable land.25 
 Certainly, the enacted framework provides notably less coverage than that 
originally proposed, which would, in principle, have required farmers to cultivate at 
least three different crops where their arable land covered more than three hectares, 
with none of the three crops covering less than five per cent of the arable land and the 
main crop not exceeding 70 per cent of the such land. In addition to reducing the 
minimum number of crops, the final measure also exempts all holdings consisting of 
less than ten hectares on the basis that the ‘obligations relating to crop diversification 
should be applied in a way that takes into account the difficulty for smaller farms to 
diversify, while continuing to make progress towards enhanced environmental 
benefit, and in particular the improvement of soil’.26 Moreover, the way in which the 
final measure has been formulated is likely to affect its application and 
implementation in a number of material ways. 
 First, it may be noted that the general rules have been relaxed in favour of 
grassland and land laying fallow.27 Indeed, the Preamble to Regulation 1307/2013 
explicitly calls for exceptions to be made ‘for farms that already fulfil the objectives 
of crop diversification as a result of being covered to a significant extent by grassland 
or fallowland, for specialised farms rotating their parcels each year or for farms that 
because of their geographical localisation would have excessive difficulties in 
introducing a third crop’.28 Consequently, the maximum threshold of 95 per cent does 
not apply to holdings where grasses or other herbaceous forage or land lying fallow 
cover more than 75 per cent of the arable land.29 In such cases, Article 44(2) provides 
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that the main crop shall not cover more than 75 per cent of the remaining arable land, 
except where this area is covered by grasses or other herbaceous forage or land laying 
fallow.  
 Similarly, complete exemptions from the crop diversification requirements are 
extended to, amongst others, ‘farms that already fulfil the objectives of crop 
diversification as a result of being covered to a significant extent by grassland or 
fallowland’.30 The details are provided in Article 44(3)(a) and (b), under which the 
crop diversification requirement does not apply to holdings ‘(a) where more than 75 
per cent of the arable land is used for the production of grasses or other herbaceous 
forage, is land lying fallow, or is subject to a combination of these uses, provided that 
the arable area not covered by these uses does not exceed 30 hectares’, or; ‘(b) where 
more than 75 per cent of the eligible agricultural area is permanent grassland, used for 
the production of grasses or other herbaceous forage or for the cultivation of crops 
under water for a significant part of the year or for a significant part of the crop cycle, 
or is subject to a combination of these uses, provided that the arable area not covered 
by these uses does not exceed 30 hectares’.31  
 Moreover, special rules apply to holdings situated north of the 62nd parallel or 
certain adjacent areas. In their case, holdings consisting of ten hectares or more of 
arable land are merely required to cultivate a minimum of two crops, with none of 
them covering more than 75 per cent of arable land unless the main crop is grasses or 
other herbaceous forage, or land lying fallow. And it may also be noted that the crop 
diversification measure will not apply to holdings ‘where more than 50 per cent of the 
areas of arable land declared were not declared by the farmer in his aid application of 
the previous year and, where based on a comparison of the geo-spatial aid 
applications, all arable land is being cultivated with a different crop compared to that 
of the previous calendar year’.32 
 Secondly, implementation of the crop diversification measure is affected by 
the definition of what constitutes a ‘crop’ for the purposes of compliance under the 
current framework. This is provided in Article 44(4), which defines as a ‘crop’; ‘ 
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(a) a culture of any of the different genera defined in the botanical 
classification of crops; 
(b) a culture of any of the species in the case of Brassicaceae, Solanaceae, 
and Cucurbitaceae; 
(c) land lying fallow;  
(d) grasses or other herbaceous forage; 
 
To this should be added that the regime was further relaxed by permitting winter crops 
and spring crops to be considered distinct crops even if they belong to the same genus 
(although the supplementary Commission Delegated Regulation does provide that, 
where a main crop is under-sown with a second crop, the area is to be considered as 
covered only with the main crop).33 Importantly, moreover, this list is non-exhaustive 
and may be extended for the purpose of; ‘(a) recognising other types of genera and 
species than those referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article and; (b) laying down the 
rules concerning the application of the precise calculation of shares of different crops.  
 Thirdly, the rules for implementing the crops diversification measure have 
been further detailed with regards to the calculation of shares of different crops. These 
rules are set out in Delegated Regulation 639/2014 and relate to the period that may 
be taken into account for the calculation of the relative share of crops, the implications 
of landscape features situated on arable land and the specific cases of mixed cropping 
in distinct rows, under-sowing and the use of seed mixtures. 
 With regards to the first of these, Article 40 of the delegated act specifies that 
for the purpose of calculating the shares of the different crops, as required under 
Article 44 of the basic act, ‘the period to be taken into account shall be the most 
relevant part of the cultivation period taking account of the traditional cultivation 
practices in the national context’.34 To this effect, each hectare of arable land 
belonging to a holding ‘shall be taken into account only once in one claim year for the 
purpose of the calculation of the shares of different crops’.35 According to the 
Commission, this would allow for account to be taken of the practical timing of crop 
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cultivation, which differ considerably across the 28 MSs, as well as facilitate a simple 
administration.36 
 The second aspect of crop diversification addressed in the Commission’s 
delegated regulation was the issue of landscape elements situated within arable fields 
and the need to clarify to farmers and MSs how to take account of the arable area 
occupied by such features.37 For the purpose of calculating the shares of different 
crops, Article 40(2) therefore provides that ‘the area covered by a crop may include 
landscape features that form part of the eligible area in accordance with Article 9 of 
Delegated Regulation (EU) No 640/2014’.38 
 The third element introduced under the delegated regulation relates to 
supplementary rules for specific cases of mixed cropping in distinct rows, under-
sowing and the use of seed mixtures. With regards to mixed cropping systems where 
two or more crops are grown in distinct rows, Article 40(3) allows them to be counted 
as distinct crops, provided that they each cover at least 25 per cent of the arable area. 
However, additional crops that are part of mixed cropping systems consisting of a 
main crop and an under-sown second crop are not recognised a distinct crops under 
this framework. In such cases, the arable area will only be considered as covered with 
one crop.39 The provision also clarifies that the use of seed mixtures may be 
recognised as partial fulfilment of the requirement to grow at least two crops. 
Specifically, Article 40(3) of the delegated regulation provides that areas ‘on which a 
seed mixture is sown shall, irrespective of the specific crops included in the mix, be 
considered as covered with one single crop and referred to as ‘mixed crop’. Moreover, 
where it can be established that the species included the seed mixtures are different to 
each other, MSs may choose to recognise those different seed mixtures as distinct 
                                                 
36
 Ibid, Preamble (40). 
37
 Ibid, Preamble (41). 
38
 Ibid, Article 40(2). Further, Article 9(1) of Delegated Regulation 340/2014 provides that: ‘Where 
certain landscape features, in particular hedges, ditches and walls, are traditionally part of good 
agriculture cropping or utilisation practices on agricultural area in certain regions, Member States 
may decide that the corresponding area shall be considered part of the eligible area of an agricultural 
parcel within the meaning of Article 67(4)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 provided that it does 
not exceed a total width to be determined by the Member State concerned’. Moreover, Article 9(2) 
adds that: ‘Any landscape features subject to the requirements and standards listed in Annex II to 
Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 which form part of the total area of an agricultural parcel shall be 
considered part of the eligible area of that agricultural parcel’. 
39
 Ibid, Article 40(3). 
- 177 - 
single crops, provided that those different seed mixtures are not used for grasses or 
other herbaceous forage.40 
 Fourthly, and lastly, it should also be noted that Annex IX of Regulation 
1307/2013 lists four practices that are recognised as equivalent to the crop 
diversification measure, thereby, requiring no further action on the part of the farmer 
to fulfil this element of the greening component. First, this includes crop 
diversification practices that go beyond those required under the basic framework. For 
instance, holdings on which at least four crops are grown will automatically comply, 
provided that main crop does not exceed 75 per cent of the arable land.41 Secondly, 
certain crop rotation practices may be recognised as fulfilling the crop diversification 
obligation, provided that a ‘more environmentally beneficial multiannual sequence of 
crops and/or fallow is followed’ and/or a minimum of four crops are grown, again 
with none of the main crops exceeding 75 per cent of the arable land. Thirdly and 
fourthly, the Annex recognises winter soil cover and the cultivation as catch crops as 
practices equivalent to the crop diversification measures.42  
 
5.3.1.1 Implementation of the Crop Diversification Measure 
As already noted, the principal objective of crop diversification is to improve the 
resilience of soils and ecosystems.43 However, given the dilution of the proposed 
measure, it would seem that crop diversification will only be applied on a small share 
of European farmland, leaving most holdings and beneficiaries of direct payments 
virtually unaffected.44 For instance, analysis by the Joint Research Centre in 2015 
found that agricultural income at the national level decreases by less than one per cent 
and that the proportion of reallocated land represents less than 0.5 per cent of the total 
agricultural area, although individual farmers could see a significant fall in income in 
excess of 10 per cent.45  Likewise, a similar analysis conducted by the European 
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Commission found that, when comparing the difference between a status quo policy 
assumption and greening in 2025, the area subject to the crop diversification 
requirement represents 0.8 per cent arable area and 0.6 per cent of UAA in the EU-
27.46 Notwithstanding these projections, the response of the Commission has been 
positive given that, in its view, the figures indicate that most farmers are already 
operating in compliance with the crop diversification requirement, which is seen as a 
successful effort of targeting those who undertake monoculture.47   
 
5.3.2 Permanent Grasslands 
The second part of the greening component is set out in Article 45 of Regulation 
1307/2013 and aims at ‘preserving the permanent grassland areas that contribute most 
to the protection of the environment and in particular carbon sequestration, 
biodiversity and soil protection’.48 As already noted, the protection of such areas was 
previously part of the cross-compliance regime, which contained an obligation to 
maintain permanent pasture.49 However, following the 2013 CAP reform, the 
greening instrument now provides the primary platform for delivering this objective, 
with two distinct responsibilities being placed on MSs to: (i) designate permanent 
grassland in environmentally sensitive areas and;50 (ii) ensure that the ratio of areas 
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of permanent grassland to the total agricultural area declared by the farmers … does 
not decrease by more than 5 per cent compared to a reference ratio to be established 
by Member States in 2015’.51  
 With regards to the first aspect of the permanent grassland measure, Article 
45(1) requires MSs to designate environmentally sensitive grasslands covered by the 
Birds Directive52 and the Habitats Directive,53 including ‘peat and wetlands situated 
in these areas, and which need strict protection in order to meet the objectives of those 
Directives’.54 In particular, it aims to protect the most environmentally sensitive parts 
of Natura 2000 areas by prohibiting conversion or ploughing of permanent grasslands 
in these areas.55 Hence, MSs are required to designate environmentally sensitive 
grasslands in Natura 2000 areas, but may also choose to recognise additional sensitive 
areas that are not covered by the aforementioned directives, including grasslands and 
carbon rich soils, in order to ensure further protection of environmentally valuable 
permanent grasslands.56 Such additional action may be taken on the basis of one, or 
more, of eight criteria listed under Article 41 of the delegated regulation. These 
include areas:   
 
(e) covering organic soils with a high percentage of organic carbon, such as 
peat land or wetlands; 
(f) hosting habitats listed in Annex I to Directive 92/43/EEC or protected 
under national legislation; 
(g) hosting plant species listed in Annex II to Directive 92/43/EEC or 
protected under national legislation; 
(h) being of significant importance for wild bird species listed in Annex I to 
Directive 2009/147/EC; 
(i) being of significant importance for wild animal species protected under 
Directive 92/43/EEC or protected under national legislation; 
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(j) covering permanent grassland of high nature value as defined by objective 
criteria to be established by the Member State; 
(k) covering soils with a high risk of erosion; 
(l) being located in a sensitive area designated within the river basin 
management plans pursuant to Directive 2000/60/EC. 
 
The second aspect of the measure, requires MSs to ensure that the total area of 
permanent grassland, relative to the area of agricultural land, does not decrease more 
than five percent below the relevant reference ratio.57 The ratio may be determined on 
the national, regional, sub-national or holding level and in the event that it decreases 
by more than 5 per cent, MSs are responsible for enforcing ‘obligations at holding 
level to reconvert land into permanent grassland for those farmers who have land at 
their disposal which was converted from land under permanent pasture or from 
permanent grassland into land for other uses … in the past’.58 This may include, but 
is not limited to, providing individual and ‘precise instructions to be respected by the 
farmer concerned on how to reverse the environmental damage caused in order to 
restore the environmentally sensitive status’.59 Importantly, MSs are required to 
establish rules for calculating, as well as maintaining the aforementioned reference 
ratio of permanent grassland.  
 Detailed guidance for the calculation of the ratio of permanent grassland was 
provided under Article 43 of the delegated act. In particular, the provision specifies 
that grassland situated on holdings enrolled in the small farmers scheme, as well as 
those used for organic production shall not be included in the overall ratio of 
permanent grassland to the total agricultural area.60 Likewise, MSs were able to 
deduce from the calculation of areas with permanent grassland, areas declared by 
farmers in 2012 as land under permanent pasture that have been converted into land 
for other uses, provided that the rules on the maintenance of permanent pasture as laid 
down in Article 6(2) of Regulation 73/2009 and in Article 93(3) of Regulation 
1306/2013 were met.61  
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 Once MSs have calculated the relevant reference ratio, it is incumbent upon 
them to establish rules to maintain permanent grasslands by ensuring that they are not 
reduced beyond the five per cent reference ratio. In doing so MS may require farmers 
to seek authorisation prior to converting permanent grassland to other uses.62 Such 
conversion may, for instance, be subject to the condition that another area of a 
corresponding number of hectares be converted to permanent grassland, in which case 
the latter is to be considered as permanent grassland as of the first day of conversion.63 
It should, however, be noted that MSs are under no obligation to establish rules for 
pre-authorisation of the conversion of permanent grasslands. Rather, Article 43(2) of 
the delegated act requires that MSs establish rules for reconversion in the event that 
the area of permanent grassland does fall below the applicable reference ratio. In other 
words, while MSs are under an obligation to monitor the ratio of permanent grassland 
to the total agricultural area on an annual basis, no concrete action is required until 
and unless it has been established that this ratio has, in fact, been transgressed. As will 
be further discussed below, this modus operandi is clearly more reactive than the 
aforementioned authorisation instrument, as it only becomes operational once the 
damage has been ‘done’.  
 In the event that the reference ratio of permanent grasslands falls below five 
per cent, MSs will have to determine of the range of farmers that will be subject to 
reconversion obligation according to the basic criteria established under Article 44(2) 
of the aforementioned regulation. Moreover, MS are required to inform farmers of 
this obligation before 31 December of the year in which the decrease beyond 5 per 
cent is established. This obligation ‘shall be complied with before the date for the 
submission of the single application for the following year, or in the case of Sweden 
and Finland, 30 June of the following year’.64 By way of derogation from the meaning 
of permanent grasslands provided under Article 4(1)(h) of the basic act, areas that are 
reconverted to grass or green cover may be regarded as permanent grasslands from 
the first day of reconversion or establishment.  
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5.3.2.1 Implementation of the Permanent Grassland Measure  
With regards to the first aspect of the permanent grassland measure, the decisions 
taken by MSs in 2014 revealed that varying levels of protection for grasslands have 
been pursued during the post-2014 programming period. Thus, while ten MSs have 
chosen to designate 100 per cent of all permanent grassland located within Natura 
2000 areas as environmentally sensitive, other MSs have chosen to designate 
considerably less.65 Most notably, Portugal and Estonia have each designated a mere 
one per cent of such grasslands as environmentally sensitive, while Ireland and Latvia 
have designated two and three per cent respectively. On the whole, 75 per cent of 
permanent grasslands located in Natura 2000 areas have been afforded this added 
layer of protection across the EU-28.66 However, there has clearly been a limited 
appetite to extend this status beyond the basic obligation, with only three MSs (Czech 
Republic, Latvia and Luxembourg) opting to designate grasslands located outside 
areas covered by the Birds and Habitats Directives.  
 As outline above, the second aspect of the measure requires that MSs maintain 
permanent grasslands at 95 per cent of the 2015 reference level. Accordingly, MSs 
have had to calculate and submit to the Commission the reference ratios that will be 
applicable from that year and onwards.67 And, following implementation, it would 
appear that MS have, in most cases, opted for utmost flexibility, with 24 MSs choosing 
to apply the ratio of permanent grassland at national level, while Belgium, Germany, 
France and the UK have done so at the regional level. Malta was the only MS that 
reported having no permanent grassland in 2014.  
 As has been seen, MSs were also granted considerable flexibility to establish 
the conditions under which conversion – not exceeding the 5 per cent ratio – may be 
authorised and/or monitored. Consequently, the choices made to this effect have the 
potential to influence the type of grasslands converted and the net decline that may be 
expected, based on the detailed rules drawn up by the MSs and other competent 
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authorities.68 And, given the level of flexibility, these impacts are likely to differ 
accordingly. In Germany, for instance, authorisation to convert permanent grassland 
must be sought before any action is taken and will, as a general rule, only be granted 
if an equivalent areas of land is re-instated as permanent grassland in same region as 
the farmer seeking the conversion.69 Further, in total only three MSs – Germany, 
Luxembourg and Portugal – have chosen to implement systems of pre-authorisation. 
By contrast, the approach taken in other MSs, including the UK is arguably more 
reactive, as the competent authority will only intervene to restore permanent 
grasslands on the regional level once the 5 per cent ration has been transgressed.70 The 
ecological outcomes of the permanent grassland measure will be further discussed 
below in connected with the expected impacts of the new direct payments regime upon 
climate change mitigation. 
 
5.3.3 Ecological Focus Areas 
As noted in the previous Chapter, the introduction of the EFA element was, in addition 
to being recognised as the most promising of the three measures, also the most 
contested during the course of the inter-institutional negotiations for its potential to 
affect production.71 The outcome has been that the final measures differ notably from 
those originally proposed. For instance, as a matter of preliminary consideration, it 
may be recalled that whereas the proposed legislation would have imposed a general 
obligation to implement the EFA on holdings consisting of more than seven 
hectares,72 the measure, as enacted, sets this threshold at 15 hectares.73 Furthermore, 
this requirement was initially intended to apply to seven per cent of the eligible area 
belonging to the holding, but has been reduced to five per cent in respect of arable 
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land,74 although the EP and the Council have the possibility of raising this to seven 
per cent pursuant to Article 43(2).75 
 The basic thresholds entail that a notably larger portion of the land managed 
by European smallholders will be entirely exempt from the requirement to establish 
EFAs than initially sought by the Commission. Indeed, according to Pe’er et al, the 
area threshold of 15 hectares entails that this exemption applies to about 88 per cent 
of EU holdings and 48 per cent of the farmed area.76 Notwithstanding this substantial 
limitation in coverage, however, the approach is defended in the Preamble on the basis 
that the EFA measure ‘should be applied in a way that avoids putting a 
disproportionate burden on smaller farms in comparison to the additional enhanced 
environmental benefit’.77 Moreover, the regulation provides for a number of 
additional exemptions to be made for holdings fulfilling specified criteria. For 
instance, provided that the arable area is not covered by those uses, and does not 
exceed 30 hectares, they will not be subject to the EFA requirement where more than 
75 per cent of the arable land is used for production of ‘grasses or other herbaceous 
forage, is land lying fallow, is used for cultivation of leguminous crops, or is subject 
to a combination of those uses’.78  
 Exemption is also made for holdings consisting of less than 30 hectares where 
more than 75 per cent of the eligible agricultural area ‘is permanent grassland, is used 
for the production of grasses or other herbaceous forage or for the cultivation of crops 
under water either for a significant part of the year or for a significant part of the crop 
cycle, or is subject to a combination of those uses’.79 Likewise, where more than 50 
per cent of the land surface area of an MS is covered by forests, Article 46(7) allows 
those MSs to exempt holdings situated in areas designated as facing ‘natural 
constraints’ from complying with this greening measure, provided that more than 50 
per cent of the relevant ‘unit’ is covered by forest and there is more than three times 
as much forest land as agricultural land.80 This condition is met by five MSs, of which 
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four are currently opting to implement this exemption (Estonia, Finland, Latvia and 
Sweden).81   
 Farms that are not covered by the aforementioned exceptions are thus, in 
principle, obliged to dedicate 5 per cent of their arable land towards the establishment 
of EFAs.82 However, this requirement is further qualified by detailed rules setting out 
the parts of the holding that may be counted as part of the EFA, as well the types of 
land use practices that may be carried out on them. Indeed, it may be recalled that both 
the EP and Council sought successfully to expand these and other options during the 
course of the negotiations. Thus, with a view to allowing for implementation to be 
adapted to national and regional considerations, the enacted rules, provide MSs with 
numerous options that can be made available to farmers to fulfil their EFA obligation. 
In order to more comprehensively discuss the practical implementation and expected 
outcomes of the current measure, it is therefore necessary to first consider the main 
options offered to – and pursued by – MSs under the current framework. 
 For those holdings to which the EFA measure does apply, an initial matter of 
consideration pertains to the specific parts that may be counted towards this end.83 
Article 46(2) lists ten standard element that MSs may make available to farmers to 
fulfil their EFA obligation on arable land. These include the following:  
 
(a) land lying fallow; 
(b) terraces; 
(c) landscape features; 
(d) buffer strips; 
(e) hectares of agro-forestry that receive, or have received, support under the 
rural development regime; 
(f) strips of eligible hectares along forest edges; 
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(g) areas with short rotation coppice where there has been no use of mineral 
fertiliser and/or plant protection products; 
(h) afforested areas which had given a right to payment under the Single 
Payment Scheme in 2008 and which had received rural development 
support;  
(i) areas with catch crops, or green cover established by the planting and 
germination of seeds (but subject to weighting factors); and 
(j) areas with nitrogen-fixing crops.84  
 
The delegated act provides additional criteria aimed at qualifying a number of the 
above listed features and areas in counting towards the fulfilment of the EFA 
requirement. With regards to the first of these, for instance, Article 45(2) of the 
delegated act specifies that, where the option to include land laying fallow is used by 
MSs, production should not be carried out on such land, although the Preamble adds 
that this ‘should not exclude voluntary actions such as the seeding of wildflower 
mixtures with a view to improve the biodiversity benefits’.85 Moreover, land laying 
fallow for more than five years for the purpose of fulfilling the EFA obligation, shall 
remain as arable land pursuant to the same Article.  
 The delegated regulation also lists the landscape features that may count as 
part of the holding’s EFA. These cover landscape features protected under GAEC 7, 
SMR 2 or SMR 3 as referred to in Annex II to Regulation 1306/2013 as well as the 
following features: 
 
 (a) hedges or wooded strips with a width of up to 10 meters; 
 (b) isolated trees with a crown diameter of minimum 4 meters; 
 (c) trees in line with a crown diameter of minimum 4 meters. The space  
       between the crowns shall not exceed 5 meters; 
 (d) trees in group, where trees are connected by overlapping crown cover, and 
       field copses of maximum 0.3 ha in both cases; 
 (e) field margins with a width between 1 and 20 meters, on which there shall 
       be no agricultural production; 
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 (f) ponds of up to a maximum of 0,1 ha. Reservoirs made of concrete or plastic 
       shall not be considered ecological focus area; 
 (g) ditches with a maximum width of 6 meters, including open watercourses 
       for the purpose of irrigation or drainage. Channels with walls of concrete 
       shall not be considered ecological focus area. 
 (h) traditional stone walls.86 
 
For MSs that choose to offer the possibility of including buffer strips as part of the 
EFA element, Article 45(5) of the Delegated Act specifies that these include those 
required under GAEC 1, SMR 1 or SMR 10 as referred to in Annex II to Regulation 
(EU) No 1306/2013, as well as other buffer strips. In particular, the provision requires 
that these qualifying buffer strips ‘shall be located on or adjacent to an arable field in 
such a way that their long edges are parallel to the edge of a water course or water 
body’.87 Such an approach is supported by the Commission on the basis that buffer 
strips located ‘near the border of arable fields along water courses or within fields 
higher upon a slope, are beneficial for the purpose of reducing runoff to surface waters 
of pollutants’.88 Moreover, in the interest of delivering benefits for biodiversity, the 
provision further precludes production from taking place on buffer strips that are 
counted as part of the EFA.89 
 As regards strips of eligible hectares along forest edges, on the other hand, 
MSs wishing to include this element are allowed to determine whether or not to allow 
production on such areas of the holding.90 That said, it should be noted that the 
Preamble to the regulation clearly supported the prohibition of production on the basis 
that ‘such a requirement will provide a higher value of ecological focus area which 
should be reflected in a differentiated value for the weighting factor for this type of 
area’.91 In the case that MSs decide not to permit production to be carried out, they 
may, however, ‘allow grazing or cutting, provided the strip remains distinguishable 
from adjacent agricultural land’.92 The width of these strips may be established by the 
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MSs, but should not exceed ten metres or be less than one metre. When setting further 
conditions under which agro-forestry may qualify as part of EFAs, MSs should ‘take 
the biodiversity objective into account…for receiving support for the establishment 
of agro-forestry systems in their rural development programmes’.93 
 The delegated regulation also provides detailed rules pertaining to the option 
to allow areas with short rotation coppice to be counted towards the establishment of 
EFAs. In particular, MSs are required to draw up a list of species that are most suitable 
from an ecological perspective, with a view to excluding non-indigenous species.94 
Pursuant to the above mentioned preclusion of the use of mineral fertiliser and/or plant 
protection products MSs are also required to ‘establish the requirements as regards 
the use of mineral fertilisers and plant protection products, keeping in mind the 
objective of ecological focus areas in particular to safeguard and improve 
biodiversity’.95 
  With regards to the option to count land covered by catch crops or green 
cover, Article 45(9) specifies that this includes areas established under SMR 1 as 
referred to in Annex II to Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and other areas under catch 
crops or green cover, ‘on the condition that they were established by sowing a mixture 
of crop species or by under-sowing grass in the main crop’. In particular, this option 
was included with a view to utilising the capacity of catch crops and green cover to 
effectively absorb residual nitrogen and avoid bare soil and diffuse pollution of 
groundwater.96 Consequently, MSs are required to draw up a list of mixtures of crop 
species and establish a period – extended no later than 1 October – for the sowing of 
catch crops or green cover, as well as additional conditions relating to production 
methods.97 This should, however, ‘not include areas under winter crops which are 
sown in autumn normally for harvesting or for grazing’.98 
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 Lastly, the option to include areas with nitrogen-fixing crops has been further 
qualified to ensure its uniform implementation. In particular, MSs are required to 
establish a list of nitrogen-fixing crops that are considered to contribute to the 
objective of improving biodiversity.99 Farmers may then choose to include areas 
covered by the listed crops on their EFA, provided that these crops are present during 
the growing season. Moreover, MSs must also specify the parts of the holding on 
which nitrogen-fixing crops may be grown in order to avoid their cultivation on areas 
that would lead to increased nitrogen leaching or deteriorated water quality. 
 In addition to choosing which of the above mentioned elements to recognise 
for the purpose of implementing the EFA measure, it should be noted that a further 
degree of flexibility was added by the ability of MSs to make use of the conversion 
and/or weighing factors, set out in Annex X of Regulation 1307/2013, when 
calculating the total hectares of arable land dedicated to the EFA. These were specified 
by the Commission in Annex II of Delegated Regulation 639/2014, which provides a 
table indicating how each of the EFA elements shall be counted as part of the 
obligation to designate 5 per cent of the arable land on affected holdings. In particular 
the use of conversion and weighing factors is intended to reflect the varying levels of 
importance that the different options have for biodiversity.100   
  
5.3.3.1 Implementation of the EFA Measure: The Main Elements 
Given the range of selection enjoyed by MSs for the purpose of implementing the new 
EFA measure, the details of its application were only appreciated following 
notification of their choices to the Commission in late 2014.101 These notifications 
revealed that a range of options had been chosen by MSs and will thereby be available 
to farmers when seeking to comply with the obligation to devote 5 per cent of their 
arable land to the establishment of EFA.102 It should, however, be noted that the 
number of elements chosen by each MS varies considerably, with some, including 
Germany and France, implementing all available options (17 and 18 respectively), 
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while others such as the Netherland and Spain have opted to include as little as four.103 
Moreover, following the Commission’s one year review of implementation, it is clear 
that three of these options – the cultivation of nitrogen-fixing crops, land laying fallow 
and catch crops – have thus far accounted for almost 95 per cent of the land devoted 
to the EFA obligation.104 Consequently, the way in which these options are 
implemented will be particularly important for determining the impacts of the EFA 
measure.  In order to explore the extent to which meaningful outcomes for biodiversity 
might be expected, it is therefore necessary to consider some of the detailed rules 
relating to the implementation of the aforementioned elements, as well as others that 
have enjoyed uptake by farmers.  In this light, a number of key observations may be 
offered. 
 First, it should be reiterated that the enacted legal provisions have considerably 
reduced the application the proposed EFA measure, with basic threshold of 15 
hectares entailing that almost half (48 per cent) of the EU’s UAA will automatically 
be exempt from fulfilling the specific requirements attached to this aspect of the 
greening component. Some estimates indicate that this may include up to 94 per cent 
of holding in newer MSs, where the average farm size is notably smaller than that of 
the EU-15, while the corresponding figure for holdings across the EU-28 is said to be 
around 88 per cent.105 This is, however, partly due to the fact that EFAs are calculated 
based on the arable area of agricultural holdings, thereby excluding areas consisting 
of eg permanent pasture and grasslands. And, the overall amount of farmland covered 
has been further affected by the activation of the forest exemption, which seeks to 
reduce the greening obligations for farmers in afforested areas where there is a 
significant risk of land abandonment and been adopted by Estonia, Finland, Latvia 
and Sweden.106 In addition, the recognition of equivalent measures have been 
approved for France, Austria, the Netherlands, Poland and Ireland, which has 
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provided further scope for farmers in these MSs to qualify for the greening payment 
without undertaking novel obligations to this effect.107 
 Secondly, even in cases where the EFA requirement does apply, the enacted 
measure arguably provides considerably greater scope for production to be carried out 
on designated areas than initially proposed. As noted in the previous Chapter, this 
condition had partly been imposed during the negotiations due to the general political 
opposition to the introduction of agri-environmental measures that had the potential 
to impact upon agricultural output. Moreover, the ability to carry out production was 
also central to distinguishing the new measure from previous set-aside schemes, 
which were criticised, at the time of the negotiations, for their potential effect on 
productivity.108 It is thus somewhat unsurprising that, of the options listed under 
Article 46(2), a number of them allow production to take place to some extent or 
another.  
 The most popular choice by MSs has been to include areas with nitrogen fixing 
crops as part of the EFA, with all but Denmark opting to implement this element 
against a weighing factor of 0.7.109 For the purpose of determining which particular 
crops to count, MS were able to choose from a list of 24 species, including common 
crops such as chickpeas, soybeans, lentils, peas and various types of beans amongst 
others.110 Consequently, some of the major agricultural states have opted to approve 
a high proportion of these crops including Italy and France, which currently recognise 
19 and 18 crops respectively. Likewise, with regards to newer MSs, Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have opted to include arable land covered by 
one or more of 14 nitrogen-fixing species chosen by each of them respectively.111  
 The uptake of the nitrogen-fixing crop option has been remarkable and was 
estimated to have covered almost 40 per cent of all land subject to the EFA obligation 
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in 2015, after weighing measures were taken into account.112 According to the 
Commission this land use has been accompanied by a 4.4 per cent increase in the 
output of protein crops across the EU in 2015, with this figure being significantly 
higher in some MSs.113 Consequently, a number of environmental benefits could 
potentially result from such expansion including reduced CO2 emissions (due to 
reduced fertiliser application) and improved soil structure.114 However, 
notwithstanding these and other benefits of growing nitrogen-fixing crops – not least 
if they are accompanied by shifts in consumer behaviour towards replacing 
historically high intakes of animal protein with that of plants – important questions 
remain surrounding the impact of such production on biodiversity following 
implementation by the MSs. In particular, it may be noted that a number of MSs have 
not explicitly banned the use of nitrogen fertilisers on areas cultivated by these crops, 
and many also fail to prohibit the use of ‘plant protection products’.115 Moreover, this 
measure has the potential to overlap with VCS in cases where MSs have opted to link 
such payments to the production of protein crops. These aspects will be further 
discussed below in relation to ex-post analyses of the VCS regime and the 
environmental outcomes that may be expected under the new direct payments 
framework. 
 Additional scope to carry out production is possible for farmers in the 20 MS 
that have chosen to recognise areas used to cultivate short rotation coppice as 
fulfilment of the EFA obligation.116 Accordingly, these MSs have had to draw up 
individual lists of suitable species, as well as the rules relating to the use of mineral 
fertilisers and pesticides, with the latter being generally prohibited on areas belonging 
to the designated EFA. However, following the notifications made to the Commission, 
it is clear that implementation will differ with regards to both the number and types 
of species that MSs have opted to include. For instance, while Sweden and Estonia 
have respectively only chosen to recognise one specie, Denmark and Ireland have 
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settled for ten each. Of the chosen species, the most popular are Willow (chosen by 
all 20 MSs), Poplar (17 MSs), Alder (14 MSs), Birch (11 MSs) and Ash (11 MSs), 
which is largely reflective of the status quo of the EU-28 where these species are 
widely cultivated.117 This is an important aspect of implementation, as one of the main 
criteria for this element is the need to ensure that listed species are native to MSs in 
order to obtain the greatest benefits for biodiversity, including supporting birds of 
open range wooded habitats.118 Thus, Hart has cautioned that these objectives may be 
undermined if non-native species are added to the list, as was for instance found to be 
the case with regards to the inclusion of Black Locust by Romania – despite its 
invasive tendencies in open habitat.119 
 Production may also be carried out on EFAs covered by catch crops and/or 
green cover, following implementation of this element by a total of 19 MSs. As 
required under Article 45(9) of the delegated regulation, these MSs have therefore had 
to specify; the mixtures of crop species that can be used; the period for sowing for 
catch crops and/or green cover and; additional conditions relating to production 
methods can be identified.120 With regards to the first of these, notable variations may 
be observed, with Germany having opted to include the greatest number of species 
(84), while Latvia has included one species and Sweden only allows green cover to 
be counted as part of the EFA obligation.121 Permitted sowing dates, are not 
significantly different, although they do vary.  
 The same cannot, however, be said about the conditions for production, which 
have been almost entirely determined by the MSs and, consequently, differ 
considerably. In particular, it should be noted that, while only Germany has explicitly 
prohibited the use of both mineral fertilisers and pesticides.122 This undoubtedly raises 
important questions about the potential impacts of this production, as it implies that 
intensive farming of protein crops could, in theory, be carried out using powerful 
herbicides and still be in compliance with the EFA obligation in a number of MSs.123   
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 Thirdly, even with regards to options that do not allow production, the current 
framework arguably provides a degree of flexibility that has the potential to impact 
upon the quality of the environmental goods delivered by the EFA measure. 
Importantly, the level of choice has resulted in a form of menu model that the 
Commission had explicitly argued against in its Impact Assessment on the basis that 
‘such an approach would very much water down the greening effect, especially if the 
payment does not match the efforts required by farmers, leading them to choose the 
measures with which they comply already or the measures with the least cost, thus 
bringing less environmental benefits’.124  
 Following the implementation by MSs, it would appear that these concerns 
were, at least to some extent, well-founded.  Indeed, a recent case study published by 
the EEA has suggested that the range of choice has not only allowed measures to be 
tailored according to national and regional ecological conditions, but has also been a 
potential means of ensuring a ‘soft’ impact for farmers. In other words, by offering a 
wide range of options some MSs have instead enabled compliance to be easily 
fulfilled, with little effort being required on the part of latter in many cases. Crucially, 
this lack of ambition has been compounded by a failure to ensure that the choices 
made at farm level are aimed at obtaining the best possible outcomes for biodiversity. 
Rather, farmers have been offered notable discretion in determining which areas of 
their arable land to designate as part of the EFA obligation.  
 For instance, the second most popular element, selected by 26 MSs (all except 
the Netherland and Romania), has been to allow land laying fallow to count towards 
fulfilment of the EFA measure. And, following the application of weighing factors, 
the Commission estimates that 38 per cent of the area devoted to EFA by EU farmers 
in 2015 was made up of land devoted to fallow.125 As already noted, a number of 
potential benefits for biodiversity, as well as soil and water resources may be attained 
by taking land out of production for a prolonged period.126 Indeed, notwithstanding 
the slightly larger coverage of land under cultivation of nitrogen-fixing crops, the 
Commission explicitly recognised that ‘the share of fallow land appears more 
important’.127 However, the importance of prolonged and consecutive periods of 
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reduced production is arguably not reflected under the current rules, which merely 
requires that farmers refrain from production on the designated land for specified 
periods on an annual basis. Hence, there is no way of ensuring continuity (ie that the 
same areas are designated in consecutive years) or that the most suitable parts of the 
holding are designated as fallow.  
 In particular, it should be noted that, despite the general ban on production 
specified under Article 45(2) of the delegated act, MSs have enjoyed wide discretion 
in setting additional criteria for the establishment of fallow land.128 Consequently, the 
details of the final rules diverge between the MSs and regions that have chosen to 
support this measure in a number of material ways. Some of these differences, such 
as those relating to the periods during which land must lay fallow, may be expected 
due to variations in cropping conditions across the EU. The rationale behind other 
differences may, however, be less clear. For instance, the rules pertaining to the level 
of activity that may be carried out on designated fallow land vary, while still 
complying with the ban on production. Thus, while Hungary allows such areas to be 
grazed and cut – grass and green cover count as fallow land in Northern Ireland where 
it may also be cut, but not removed during the specified fallow period.129 Moreover, 
implementation in other parts of the UK, especially, has allowed areas sown with wild 
birdseed mixes to be counted as fallow. Again, the extent to which these and other 
practices may be translated into ecological benefits, will largely depend on the 
individual choices made by farmers. In order to safeguard these positive outcomes it 
is, therefore, crucial to ensure that the land being put to fallow is not simply the least 
productive piece of land, but that it holds some environmental merit based on defined 
standards and objectives.130  
 Similar concerns may also be submitted regarding the implementation of 
landscape features, which is the third most popular element, having been selected by 
a total of 24 MSs. Some of these features were already protected under cross-
compliance for their potential environmental benefits, although a number of MSs have 
chosen to expand this list to include ‘other landscape features’ as well.131 This has 
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provided farmers with a wide range of options that may be counted towards fulfilment 
of the EFA measure. Importantly, however, the current rules do not require minimum 
levels of management of these features. Moreover, with regards to features already 
protected under cross-compliance, it is not clear what incentive the EFA requirement 
offers for maintaining them than would otherwise be the case. 
 Additional overlap with cross-compliance standards is also evident pertaining 
to the choice to enable buffer strips to be counted as part of the area devoted to the 
EFA requirement. This option was activated by 17 MSs, of which ten have further 
elected to recognise ‘other buffer strips’ in addition to those required under cross-
compliance.132 As already noted, the potential ecological benefits of buffer strips are 
numerous, including for biodiversity, soil and water quality. Indeed, the Commission 
initially envisaged that their inclusion could serve as ‘natural water retention 
measures’ and thereby contribute towards the creation of a type of ‘green 
infrastructure’ capable of meeting the objectives of the WFD.133 However, Dick et al 
have pointed out that, although these features may certainly contributed towards 
improved water quality, it is less clear how this option provides benefits for wildlife 
and biodiversity more broadly.134 Either way, this measure is currently of limited 
importance, as buffer strips constituted less than two percent of land devoted to EFA 
in 2015.  
 Fourthly, and lastly, it may be noted that an innovative element of the EFA 
measures is the ability of MSs to allow farmers whose holdings are in close proximity 
of each other to implement the measure collectively, provided that at least 50 per cent 
of the area subject to the obligation (2.5 percent of the total arable land) is devoted to 
the common EFA.135 This option was added to the framework during the legislative 
negotiations by the Dutch and Danish Council representatives and allows for adjacent 
and continuous areas to be designated as a single collective entity.136 Notwithstanding 
the potential benefits that could be derived from the establishment of extended and 
uninterrupted areas dedicated to producing environmental public goods, only the 
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Netherlands and Portugal have chosen to allow for collective implementation. 
Certainly, there may be administrative, and other, reasons for choosing not to add 
additional elements to the national and regional implementation under the current 
programming period. However, given its positive potential there would appear to be 
significant scope to expand the premise of this obligation in the future.  
 
5.4 Voluntary Coupled Support: Ex-post Review of the new 
Framework 
An aspect of the Cioloș reforms that received surprisingly limited attention during 
both the inter-institutional negotiations and subsequent implementation process, 
relates to the continuation of VCS schemes during the 2013-2020 programming 
period. That said, as already indicated, it was not possible to fully appreciate the extent 
to which such support would be implemented, given the wide discretion enjoyed by 
MSs to allocate funds, within pre-established limits, in order to support specific types 
of production and agricultural sectors. Thus, it was not until the end of 2014 
(following the submission by MSs of their notifications by 1 August of the same year) 
that it was conceivable to gauge the level of uptake and implementation of VCS 
payments. Before exploring the outcomes of these decisions, it is first necessary to 
consider the legal basis of the reformed VCS framework.  
 
5.4.1 The Basic Framework 
As previously noted, a number of coupled payments remained in place following the 
conclusion of the Health Check in 2008, including payments for sheepmeat, goatmeat, 
veal and beef, inter alia.137 These were further extended under Article 52(2) of 
Regulation 1307/2013, which listed the following 21 sectors and productions that 
would be eligible for support from 2015:  
 
‘cereals, oilseeds, protein crops, grain legumes, flax, hemp, rice, nuts, 
starch potato, milk and milk products, seeds, sheepmeat and goatmeat, 
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beef and veal, olive oil, silkworms, dried fodder, hops, sugar beet, cane 
and chicory, fruit and vegetables and short rotation coppice’.138  
 
For the purpose of implementation, Article 52(3) specifies that support for these 
measures ‘may only be granted to those sectors or to those regions of a Member State 
where specific types of farming or specific agricultural sectors that are particularly 
important for economic, social or environmental reasons undergo certain difficulties’. 
Moreover, Article 52(5) provides that coupled support should only be granted ‘to the 
extent necessary to create an incentive to maintain current levels of production in the 
sectors or regions concerned’. In particular, these limitations were included to ensure 
that the measure would fall within the so called ‘Blue Box’ of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, thereby avoiding that they would be subject to the reduction 
commitments otherwise required of payments falling within the ‘Amber Box’.139  
 The financial provisions are set out under Article 53 and allow MSs to use up 
to eight per cent of their annual direct payments budgets to fund the implementation 
of the VCS measures. In addition, MS are able to use up to a maximum of 13 per cent 
of their annual net ceiling provided that until 31 December 2014 they: (i) applied the 
single area payment scheme laid down in Title V of Regulation (EC) No 73/2009; (ii) 
financed measures under Article 111 of that Regulation (suckler cow premium) or; 
(iii) are covered by the derogation provided for in Article 69(5) or, in the case of 
Malta, in Article 69(1) of that Regulation.140 Alternatively, the 13 per cent maximum 
could be secured by MSs if they used more than five per cent of their direct payments 
budget to fund coupled payments (excluding the crop specific payment for cotton) 
during at least one year between 2010-2014.141 This may be compared to the 
Commission’s original proposals, which would have allowed MSs to maintain a basic 
rate of five per cent for VCS payment, with the possibility of raising this to a 
maximum of eight per cent of their national envelopes.142 
 Furthermore, MSs choosing to operate a system of VSC post-2014, have the 
option of allocating an additional two percent of their annual ceilings to support the 
                                                 
138
 Direct Payments Regulation (n 1) Article 52(2).  
139
 See, Commission Delegated Regulation (n 24) Preamble (5). 
140
 Direct Payments Regulation (n 1) Article 52(2)(a). 
141
 Ibid, Article 52(3)(b). 
142
 European Commission (n 18) Article 38. 
- 199 - 
production of protein crops.143 In particular, this payment was intended to support 
livestock production and to ‘maintain the protein based autonomy of the breeding 
sector’.144 Finally, for those MSs that used more than ten per cent of their direct 
payments budget to fund coupled support payments during at least one year in the 
period 2010-2014 there would be scope to extend the allocation beyond the 13 per 
cent maximum (excluding the payment for protein crops) upon approval by the 
Commission.145 
 
5.4.2 Implementation of VCS Payments 
As of 1 January 2015, the new framework for VCS has been implemented with respect 
to various sectors, and at widely differing levels, by a total of 27 MSs (all except for 
Germany).146 For instance, while Denmark, Luxembourg, Ireland and Sweden have 
opted to support a single sector each, other MSs – some of which have significant 
agricultural sectors – such as Romania and Italy have chosen to support 12 and 11 
sectors, respectively.147 Likewise, while the Netherlands, Ireland and Luxembourg 
have each transferred less than one per cent of their annual budgets to fund VCS 
measures, other MSs have opted for significantly higher rates.148 In total, nine MSs 
chose to allocate less than eight per cent of their national direct payments budgets for 
2015, while 11 MSs have opted to transfer the maximum 13 per cent,149  and nine of 
these (all except for Slovakia and Sweden) making a further two per cent available for 
supporting the protein crop sector.150 To put this into perspective, this is roughly 
equivalent to half of the entire spending on the new greening component in these MSs, 
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which, as will be recalled, accounts for 30 per cent of the direct payments budget since 
1 January 2015.  
 In addition, it should be noted that three MSs successfully sought the 
Commission’s approval to exceed the maximum threshold of 13 per cent, plus the 
additional two per cent for protein crops. Thus, Belgium, Finland and Portugal 
respectively devoted 17, 20 and 21 per cent of their direct payments budgets, towards 
funding coupled support measures in 2015.151 Also, Malta exercised its right to 
derogate from these provisions by spending three million Euro on VCS, which 
amounted to just over 57 per cent of its direct payments budget for the same year.152 
In total, Matthew estimated that the budget for coupled payments has risen from 6.8 
per cent of the direct payments budget in 2013 to 10 per cent in 2015, and although 
this overall increase is not reflected by all MSs, it arguably marks a clear shift from 
the previous programming period and the general trend towards decoupling.153 It 
follows that while some MSs such as Austria, Greece and Portugal have actually 
reduced national levels of coupled support, others have increased theirs dramatically. 
For instance, Finland has increased the level of coupled support from 9 per cent in 
2013 to 20 per cent of its direct payments budget in 2015, while Slovakia has gone 
from 3.3 to 13 per cent during the same period. Most dramatically, Sweden increased 
its level of coupled support from 0.6 per cent to the maximum level of 13 per cent in 
2015.154 
 However, the VCS measure is mainly of relevance to the current thesis and 
discussion given the sectors that have ultimately been supported under the new 
framework. In particular, it should be noted that 82 per cent of the funds used to 
provide coupled support were devoted to animal sectors and production in 2015.155 
This included 41 per cent of the total VCS envelope for beef and veal, which was by 
far the most popular sector and chosen by 24 of the 27 MS that have opted to 
implement VCS.156 The second most popular support sector was milk and dairy, 
accounting for 20 per cent of the VCS budget in 19 MS, followed by support for sheep 
                                                 
151
 Ibid, 9. 
152
 Ibid, 9. See, also Regulation 73/2009 (n 49) Article 69(1). 
153
 A. Matthews, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Coupled Payments in the CAP (16 April 2015) 
(available at http://capreform.eu/two-steps-forward-one-step-back-coupled-payments-in-the-cap/, 
last accessed on 27 June 2017).  
154
 Ibid. 
155
 European Commission (n 147) 9. 
156
 European Commission (n 65) 9. 
- 201 - 
and goat meat in 22 MS. Thus, given the sectors that MSs have chosen to support, 
implementation of the VLC measure clearly has the potential to impact upon the 
environment given the climate ‘footprint’ of the supported sectors. 
 Indeed, as outlined above, MSs enjoy broad discretion in choosing whether or 
not to implement the VCS measure under the new framework, with the Commission 
having very limited input in cases where this support does not extend beyond the 13 
per cent maximum.157 Not least, MSs enjoy significant power to determine whether 
support for a particular sector or production is justified for ‘economic, social or 
environmental reasons’. In other words, the Commission does not have the mandate 
to question or evaluate if a particular sector is objectively in need of additional support 
on any of these grounds, unless the above limit is transgressed.158 Likewise, the 
measure does not take into account the fact that support for certain types of production 
may have socio-economic benefits, but may nonetheless also contribute to 
externalities that are far from ideal. Not least, this is reflected by the unprecedented 
increase in coupled support that has been directed to meat and dairy farmers without 
the need for MSs to assess the environmental implications of these payments; and 
despite the ecological impacts that livestock production continues to have on a global 
scale. As is further discussed below, this certainly raises pertinent questions about the 
coherence between the new framework for coupled support and the overarching 
climate and environmental EU objectives.  
 Finally, there would also appear to be scope to caution of the potential for 
double funding of protein crops, which is currently being implemented by 16 MSs. In 
particular, it may be noted that each of these MSs have also chosen to allow the 
cultivation of nitrogen-fixing crops to be counted as part of the EFA obligation. This 
is arguably of some significance, given the range of protein crops – from soybeans 
and chickpeas to grain and forage legumes – that are currently eligible for support 
under the EFA measure. And, of explicit concern, is the fact that producers of these 
crops would appear to be eligible to receive coupled support, as provided for in Article 
53(3) of the Direct Payments Regulation. At least, the regulation does not specifically 
preclude coupled support for protein crops from applying to crops that have been 
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cultivated for the purpose of satisfying the EFA obligation.159 This raises questions 
about the possibility of receiving the greening payment for cultivating nitrogen-fixing 
crops, while at the same being eligible for the additional coupled support available for 
the production of those very same protein crops. Thus, given the increases in output 
that have been recorded for a number of such crops since 2015 (four per cent across 
the EU),160 it would seem pertinent to clarify the legal framework so as to prevent the 
double funding of crops that have specifically been cultivated and accounted for under 
the EFA measure. Failure to do so would risk further depleting this measure which, 
as discussed below, is already expected to provide limited environmental outcomes.    
 
5.5 Expected Outcomes for Biodiversity and Climate Change 
As outlined above, the 2013 CAP reform especially aimed at improving the 
management of ecological resources in order to ensure greater links between direct 
payments and practices of benefit to the environment and climate. Thus, in order to 
complete the analysis of the measures introduced by the Direct Payments Regulation, 
it is necessary to consider the extent to which these are expected to meet central 
objectives relating to biodiversity and climate mitigation, as expressly referred to in 
both key policy documents and the enacted regulations.161 For this purpose, it may 
therefore be noted that a growing body of literature and research has been published 
on the environmental impacts of the post-2014 framework. However, considering the 
very recent implementation of these measures it is also important to stress that it is 
still premature to draw definitive conclusions about their outcomes. Moreover, it may 
be highlighted that, of the studies that have so far been carried out, a number of them 
focus disproportionately on implementation in a small number of northern MSs and 
consequently provide limited insight into the EU-wide status quo.162 Notwithstanding 
these and other caveats, a few concluding observations may nonetheless be offered, 
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drawing on the preceding discussion of the formulation and implementation of the 
main elements of the new direct payments framework.  
 
5.5.1 Biodiversity: Can the Post-2014 Direct Payments Framework Provide 
Meaningful Protections? 
5.5.1.1 Addressing the Main Targets and Objectives of EU Conservation Policy 
The need for the EU to make greater efforts to ensure the protection of biodiversity 
was definitely underscored by its failure to meet the previous objective of halting 
biodiversity loss by 2010.163 And, it may be recalled from the discussions in Chapters 
2 and 3 that this was replaced by a new headline target for biodiversity in March 2010 
intended to ‘halt the loss of biodiversity and the degradation of ecosystem services in 
the EU by 2020, restore them in so far as feasible, while stepping up the EU 
contribution to averting global biodiversity loss’.164  
 Given the shortcomings of past policy responses, the aim of not only halting 
negative trends, but also restoring degraded ecosystems by 2020, is consequently no 
minor feat and is currently pursued by six mutually supportive and inter-dependent 
targets responding to the revised headline objective.165 Although most of these targets 
are not exclusively aimed at farming sectors, several have significant implications for 
agriculture and forestry (as supported under the second pillar),166 with target 3A being 
specifically framed to ‘maximise areas under agriculture across grasslands, arable 
land and permanent crops that are covered by biodiversity-related measures under the 
CAP so as to ensure the conservation of biodiversity and to bring about a measurable 
improvement in the conservation status of species and habitats that depend on or are 
affected by agriculture and in the provision of ecosystem services as compared to the 
EU2010 Baseline, thus contributing to enhance sustainable management’.167 
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 For the purpose of realising these objectives, EU institutions were called upon 
in 2011 to increase integration ‘through targets and action to enhance the positive 
contribution of the agriculture…to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use’.168 
Hence, the Cioloș reform was seen as a key platform for delivering the instruments 
and framework necessary for attaining the ambitious targets set by the 2020 
Biodiversity Strategy, as well as reinforcing the central role of the CAP for meeting 
them. In this light, the greening payment represented a primary mechanism for 
implementing these targets and furthering environmental integration during the 2014-
2020 programming period. In order to determine the contributions made by this new 
component of the direct payments regime, the outlined objectives must therefore be 
assessed against its expected policy outcomes. 
  
5.5.1.2 Expected Policy Outcomes 
Definitely, each of the three greening measures were initially proposed with the 
intention of addressing the issue of biodiversity loss to one extent or another.169 And 
this express aim was carried forward and restated in the Preamble to the final Direct 
Payments Regulation,170 as well as the main accompanying Delegated Act.171 
However, given the contents and design of the enacted instruments it has already been 
suggested that crop diversification and the protection of permanent grasslands are 
largely expected to have only nominal and indirect implications for the EU’s central 
aim of reversing negative trends and protecting the richness of species upon which 
robust and resilient ecosystems depend. For instance, with regards to the former, 
Dicks et al have argued that there is little empirical or experimental evidence to 
support the claim that wildlife may benefit from the measure.172 Likewise, the 
implementation of the permanent grassland measure is unlikely to result in notable 
improvements for biodiversity.173  
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 In particular, this would appear to affirm the concerns raised by numerous 
environmental NGOs during the course of the reform negotiations, which questioned 
the ability of the proposed measures to effectively meet the objectives of the 2020 
Biodiversity strategy.174  As concluded by such groups at that time, the EFA measure 
undoubtedly emerged from this process as the component with the greatest potential 
for improving biodiversity indicators because of its ability to provide much needed 
habitat within arable landscapes.175 However, notwithstanding this formal step 
towards expanding the areas of arable land and permanent crops subject to 
biodiversity- related measures, important questions remain as to whether the current 
design and implementation will deliver the substantial improvements that are 
necessary for reversing negative trends by 2020. Bearing in mind the main aspects of 
implementation analysed above, a few further points may therefore be offered with 
regards to the specific implications for biodiversity. 
 First, as already indicated, the flexibility afforded to MS for the purpose of 
implementation, as well as the range of exemptions and equivalence options available 
has significantly reduced its application and thereby also the prospects of effectively 
maximising the total agricultural area subject to the EFA obligation. According to 
Pe’er et al, the decision to set the threshold at 15 hectares of arable area has been 
particularly limiting given the exemption of small farmers and exclusion of non-arable 
land such as permanent pasture and grassland when calculating the area required to 
form part of the EFA.176 Hence, they conclude that even under highly conservative 
scenarios, more than 88 per cent of farm holdings across the EU would be entirely 
exempt of the EFA requirement under the current framework, with this number being 
as high as 94 per cent in newer MSs.177 In terms of comprehensive coverage, 
moreover, they calculate that these conditions amount to the exclusion of almost half 
of the EU’s UAA, with this figure most likely being significantly higher in practice.178 
 Secondly, even where the EFA measure is applicable, its potential has 
arguably been undermined by the range of options available at the national and 
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holding levels. The most important of these have been analysed above where it has 
been suggested that the decisions taken by MSs and farmers to date, have not 
necessarily entailed the optimal course of action in terms of biodiversity. Instead, they 
have reflected other pressing considerations such as the apparent desire to limit the 
impact of the EFA obligation upon farmers as well as maintaining levels of 
productivity.179 Not least, such criticism has been levelled against some of the most 
popular features to be implemented by MSs, including the growing of nitrogen-fixing 
crops, the biodiversity benefits of which remain ‘unconvincing’ in the view of 
environmental NGOs.180 Indeed, Pe’er et al have argued that while the cultivation of 
nitrogen-fixing crops may benefit soil quality in particular, it is unclear how it meets 
the stated objective to protect and improve biodiversity.181 Moreover, the European 
Commission has recently conceded that, together with catch crops, they generate ‘the 
lowest coefficient for biodiversity’, with figures for 2015 disclosing that only 26.9 per 
cent of the physical area of EFAs is effectively devoted to the most beneficial elements 
for the environment, such as hedges, trees, ponds, ditches, terraces, stone walls and 
other landscape features.182   
 Concerns have also been raised about aspects of implementation that have the 
potential to deliver less favourable environmental outcomes if not carefully managed. 
For instance, with regards to catch crops and green cover, which cover 27.7 per cent 
to the land devoted to EFA, Hart has argued that while these types of land use may 
provide some benefit for biodiversity, primarily by way of winter cover and potential 
mitigation against the emission of nitrous oxide in winter, such outcomes must be 
considered in light of other related practices. In particular, she notes that there has 
been a tendency to use considerable amounts of herbicides to remove cover crops in 
MSs and regions where zero tillage techniques are practiced.183 This has the potential 
to impact on biodiversity by supressing certain types of broad leaved weeds, which 
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serve as sources of pollen and nectar for farmland insects.184 Thus, unless the use of 
such herbicides are properly reduced or eliminated on EFAs, they could even 
contribute to decreased water quality considering that diffuse pollution of agricultural 
herbicides continues to be a main source of such pollution.185   
 Against this background, a promising and recent EU policy initiative has been 
to propose a general ban of the use of plant protection products on productive EFAs, 
with such a ban being specifically ‘considered a most effective requirement from the 
environmental perspective’.186  If implemented,187 the measure would constitute a 
considerable advance on the earlier position given that in 2015 only four MSs imposed 
environmental restrictions on catch crops and only one MS did so on nitrogen-fixing 
areas. Moreover, this would undoubtedly serve to create greater harmonization and 
coherence on the implementation of the EFA measure across the EU.  
 Thirdly, and lastly, the scope for improvement in terms of biodiversity would 
seem to be restricted by the evidence noted, which indicated that the 2013 CAP 
reforms have had little to no transformational effect in terms of how farmers farm 
their land.188  On the other hand, positive changes may be derived from an increased 
area of protein crops, which are the only crops expected to increase by more than 5 
per cent.189  However, while these changes are beneficial for biodiversity, and are 
likely to be even more so if pesticide use is banned on nitrogen-fixing crops, the 
concrete improvements on the ground would appear to fall short of the ambition 
required to meet the concerns expressed in the 2015 The Mid-term Review of the EU 
Biodiversity Strategy to 2020, which observed that species linked to agricultural 
ecosystems continued to decline and called for greater efforts to address the resulting 
loss of biodiversity.190 Undoubtedly, these and other concessions would also serve to 
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affirm the main conclusion drawn by Pe’er et al, namely that the current design and 
implementation of the EFA measure is ‘unlikely to contribute to improving the status 
of farmland biodiversity given that the majority of farmers would not be required to 
perform any changes of current farming practices to comply with it’.191  
 
5.5.2 Addressing the Challenges of Climate Change: Does the New Direct 
Payment Regime provide a Viable Approach? 
5.5.2.1 The Role of Agriculture for Meeting EU Climate Objectives 
As extensively discussed in Chapters two and three, the link between agriculture and 
climate change is highly complex, with land management practices having the ability 
to contribute towards increased concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere, as well as 
mitigating the effects of such emissions through management techniques that optimise 
the ability of land to sequester CO2.
192 A growing focus of EU policy-makers in recent 
years has therefore been on developing instruments relating to the management and 
use of agricultural lands, with a view to contributing towards the long-term goal of 
reducing anthropocentric GHGs emissions, as well as to mitigate against the expected 
effects of climate change.193  
 As the first climate measure to be introduced under Pillar I, the new greening 
component may certainly be regarded as a landmark element of this process.194 In 
particular, the proposed direct payments regulation saw all three greening elements as 
contributing to climate change adaptation, asserting that: ‘these payments will ensure 
that all farms deliver environmental and climate benefits through the retention of soil 
carbon and grassland habitats associated with permanent pasture, the delivery of water 
and habitat protection by the establishment of ecological focus areas and improvement 
of the resilience of soil and ecosystems through crop diversification’.195 Similarly, the 
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2011 Impact Assessment foresaw crop rotation/diversification as aiding, soil organic 
matter and structure so as to promote climate change mitigation and adaptation and 
biodiversity, with similar positive benefits flowing from land left fallow in EFAs.196 
As has been observed, however, these expectations were tempered by the 
implementation of the final measures and the limited impact that the current crop 
rotation requirement, in particular, is expected to have for climate change mitigation. 
 Of the three greening measures, the maintenance of permanent grassland is 
clearly the practice that most directly attempts to provide outcomes beneficial for the 
climate, with both the Impact Assessment and the legislation itself underscoring the 
importance of permanent grassland to provide carbon sequestration.197  More 
specifically, the provision requiring MS to designate permanent grasslands that are 
environmentally sensitive in areas covered by Natura 2000 network, refers to the 
protection of peat and wetlands. Moreover, with regards to discretionary designation 
outside the areas covered by the network, there is additional mention of permanent 
grassland on carbon-rich soils.198  
 The impetus to protect permanent grasslands should be viewed in light of the 
decreases in grasslands that have been recorded across the EU in recent decades. 
Indeed, these reductions have been especially prevalent in newer MSs where almost 
12 per cent of grasslands are estimated to have been converted to other uses between 
1993-2011,199 whereas the overall figure for the EU was around 6.4 per cent.200 As 
noted, such conversion is inevitably linked to the release of CO2 and is thereby likely 
to further exacerbate the climate change conundrum that must be addressed in order 
to ensure the sustainability of agricultural systems and long-term food security.201 
Furthermore, grasslands provide vital support for, butterfly populations, amongst 
others, which may be used as structural headline indicators for biodiversity and are 
estimated by the EEA to have declined by up to 50 per cent in some parts of the EU.202 
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 In response, the newly introduced permanent grassland measure aims at 
preserving the carbon sequestration capacity of existing grasslands, as well as pre-
empting future conversion, which would not only reduce the overall ability of 
grasslands to mitigate against climate change but, as mentioned, would also have 
negative implications for biodiversity.203 Given these objectives it is necessary to 
assess the extent to which the permanent grassland measure may expected to improve 
the climate-related outcomes of the CAP framework. 
 
5.5.2.2 Expected Policy Outcomes 
A number of critical observations may be made in this regard. First, as already seen 
pertaining to the designation of sensitive grasslands, the measure will, in practice, 
provide limited protection for grasslands located outside of Natura 2000 areas, as only 
five MSs have opted to classify portions of such grasslands as environmentally 
sensitive, thereby protecting them from ploughing.204 That said, it may also be 
reiterated that the wide-scale designation of environmentally sensitive grasslands 
within Natura 2000 areas by a number of MSs are nonetheless expected to support 
some improvements, with initial data indicating that environmentally sensitive 
permanent grassland which must be designated amounts to 16 per cent of all 
permanent grassland, although the overall figure conceals significant variation 
between Member States. 205 In particular, Hart has suggested that the ban on ploughing 
imposed on such land may deliver benefits for carbon and soil given that the protection 
of environmentally sensitive permanent grassland is now subject to a payment and 
therefore strict controls and a greater likeliness of compliance.206 
 Secondly, with regard to the separate obligation of MSs to ensure maintenance 
of the ratio of permanent grassland as against the total agricultural area, the earlier 
cross-compliance regime has been strengthened in two respects, in that it may now 
also be applied at the sub-regional or even holding level, as opposed to just national 
or regional level; and the ‘margin of appreciation’ in terms of reduction of that ratio 
is now 5 per cent, as opposed to 10 per cent. Despite these improvements, however, 
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the formulation and design of the final measure entails that the protection of 
permanent grassland will, in most cases, only translate to tangible legal obligations if 
the total ratio of permanent grassland (at the specified regional, national or holding 
level) falls by more than five per cent, with only three MSs – Germany, Luxembourg 
and Portugal – choosing to implement systems of prior authorisation.207 In other MSs, 
the measure will, therefore, not require any positive action on the part of farmers, 
unless it is determined that the reference ratio of grassland to the total area of 
agricultural land for a given year has decreased by more than five per cent, in which 
case farmers that have been responsible for such conversion will be primarily be under 
an obligation to reinstate the corresponding area of grassland.  
 Thus, notwithstanding the aim of preventing future conversion of sensitive 
grasslands, the measure does little to address ecological losses stemming from 
previous conversions of grasslands into more profitable land uses.208 In this light, 
Mahé suggests that the formulation of the permanent grassland measures in its current 
form is regrettable and that it would significantly have benefited from the inclusion 
of an ‘incentive scheme to restore former grasslands that were converted to cultivation 
in order to access payment entitlements’.209 Moreover, its effectiveness is potentially 
further undermined by the lack of a clear distinction in the legislation between high-
nature-value grasslands and re-seeded grassland, with the latter being less likely to 
have climate change and environmental benefits.210  Indeed, it may be underscored 
that benefits for biodiversity remain higher on existing, rather than converted, 
grasslands many years after conversion.211 Similarly, the focus on net area does not 
take into account the added value of, for instance, encouraging connectivity of 
designated permanent grasslands.212  
  Thirdly, considering the pervasive impacts of climate change and the role of 
agriculture in perpetuating these changes, it is unclear how the relatively limited 
design of the new greening measure will be able to make a meaningful contribution 
to stemming agricultural GHG emissions and improving the carbon sequestration 
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ability of European grasslands. Moreover, the climate-related dimensions of the 
greening framework would appear to have been further downgraded by the 
implementation choices made by MS. For instance, this was acknowledged in  the 
2016 Implementation Report prepared for the European Commission, which 
concluded that ‘[o]verall, the choices made under all three greening measures are 
considered to be moderately relevant to address the priorities identified for GHG 
emissions, maintaining carbon stocks and/or increasing carbon sequestration’.213   
 Not least, it should be noted that despite the introduction of the new greening 
payment in 2015, the EU has recently conceded that ‘no comprehensive quantified 
estimates of the impact of current and future actions under the first pillar of the CAP 
on greenhouse gas emissions are available’.214 Surely, this lack of data and accounting 
on the part of the EU significantly undermines the ability to assess and evaluate the 
anticipated outcomes of the greening measures against their stated climate objectives. 
And, given the broader implementation of the post-2014 direct framework this 
uncertainty is likely to be exacerbated by the significant recourse to VCS for animal 
sectors, which may have an adverse effect on CH4 emissions. 
 Lastly, the choice by 27 MS to use their direct payments envelopes to support 
livestock and animal sectors entails that the EU has committed itself to directly 
funding some of the most environmentally taxing forms of agricultural production for 
the foreseeable part of the 2014-2020 programming period.215 In addition to 
significantly increasing previous levels of such support, the implementation of this 
framework may also be expected to have more long-term and structural implications 
that should not easily be overlooked. For instance, it may recalled that the 
Commission expressed optimism in its 2011 Communication over the growing export 
opportunities that are projected to arise as a result of increased food demand and 
changing global diets.216 Further, much of this growth is expected to take place within 
animal sectors, thereby, widening the prospects of finding new markets for the export 
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of EU meat and dairy products in particular.217 Consequently, the unprecedented 
expansion of coupled support for these particular types of food production has the 
potential to impact upon farm decisions, since, at least historically, these have tended 
to be ‘distorted by coupled subsidies towards subsidised activities and away from 
productivity-motivated activities’.218 In this light, the commitment of additional 
coupled payments for these producers could presumably incentivise them to make 
further investments and expansions based on the expectation of continued support and 
increased global demand.
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Chapter 6 
The Revised Rural Development and Cross-Compliance 
Frameworks 
6.1 Introduction 
The changes made to the rural development and cross-compliance frameworks under 
the 2013 CAP reform, were far less extensive than those relating to Pillar I and the 
direct payments regime. Indeed, as already highlighted, both the Commission’s initial 
proposals, as well as the institutional and public debates that took place as part of the 
subsequent negotiation process, overwhelmingly focused on the latter and the 
adoption of the new greening component in particular. Unsurprisingly then, there was 
a limited desire to undertake simultaneous and wide-scale restructuring of Pillar II, in 
particular, with the main outcome being that the fundamental architecture and 
rationale of the rural development policy remains largely intact following the Cioloș 
reforms.1  
 Notwithstanding these modest political ambitions, a number of changes were 
introduced that have the potential to impact upon the programing of RDPs, and 
thereby also the environmental outcomes that may be expected to stem from Pillar II 
measures during the 2014-2020 programming period.2 For instance, Regulation 
1305/2013 (the Rural Development Regulation) has explicitly strengthened the 
climate dimension of these instruments by requiring that a minimum of 30 per cent of 
EAFRD contributions to each RDP be devoted to ‘climate mitigation and adaptation 
as well as environmental issues’.3 Likewise, with regard to cross-compliance, the 
regime has been further streamlined under the new Horizontal framework, inter alia, 
with a view to solidifying its application across both CAP pillars. In particular, these 
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and other changes reflected a continued commitment the process of EPI, with the 
Preamble to the Regulation 1305/2013 explicitly emphasising that ‘[t]he Union's 
priorities for rural development should be pursued in the framework of sustainable 
development and the Union's promotion of the aim of protecting and improving the 
environment’.4 
 Against this background, the current Chapter analyses the main novelties of 
the post-2014 rural development and cross-compliance frameworks, and the extent to 
which they may be expected to improve the quality of environmental governance and 
public goods delivered under each respective pillar of the CAP. It should, however, 
be noted from the outset that, given the voluntary nature of Pillar II measures in 
particular it is, at this point, still too early to draw definite conclusions about the 
outcomes of the 2013 reforms. Not least, it takes considerable time for the effects of 
these measures show through and research to this effect is only just beginning to be 
disseminated. Moreover, it might also be added that the ability to offer a detailed 
analysis of national and sub-national implementation is obviously curtailed given the 
sheer number of RDPs, a total of 118, that have been approved for the current 
programming period.   
 
6.2 The Main Elements of the post-2014 Rural Development 
Framework 
6.2.1 Strategic Objectives and the Continued Centrality of Sustainable 
Development 
As outlined in previous Chapters, the concept of rurality is particularly 
multidimensional, with the rural development policy providing an essential platform 
for pursuing central EU objectives and strategies beyond that of farming and the 
CAP.5 In particular, rural development is part of the broader cohesion policy aimed at 
addressing structural and socio-economic disparities between the various regions and 
MSs, with the EAFRD being one of five European structural and investments funds 
(ESI).6 This is specifically underscored by the current mission statement set forth 
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under Article 3 of Regulation 1305/2013, which stipulates that the EAFRD shall 
‘contribute to the Europe 2020 Strategy by promoting rural development throughout 
the Union in a manner that complements the other instruments of the CAP, the 
cohesion policy and the common fisheries policy’.  
 The coherence and coordination between these funds was further strengthened 
under Regulation 1303/2013, which established a common  strategic framework to 
facilitate programming, as well as sectoral and regional coordination of measures 
supported through these funds during the 2014-2020 budgetary period.7 On the 
administrative level, for instance, this revised framework enables MSs to provide a 
single document, a so-called Partnership Agreement, containing the strategy for all 
ESI funds at national level, based on common standards for the programs defined 
therein. Moreover, on a broader strategic level, the need to strengthen the link between 
programming and the implementation of the EU’s sustainable development agenda 
was especially emphasised under the new framework. For instance, Regulation 
1303/2013 provides that the objectives of the ESI funds should be ‘pursued in the 
framework of sustainable development and the Union's promotion of the aim of 
preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment as set out in 
Articles 11 and 191(1) TFEU, taking into account the polluter pays principle’.8 
Furthermore, this required MSs to ‘ensure that environmental protection 
requirements, resource efficiency, climate change mitigation and adaptation, 
biodiversity, disaster resilience, and risk prevention and management are promoted’, 
as part of the preparation of national Partnership Agreements and programmes, as well 
as their implementation.9 And, in addition, there is now a more pronounced 
responsibility on the part of MSs to provide information, through established 
methodologies, of the specific support for climate change that is formulated under 
each of the structural and investment funds.10   
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 These changes have, likewise, been closely reflected under the newly revised 
rural development policy, the priorities of which are specifically required to ‘be 
pursued in the framework of sustainable development’.11 Similarly, Regulation 
1698/2005 emphasised the central role of the second pillar for pursuing the strategic 
aims of the Göteborg strategy during the previous programming period.12 However, 
these priorities have arguably been somewhat expanded under the post-2014 rural 
development policy and the EU’s 2020 Strategy vision of ‘smart, sustainable and 
inclusive’ growth.13 Indeed, as impressed by the Commission’s main communication, 
the latter was particularly important for setting the overarching objectives of the 2013 
reforms.14  
 In the context of rural development, these objectives are restated under Article 
4 of Regulation 1305/2013 and include (i) fostering the competitiveness of 
agriculture; (ii) ensuring the sustainable management of natural resources, and climate 
action; (iii) achieving a balanced territorial development of rural economies and 
communities including the creation and maintenance of employment. Thus, while the 
second of these provides the imperative for furthering the CAP’s environmental 
agenda, the first and third objectives largely reflect the socio-economic dimensions of 
rural development policy – although these goals certainly have the potential to overlap 
at various points.  
 
6.2.2 Priorities and Focus Areas 
Certainly, one of the main aims of the Cioloș reforms – as they related to rural 
development – was to improve the targeting and efficiency of measures funded under 
the second pillar.15 In doing so, the Commission had proposed the introduction of six 
guiding priorities, which were intended to replace the four thematic axes that 
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underpinned programming during the 2007-2013 period. These priorities were 
subsequently agreed and adopted under Regulation 1305/2013, the complete list of 
which is set out as follows in Article 5(4):  
 
(1) fostering knowledge transfer and innovation in agriculture, forestry, and 
rural areas; 
(2) enhancing farm viability and competitiveness of all types of agriculture in 
all regions and promoting innovative farm technologies and the 
sustainable management of forests; 
(3) promoting food chain organisation, including processing and marketing of 
agricultural products, animal welfare and risk management in agriculture; 
(4) restoring, preserving and enhancing ecosystems related to agriculture and 
forestry; 
(5)  promoting resource efficiency and supporting the shift towards a low 
carbon and climate resilient economy in agriculture, food and forestry 
sector; 
(6) promoting social inclusion, poverty reduction and economic development 
in rural areas. 16 
 
It should also be underscored that each of these priorities are further subject to the 
cross-cutting objectives of innovation, environment and climate change mitigation 
and adaptation.17 
  For the purpose of implementation, MSs were required to draw up RDPs based 
on ex-ante evaluations of their specific funding needs, and which addressed at least 
four of the six guiding priorities under Regulation 1305/2013.18 In doing so, MSs have 
been able to choose any combination of EAFRD measures to pursue their chosen 
priorities, with Article 13 requiring each measure formulated under national and 
regional RDPs  to ‘contribute specifically to the achievement of one or more Union 
priorities for rural development’. Moreover, each RDP must demonstrate appropriate 
consideration for environmental concerns and conditions, with the express 
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requirement that 30 per cent of the total EAFRD contribution to the rural development 
programme shall be reserved for measures focused on these issues.19  
 The post-2014 measures are provided under Chapter II of the Rural 
Development Regulation and are further supplemented by an indicative list of their 
relevance to each of the aforementioned six priorities, set out in Annex VI of the same 
regulation. In total, the regulation lists almost 30 measures, without being beyond the 
scope of the current discussion to offer detailed analysis on each individual aspect. In 
order to provide a basic account of the new framework, however, it is necessary to 
consider each of the main priorities in brief, before focusing more closely on those 
measures that are specifically intended to address environmental objectives and 
provide public environmental goods. 
 The first priority aims at fostering knowledge transfer and innovation in 
agriculture, forestry, and rural areas, and has primarily been formulated to address the 
growing needs of small and medium size enterprises in the farming sectors to access 
an ‘appropriate level of technical and economic training as well as an increased 
capacity to access and exchange knowledge and information including through the 
diffusion of best agricultural and forestry production practices’.20 To this effect, 
knowledge transfers may be supported across a range of platforms comprising 
training, workshops, coaching and short-term farm exchanges, amongst others.21 
Furthermore, Article 5(1) provides three main focus areas through which such actions 
may be pursued, namely: (i) fostering innovation, cooperation, and the development 
of the knowledge base in rural areas; (ii) strengthening the links between agriculture, 
food production and forestry and research and innovation, including for the purpose 
of improved environmental management and performance and; (iii) fostering lifelong 
learning and vocational training in the agricultural and forestry sectors.22 It follows 
that, although this priority does not have an environmental focus, per se, it is possible 
to fund measures targeting improved environmental management and performance as 
part of overall efforts to promote innovation and knowledge transfers between 
member of the farming community.   
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 There is also a degree of overlap with the second priority, which aims at 
enhancing farm viability and competitiveness across farm sectors, as well as 
promoting innovative farm technologies and the sustainable management of forests. 
Indeed, this directly reflects the first of the three overarching CAP 2020 objectives 
defined in the main Communication and is directed specifically at ‘improving the 
economic performance of all farms and facilitating farm restructuring and 
modernisation, notably with a view to increasing market participation and orientation 
as well as agricultural diversification’.23 In addition, this priority focuses on 
facilitating the entry of skilled farmers into the agricultural sectors, with a particular 
view to ensuring ‘generational review’.24 This includes the ability to providing extra 
support for young farmers under a number of Pillar II measures, with the Preamble to 
the regulation recognising that ‘in order to address problems of young farmers related 
to access to land Member States are…able to offer this support in combination with 
other forms of support, for example, through the use of financial instruments’.25 MSs 
may also provide specific support for young farmers, should they choose to adopt 
thematic sub-programmes to address specific needs of rural communities.26  
 The third priority aims to promote food chain organisation, including 
processing and marketing of agricultural products, animal welfare and risk 
management in agriculture by; (i) improving competitiveness of primary producers 
and better integrating them into the agri-food chain through quality schemes, adding 
value to agricultural products, promotion in local markets and short supply circuits, 
producer groups and organisations and inter-branch organisations; and (ii) supporting 
farm risk prevention and management.27 Annex VI lists 8 measures that are of 
particular relevance to meeting these objectives, including payments to support the 
restoration of agricultural production potential damaged by natural disasters and 
catastrophic events and introduction of appropriate prevention actions,28 the 
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establishment of producer groups29 and the provision of animal welfare services,30 
amongst others.  
 The fourth priority is of particular relevance to the current thesis given its aim 
to support the restoration, protection and enhancement of ecosystems related to 
agriculture and forestry.31 More specifically, this priority is to be pursued with a focus 
on three main areas. The first of these pertains to the restoration, protection and 
enhancement of biodiversity ‘including in Natura 2000 areas, and in areas facing 
natural or other specific constraints, and high nature value farming, as well as the state 
of European landscapes’.32 As will be further discussed below, these objectives are 
relevant to several measures, including Natura 2000 payments for farmers and WFD 
payments,33 and payments to areas facing natural constraints.34 Moreover, the second 
and third focus areas are intended to address some of the most pressing agricultural 
externalities and aim at improving ‘water management, including fertiliser and 
pesticide management’, and ‘preventing soil erosion and improving soil 
management’, respectively.35 Likewise, the post-2014 framework provides MSs with 
a number of measures for the purpose of pursuing these objectives including the novel 
agri-environment-climate measure36 and the payment to support the organic 
farming,37 both of which will be considered in detail below. 
 Undoubtedly, the fifth priority also has a strong environmental emphasis, with 
its aim being to promote resource efficiency and support ‘the shift towards a low 
carbon and climate resilient economy in agriculture, food and forestry sectors’.38 As 
already noted, resource efficiency represents a cross-cutting theme under the post-
2014 rural development framework and is largely reflective to the EU’s 2020 
strategy.39 Hence, there are a number of measures under Regulation 1305/2013 that 
are of direct relevance to this priority, and as will be explored below, the establishment 
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of the European Innovative Partnership Network is of particular interest to the current 
discussion.40  
 The sixth, and final, programming priority under the current framework 
addresses the social disparities and challenges facing many rural communities by 
encouraging the ‘development of services and infrastructure leading to social 
inclusion and reversing trends of social and economic decline and depopulation of 
rural areas’.41 In particular, RDPs that include this priority are intended to focus on (i) 
facilitating diversification, creation and development of small enterprises, as well as 
job creation; (ii) fostering local development in rural areas and; (iii) enhancing the 
accessibility, use and quality of information and communication technologies in rural 
areas.42 And, in this context, it may be noted that the Leader program is expected to 
continue to play a dominant role, with MSs being required to reserve at least 5 per 
cent of their EAFRD contribution to promote this measure.43 
  
6.3 Measures with Environmental and Climate-Related Foci 
Following the dissolution of the axis regime, second pillar measures are not as clearly 
demarcated as was the case under Regulation 1698/2005.44  Indeed, as already 
indicated, the main body of Regulation 1205/2013 does not provide strict 
categorisations of the approximately 30 measures that are contained under Chapter II 
and which are each required to pursue one or more of the six priorities listed above. 
However, further clarification is provided by the indicative list of measures and their 
corresponding priorities in Annex VI of the regulation. In particular, the latter lists 
eight measures ‘of particular relevance to restoring, preserving and enhancing 
ecosystems dependent on agriculture and forestry, and promoting resource efficiency 
and supporting the shift towards a low carbon and climate resilient economy in 
agriculture, food and forestry sectors’ (ie, priorities four and five).45 Four of these 
relate to forestry, and although there are clearly intersectional aspects between such 
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measures and those relating to agriculture (especially with regards to climate change 
adaptation and mitigation), the current analysis is limited to measures focusing on the 
latter. These comprise agri-environment-climate measures, organic farming 
provisions, Natura 2000 and Water framework directive payments and payments to 
areas facing natural or other specific constraints.  
 In addition, the overarching objectives of the 2020 strategy and their focus on 
resource efficiency has furthered the establishment and development of networks 
aimed at implementing the EIP ‘Agricultural Productivity and Sustainability’, which 
is intended to address some of the main challenges to agriculture and productivity, as 
understood by the EU.46 Importantly, this instrument is inter-sectoral and relates to 
most of the six rural development priorities in some way. Thus, given its title it is 
perhaps not unexpected that the EIP also has the potential to impact upon the way in 
which ecological and climate-related protection measures are formulated during the 
2014-2020 programming period. Some of the relevant aspects of this instrument will 
therefore also be analysed, before considering the changes made to the horizontal 
regime introduced under Regulation 1306/2013.  
 
6.3.1 The Agri-Environment-Climate Measure 
The agri-envrionement-climate (AEC) payment is set out under Article 28 of the basic 
regulation and requires MSs to include in their rural development programs measures 
to ‘preserve and promote the necessary changes to agricultural practices that make a 
positive contribution to the environment and climate’.47 This comprises payments 
aimed at encouraging practices that contribute to ‘climate change mitigation and 
adaptation and that are compatible with the protection and improvement of the 
environment, the landscape and its features, natural resources, and the soil and genetic 
diversity’.48 Consequently, it replaces the former agri-environment measures (Article 
38 of Regulation 1698/2005) and is, according to the wording of the Preamble, 
expected to continue ‘to play a prominent role in supporting the sustainable 
development of rural areas and in responding to society's increasing demands for 
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environmental services’.49 As in the case of its precursor, payments for such services 
should cover income forgone, as well as additional costs associated with the 
undertaken commitment, but only to the extent that the remunerated actions go beyond 
the relevant mandatory standards and requirements, so as to comply with the polluter 
pays principle.50 In addition, the revised provision has added a number of elements 
that have implications for the way in which AEC measures are adopted and formulated 
within the context of national and sub-national RDPs.  
 First, AEC payments funded by the EAFRD must reflect the new legal 
baselines entrenched by the 2013 CAP reforms. According to Article 28(3) the 
services and commitments undertaken by farmers in exchange for remuneration must 
go beyond the standards established for cross-compliance under Regulation 
1306/2013, the relevant criteria and minimum activity established pursuant to Article 
4 of Regulation 1307/2013 and minimum requirements for fertiliser and plant 
protection use and other relevant mandatory regulatory requirements established by 
national law.51 More specifically, the minimum requirements for fertilisers must 
include, inter alia, the Codes of Good Practice introduced by the Nitrates Directive 
for farms outside nitrate vulnerable zones, and requirements concerning phosphorous 
pollution, while corresponding requirements for plant protection products use must 
include general principles for integrated pest management (under the Pesticides 
Directive).52 
 However, the obligations relating to the greening measures are not explicitly 
mentioned the rural development regulation, with the effect that it would appear 
possible for double funding to arise as a source of potential conflict in cases where 
farmers are in receipt of the basic payment under Pillar I (and are thereby required to 
observe the greening obligations), as well as being remunerated for carrying out such 
services under the AEC measure. Indeed, it may be recalled that one of the main 
concerns voiced by environmental NGOs and academic commentators was the need 
to ensure that the payment for practices of benefit to the climate and the environment 
was not undermined by Pillar II measures supporting similar or identical services. 
This was, likewise, underscored in the Rural Development Regulation,53 and has 
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subsequently been specifically addressed by the Commission in Delegated Regulation 
807/2014, which requires additional costs and income foregone resulting from 
practices of beneficial for the climate and the environment, as well as equivalence 
practices, to be deducted from AEC payments in order to avoid double funding.54 
Hence, the latter has clearly established that AEC payments may only be made in 
exchange for services that go beyond the greening obligations, in addition to the rules 
on cross-compliance and minimum activity noted above. 
 Secondly, as suggested by its title, the AEC measure is definitely intended to 
have a greater focus on climate change adaptation and mitigation than was previously 
the case.55 As outlined above, this is largely reflective of the 2020 Strategy and its 
focus on elevating resources efficiency across all EU policies in response to rising 
concerns over global climate change. Thus, the Preamble emphasises the need to 
encourage ‘farmers and other land managers to serve society as a whole by 
introducing or continuing to apply agricultural practices that contribute to climate 
change mitigation and adaptation’.56 With regards to mitigation, more specifically, it 
also provides that such ‘action should relate both to limiting emissions in agriculture 
and forestry from key activities such as livestock production, fertilizer use and to 
preserving carbon sinks and enhancing carbon sequestration with regard to land use, 
land use change and the forestry sector.57 This enhanced focus on climate measures 
has undoubtedly added a positive element to the new agri-environment-climate 
measure, and it might further be noted that Article 59(6) requires 30 per cent of the 
EAFRD budget to be spent on environment, climate and other related measures.58
 Thirdly, the new AEC payment allows for farmers to undertake the contractual 
duties of implementation on a collective basis. This represents a welcome addition to 
the previous framework, which merely enabled contractual undertakings at holding 
level, and has the potential to harness the many situations in which ‘synergies 
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resulting from commitments undertaken jointly by a group of farmers multiply the 
environmental and climate benefit’.59 In this light, there is clearly a similarity between 
the aforementioned option and the ability to implement the EFA measure under 
Regulation 1307/2013 on a collective basis.60 It does, however, remain to be seen if 
this option will, in reality, be pursued by farmers during the course of the current 
programming period. For instance, with regards to EFA, only two MSs and Wallonia 
have so far even chosen to allow for such implementation, with the likely benefits and 
coverage of this measure being very limited.  
 Fourthly, and lastly, of the main elements added by the AEC measure, it 
should be noted that Article 28(4) requires MSs to ‘endeavour to ensure that persons 
undertaking to carry out operations under this measure are provided with the 
knowledge and information required to implement such operations’.61 In particular, 
the Preamble stresses that this is necessary ‘to ensure that farmers and other land 
managers are in a position to correctly implement the commitments they have 
undertaken’ and that MSs therefore have the obligation to ensure that such support is 
made available through, for instance, expert advice.62 The importance of this new 
requirement cannot easily be overstated and it is submitted that it represents a greater 
understanding on the part of the EU of the critical need to ensure that farmers and 
other land managers are up to the task of implementing AEC obligations in ways that 
contribute to their corresponding objectives. Indeed, as noted at various points above, 
given the complexity and intersectoral dimensions of climate change, biodiversity loss 
and other environmental challenges addressed by CAP measures, ensuring that 
farmers have appropriate knowledge and understanding of these processes may 
certainly enhance the way in which agricultural resources are managed and protected 
in the long-term.  
 The requirement for MSs to ensure that farmers receive the necessary support 
to comply with measures aimed at providing climate and environmental benefits that 
go beyond the legal baseline and the obligations linked to the greening measures is 
therefore particularly encouraging. Moreover, as will be further detailed below, it is 
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part of a wider and cross-cutting effort under the 2013 reforms to enhance the role and 
quality of farm advisory systems funded by the EAFRD and administrated at the 
national and regional levels. And, as specified in the Preamble this includes providing 
qualified advice ‘on climate change mitigation and adaptation, biodiversity, the 
protection of water, the development of short supply chains, organic farming and 
health aspects of animal husbandry’, amongst others.63 
 
6.3.2 Organic Farming 
Organic farming arose as an alternative to the conventional forms of high-intensive 
production and management practices that prevailed in Western Europe during the 
1970s and 80s. At that time, it may be recalled, the EC was experiencing vast levels 
of overproduction of a number of staple products, with the more extensive methods 
of organic farming offering potential means of reducing surpluses, while also being 
more labour intensive and attracting premium market prices due to consumer demand 
and preferences.64 It was thus recognised for its potential to both reduce the negative 
impacts of production (compared to conventional methods), as well as adding much 
needed opportunities to drive rural economies and development.65 
 In order to ensure the proper functioning and cohesion of organic sectors, the 
EU has sought to harmonise this area by establishing common standards for the 
production and certification of organic products. This was first done with a focus on 
horticultural activity under Regulation 2092/9166 and was later expanded and 
amended to include livestock production chains, inter alia.67 Prior to these 
interventions, the total area of farmland devoted to organic production had been rising 
steadily on an annual basis. However, this rate increased significantly between 2000-
2008, with the total area of land growing by 5.7 per cent on an annual basis in the EU-
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15 and a considerable 20 per cent in the EU-12. The corresponding growth rate for 
the EU-27 during this period was 7.4 per cent per year over the same period.68 
 Yet, despite these early interventions, organic production was unable to keep 
up with the fast-growing demand for high-quality and responsibly produced food.69 
For instance, in 2007 Gill highlighted the significant undersupply of locally produced 
organic foods in the UK context.70 Subsequently, the rules on organic farming were 
further consolidated under Regulation 834/2007, which sought to ‘provide a more 
explicit statement of the objectives, principles and production rules applying to 
organic farming and produce’, in addition to introducing novel requirements such as 
the use of a compulsory Community logo .71  
 This framework remains in place today, with Regulation 834/2007 providing 
the main rules for organic production and certification.72 However, it should be noted 
that, although the regulatory harmonisation and standardised recognition of these 
processes has facilitated the expansion of organic markets, this framework has 
provided limited support in terms of dedicated payments to incentivise farmers to 
convert to, or maintain, organic practices. Likewise, such specific payments were 
largely absent during the previous programming period, with organic farming mainly 
being supported under the agri-environment measure introduced by Regulation 
1698/2005.73  
 Against this background, the 2013 CAP reform has enhanced the ability of 
MSs to support producers that undertake organic forms of production and certification 
pursuant to the rules established by Regulation 834/2007 in two main ways that are of 
particular relevance to the current discussion.74 First, it may be recalled that farmers 
that comply with the rules on organic production and certification automatically 
qualify for the payment for practices beneficial to the environment and climate, and 
thereby also the basic payment without having to adopt particular practices to comply 
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with the greening measures introduced by Regulation 1307/2013.75 Secondly, the 
introduction of a specific payment to support organic production under Article 29 of 
the rural development regulation represents a novel feature of the post-2014 
framework and requires MSs to grant support, per hectare of agricultural area, to 
farmers or groups of farmers who commit to undertake, convert or maintain land 
under organic production, and who fulfil the requirement of active farmer defined in 
Article 9 of Regulation 1307/2013.76 And, with regards to this new organic farming 
provision, two further points may be highlighted. 
 First, it may be noted that, as general rule, Article 29(3) requires farmers to 
commit to the regular contracting period of between five to seven years, but also takes 
account of the broader processes related to organic production and the need ‘to avoid 
a large-scale return by farmers to conventional farming support should be given to 
both conversion and maintenance measures’.77 Thus, it provides that ‘where support 
is granted for conversion to organic farming Member States may determine a shorter 
initial period corresponding to the period of conversion’.78 Likewise, MSs may 
determine a shorter contracting period for farmers undertaking new commitments 
relating to the maintenance of organic farmland ‘that directly follow the commitment 
performed in the initial period’.79 In addition, MSs ‘may provide in their rural 
development programmes for annual extension after the termination of the initial 
period’ where support is granted for the maintenance of organic farming’.80  
 Secondly, the possibility to adopt this measure on a collective basis may be 
highlighted as a particularly positive feature of the organic farming measure. Indeed, 
as pointed out above, this approach has also been possible for the purpose of 
implementing other CAP measures, such as the AEC and EFA measures, and 
constitutes a promising initiative to enhance the ‘synergy in biodiversity, benefits 
delivered by the organic farming measure, collective contracts or co-operation 
between farmers’ by encouraging coverage across larger, adjacent areas.81 In 
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particular, this added support was defended in response ‘to the increasing demand of 
society for the use of environmentally friendly farm practices and for high standards 
of animal welfare’.82 Indeed, it may be noted that the area devoted to organic farming 
amounted to 6.2 per cent of the total UAA across the EU-28 in 2015, with the greatest 
proportions of this land being located in Spain, Italy, France and Germany, which are 
all defined by longstanding and established organic sectors.83 However, the national 
share of organic farmland differs significantly between MSs. Thus while Austria (19 
per cent), Sweden (16 per cent) Estonia (13 per cent) and the Czech Republic (12 per 
cent) each had shares of over 10 per cent of the notational UAA devoted to organic 
production in 2015, other important agricultural producers such as Romania, Hungary, 
Poland and France devoted less than 5 per cent for this purpose.84  
 Although it is, at this point, still too early to determine the extent to which the 
added element of financial support provided under Article 29 will be successful in 
continuing to support the conversion, maintenance and expansion of organic farming 
– the possibility to design tailor-made payments for this important sector certainly 
holds promising prospects for harnessing the benefits of such production during the 
current programming period. And, in this light, it should also be noted that further 
possibilities are offered under Delegated Regulation 808/2014, which provides for 
agri-environment-climate measures under Article 28, support for organic production 
under Article 29, animal welfare commitments under Article 33 and forest-
environmental and climate commitments under Article 34 to be combined, provided 
that they are compatible.85 
 
6.3.3. Natura 2000 and Water Framework Directive Payments 
The Natura 2000 and Water Framework Directive payment is set out in Article 30 of 
the Rural Development Regulation and is largely reflective of the corresponding 
measure previously introduced under Article 38 of Regulation 1698/200. 
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Consequently, this instrument is intended to continue to contribute to the effective 
management of Natura 2000 sites, by providing support to farmers (and forest holders) 
operating in these areas and who experience specific disadvantages as a consequence 
of the implementation of Directives 92/43/EEC and 2009/147/EC and the related 
obligations imposed thereunder.86 As suggested by the title, MSs are also required to 
provide support for farmers operating in areas that are included in river basin 
management plans pursuant to the WFD, in order to address disadvantages resulting 
from their implementation.87 In addition, it should be noted that a novel feature of the 
measure is to allow support to be provided for other ‘delimited nature protection areas 
with environmental restrictions applicable to farming or forests which contribute to 
the implementation of Article 10 of Directive 92/43/EEC, provided that, per rural 
development programme, those areas do not exceed 5 % of the designated Natura 
2000 areas covered by its territorial scope’.88 
 For the purpose of implementation, MSs must ensure that support pursuant to 
this measure is linked to practices that go beyond basic mandatory standards and 
requirements. Thus, with regards to Natura 2000 payments, these ‘shall only be 
granted in relation to disadvantages resulting from requirements that go beyond the 
good agricultural and environmental condition provided for in Article 94 and Annex 
II of Council Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 and the relevant criteria and minimum 
activities established pursuant to points (c)(ii) and (c)(iii) of Article 4(1) of point (c) 
of Article 4(1)of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013’.89 In addition, MSs are required to 
ensure that such payments do not amount to double funding of the greening measures 
following their introduction in 2015.  
 Likewise, these standards apply to payments pursuant to the WFD. However, 
in order to be eligible to receive such payment, a number of additional conditions must 
be satisfied under the new provision. First, payments linked to the WFD may only be 
made with regards to specific requirements that ‘were introduced by the Water 
Framework Directive, are in accordance with the programmes of measures of the river 
basin management plans for the purpose of achieving the environmental objectives of 
that directive and go beyond the measures required to implement other Union law for 
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the protection of water’.90 Secondly, as a clear expression of the ‘provider gets’ 
principle, MSs must ensure that these payments go beyond the level of protection of 
the Union law existing at the time the WFD was adopted, as laid down in Article 4(9) 
of that Directive.91 And, thirdly, WFD payments shall only be made in relation to 
specific requirements that ‘impose major changes in type of land use, and/or major 
restrictions in farming practice resulting in a significant loss of income’.92  
 Undoubtedly, this measure has the potential to enhance the protection of 
Natura 2000 areas, as well as delivering support for farmers having to comply with 
specific requirements of river basin management programs, if prioritised by MSs. 
However, its implementation depends, not only on the willingness of MSs to fund it, 
but in the case of the WFD this also requires that MSs have, in fact, fully prepared the 
aforementioned management program or introduced horizontal management 
prescriptions through national legislation.93 Indeed, Birdlife International have noted 
that delays in the preparation of management plans, prevented the measure from being 
effectively implemented by a number of MSs during the previous programming 
period.94 Consequently, less than 1 per cent of total rural development expenditure 
was devoted to this measure from 2007-2013.95 And, as is further discussed below, 
the likeliness of significantly increasing these commitments are arguably undermined  
by the failure to include WFD obligations within cross-compliance, as the framework 
currently stands. 
 
6.3.4 Payments to Areas Facing Natural or Other Specific Constraints 
Of the measures listed in Annex VI as being of particular relevance to restoring, 
protecting and enhancing agricultural ecosystems, the fourth and last of these to be 
subject to analysis, relates to the payment to areas facing natural or specific constraints 
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(ANC).96 As outlined in Chapter 3, the underlying rationale for this payment is to 
provide support to farmers for natural or specific disadvantages that exist to farming 
in areas characterised by natural or specific handicaps, with the main purposes of such 
payments being to ensure the occupation of agricultural land, as well as preventing 
abandonment in those regions that are most at risk. More specifically, recital 25 of the 
Rural Development Regulation provides that ‘[p]ayments to farmers in mountain 
areas or in other areas facing natural or other specific constraints should, by 
encouraging continued use of agricultural land, contribute to maintaining the 
countryside as well as to maintaining and promoting sustainable farming systems’.97 
 The basic elements of the ANC measure are set out in Articles 31 of the rural 
development regulation and largely reflect the rules established by Article 37 of 
Regulation 1698/2005. Accordingly, payments should be granted on an annual basis 
per hectare of agricultural area in order to compensate farmers for income foregone 
and additional costs linked to the disadvantage of the area concerned.98 For the 
purpose of establishing the level of payments, additional costs and income foregone 
should be calculated in comparison to areas that are not affected by such constraints.99 
In doing so MSs may also opt to implement differentiated payments based on the 
severity of the natural or specific constraint affecting (i) farming activity and (ii) 
farming systems (for instance based on whether farming is carried out intensively or 
extensively).100 
 In addition, implementation of the ANC measure depends on the designation 
by MSs of areas facing natural constraints or other specific constraints according to a 
number of criteria. These are detailed under Article 32 and introduce notable changes 
to the way in which this long-standing and controversial CAP measures is applied.101 
Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 3, the ANC measure has been subject to a process of 
gradual reform in recent years, which has been aimed at fine-tuning and ensuring that 
                                                 
96
 As noted above, the Annex also covers measures aimed at the forestry sector, but which are beyond 
the scope of the current discussion. 
97
 Direct Payments Regulation (n 3) Preamble (25). 
98
 Ibid, Article 31(1). 
99
 Ibid, Article 31(1). 
100
 Ibid, Article 31(1). 
101
 See, eg; European Court of Auditors, Special Report No 4/2003 ‘Concerning Rural Development: 
Support for Less Favoured Area Payments’ (European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg, 2003) [2003] 
OJ C 151, 27.6.2003; P. Wathern, ‘Less Favoured Areas and Environmentally Sensitive Areas: A 
European Dimension to the Rural Environment, in W. Howarth, C. Rodgers (eds)  
Agriculture, Conservation and Land Use: Law and Policy Issues for Rural Areas (Cardiff University 
of Wales Press, 1995). 
- 234 - 
implementation is based on clearly defined and objective criteria. The latter is also 
highlighted in the Preamble to the regulation as crucial for ‘ensuring the efficient use 
of Union funds and equal treatment for farmers across the Union’.102 
 Under the new framework MSs are required to designate areas based on three 
categories; (i) mountain areas; (ii) areas, other than mountain areas, facing significant 
natural constraints; and (iii) other areas affected by specific constraints.103 With 
regards to the first of these, Article 31(2) provides that in order to benefit from the 
ANC payment mountain areas shall be characterised by a considerable limitation of 
the possibilities for using the land and by an appreciable increase in production costs 
due to:  
(a) the existence, because of altitude, of very difficult climatic conditions, the 
effect of which is to substantially shorten the growing season; 
(b) at a lower altitude, the presence over the greater part of the area in question 
of slopes too steep for the use of machinery or requiring the use of very 
expensive special equipment, or a combination of these two factors, where 
the constraints resulting from each taken separately are less acute but the 
combination of the two gives rise to an equivalent constraints.104 
 
Moreover, all areas north of the 62nd parallel and certain adjacent areas shall be 
considered to be mountain areas for the purposes of the current framework.105 
 Secondly, in order for areas other than mountain areas to be eligible for ANC 
support, at least 60 per cent of the agricultural area must meet one or more of the 
criteria listed in Annex III at the threshold value indicated if such agricultural areas 
are to be considered to be facing considerable natural constraints.106 Also, for the 
purpose of delimiting areas other than mountain areas, MS are required to ‘carry out 
a fine-tuning exercise, based on objective criteria, with the purpose of excluding areas 
in which significant natural constraints, referred to in the first subparagraph have been 
documented but have been overcome by investments or by, economic activity, or by 
evidence of normal land productivity, or in which production methods or farming 
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systems have offset the income loss or added costs referred to in Article 31(1)’.107 
Importantly, this obligation is intended to address the previous situation in which 
socio-economic criteria were interpreted liberally in order to extend coverage to ‘other 
less favoured areas’.  
 The third category of areas (iii) may be eligible for ANC payments ‘if they are 
affected by specific constraints and if it is necessary for land management to be 
continued in order to conserve or improve the environment, to maintain the 
countryside, to preserve the tourist potential of the area or to protect the coastline’.108 
Moreover, in the case of specific constraints, support may be granted provided that 
the relevant areas are similar and comprising less than ten per cent of the areas of any 
given MS.109  
 Article 32 also allows for ANC payments to be made where at least 60 per 
cent of the agricultural area meets a minimum of two of the biophysical criteria listed 
in Annex III, provided that each of these fall within a maximum margin of 20 per cent 
of the indicated thresholds.110 And similarly, this applies in instances where at least 
60 per cent of the area is comprised of land meeting at least one criterion in the 
aforementioned Annex, as well as areas meeting two or more of these, provided that 
each of these fall within a maximum margin of 20 per cent of the indicated 
thresholds.111  
 Clearly, the targeting of the ANC measure has been somewhat improved under 
the new framework, with the adoption of objective criteria being a particularly key 
aspect of this change. Moreover, the concept of fine-tuning entails that MSs are 
required to take into account the impact of technological progress and other forms of 
interventions that may allow for natural or specific disadvantages to be overcome. 
Thus, the application of these criteria will undoubtedly entail that certain areas that 
are objectively deemed to be suffering from handicaps will nonetheless be ineligible 
to receive support if they have successfully been overcome and productivity 
maintained. In other words, it will no longer be sufficient for areas to exhibit one or 
more of the biophysical criteria listed in Annex III of the rural development regulation 
in order to receive ANC payments.  
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 As already indicated, this was arguably one of the main contributions of the 
Cioloș Commission towards updating the rural development regime, given the long-
standing sensitivity and reluctance on the part of EU MSs to address the shortcomings 
of the previous ANC indicators. However, it should be noted that although the new 
framework was originally intended to apply from the start of the current programming 
period in 2014, MSs have been given until 2018 to apply the revised ANC measure.112 
Moreover, of the 98 RDPs that will be including these instruments, only 11 had 
included biophysical delimitation and fine-tuning, while the other 87 were in the 
process of doing so, by November 2016.113 Thus, the Commission has warned that the 
implementation of this measure could be even further delayed unless these plans are 
finalised as soon as possible.114 
 Clearly, it is too early to appreciate how the new ANC payment will impact 
upon farming activity and systems in eligible areas, or the level of funding that will 
be devoted to its implementation. Indeed, it may be recalled that MSs are required to 
spend at least 30 per cent of their EAFRD budgets on the implementation of seven 
listed measures, including ANC payments, but are free to distribute this spending as 
they see fit.115 However, despite these funding arrangements and the specific aim to 
support ‘sustainable’ farming systems (as noted above), it is submitted that the ANC 
measure is still overwhelmingly focused on providing socio-economic relief to rural 
communities, rather than ensuring the provision or protection of particular ecosystem 
services in such areas. Thus, notwithstanding the introduction of more precise 
targeting and criteria, it is still highly unclear how these payments will enhance the 
level of environmental protection, given the continued focus on providing socio-
economic support to rural communities in risk of abandonment.  
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6.3.5 European Innovative Partnership 
As outlined above, innovation and resource efficiency were formulated as central and 
cross-cutting themes of the 2013 reforms.116 Accordingly, these are encouraged to be 
reflected in national and regional RDPs as far as possible and may be pursued under 
a combination of measures and headings. Of particular interest to the current analysis 
is the introduction of the EIP on ‘Agricultural Productivity and Sustainability’, which 
is one of five EIPs tasked with delivering the targets of the EU’s 2020 Strategy for 
growth within the Union.117 In particular, the Commission’s 2012 Communication on 
the EIP 'Agricultural Productivity and Sustainability’ highlighted  innovation as a 
necessary pre-requisite for overcoming the existing gap ‘between  the  provision  of  
research  results  and  the  application  of innovative approaches to farming 
practice’.118 Thus, the role of the EIP is broadly to provide ‘a bridge between science 
and the application of innovative approaches in practice’.119  
 In the context of rural development, this means building bottom-up approaches 
and bringing ‘together all relevant actors at Union, national and regional levels, 
presenting new ideas to Member States on how to streamline, simplify and better 
coordinate existing instruments and initiatives and complement them with new actions 
where necessary’.120 In so doing, the Rural Development Regulation recites that the 
‘EIP for agricultural productivity and sustainability should contribute to the 
achievement of the Europe 2020 objectives of smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth’;121 with its aims being to ‘deliver a steady and sustainable supply of food, 
feed and biomaterials, including existing and new types’.122   
 Against this background, the EIP on Agricultural Productivity and 
Sustainability was formally launched as part of the rural development framework 
under Title IV of Regulation 1305/2013. The primary purpose of its inclusion was to 
offer support for RDPs to develop and pursue ‘innovative actions promoting a 
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resource-efficient, productive and low-emission agricultural sector’.123 More 
specifically, Article 55(1) provides that the aim of the EIP is to:  
 
(a) promote a resource efficient, economically viable, productive, 
competitive, low emission, climate friendly and resilient agricultural and 
forestry sector, working towards agro-ecological production systems and 
working in harmony with the essential natural resources on which farming 
and forestry depend;  
(b) help deliver a steady and sustainable supply of food, feed and biomaterials, 
including existing and new types; 
(c) improve processes to preserve the environment, adapt to climate change 
and mitigate it; 
(d) build bridges between cutting-edge research knowledge and technology 
and farmers, forest managers, rural communities, businesses, NGOs and 
advisory services. 
 
Moreover, Article 55(2) provides that these objectives are to be pursued by way of 
three main approaches, namely: (i) creating added value by better linking research and 
farming practice and encouraging the wider use of available innovation measures; (ii) 
promoting the faster and wider transposition of innovative solutions into practice and; 
(iii) informing the scientific community about the research needs of farming practice. 
 In order to implement the aims of the agricultural EIP and the development of 
innovation projects, Article 56 requires support to be provided for organisational 
groups set up by interested stakeholders such as farmers, researchers, advisors, 
businesses and other actors concerned with innovation in the agricultural sector.124 
However, it is up to MSs to determine, within the framework of their RDPs, the level 
of payments granted to support such groups.125 Despite the voluntary nature of the 
EIP framework, it had been implemented in no less than 26 MSs, under 96 RDPs, by 
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2016, and there would certainly be evidence to suggest its continued popularity. 126 
For instance Coffey et al have suggested that the ‘EIP’s bottom-up and farmer-led 
approach is truly distinctive and highly appreciated by stakeholders’.127 That said, 
they have also identified aspects that may be improved so as to increase both the 
efficiency and impact of this instrument. Not least, it was suggested that there could 
be more effective dissemination of the lessons emerging from the Operational Groups 
with a view to engaging farmers and the broader rural community in EIP projects.128’   
 The need to ensure greater dissemination between groups was also reflected 
in the Rural Development Regulation, with Article 53 establishing a new EIP network 
aimed at facilitating the networking and coordination of operational groups, advisory 
services and researchers involved in the implementation of actions targeting 
innovation in agriculture.129 This is intended to provide a platform for ‘the sharing of 
expertise as well as the development of new and specialised expertise, services and 
products’.130 And, in doing so, aims at bringing ‘together all relevant actors at Union, 
national and regional levels, presenting new ideas to Member States on how to 
streamline, simplify and better coordinate existing instruments and initiatives and 
complement them with new actions where necessary’.131 
    
6.4 The Cross-Compliance Framework 
As outlined in Chapter 4, the post-2014 horizontal framework was intended to lay 
down common rules on financing, the farm advisory system, management and control 
systems, clearance of accounts, as well as cross-compliance. And, of the four basic 
acts proposed by the Commission in 2011, the regulation on the financing, monitoring 
and management of the CAP was definitely subject to the least amount of amendments 
during the inter-institutional negotiation process, with the final framework largely 
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reflecting the proposed regime outlined in Chapter 4.132 In order to avoid further 
repetition, the remaining part of the discussion therefore focuses on carrying forward 
the analysis of the main elements that have been added to the cross-compliance 
regime, following the implementation of the 2013 reforms. 
 
6.4.1 The Main Elements of the Revised Cross-Compliance Regime 
The primary ambition of the Cioloș Reform pertaining to cross-compliance was 
clearly to streamline and enhance the regime, with a particular view to ‘strengthening 
the climate change dimension within GAEC and ensuring consistency with the 
provisions of greening and of relevant environmental measures offered under rural 
development’.133 In doing so, the Preamble to Regulation (EU) 1306/2013 (the 
Horizontal Regulation) emphasises that cross-compliance is expected to continue ‘to 
contribute to the development of sustainable agriculture through better awareness on 
the part of beneficiaries of the need to respect…basic standards’.134 Importantly, 
moreover, these standards are intended to ensure that the CAP remains ‘compatible 
with the expectation of society through improving consistency of that policy with the 
environment, public health, animal health, plant health and animal welfare 
policies’.135 
 Consequently, a number of changes have been made to the system of cross-
compliance that was previously in place under Regulation 73/2009.136 Most of these 
have been formal in nature, although some may definitely be relevant to the substance 
of cross-compliance measures and the outcomes that are expected as a result of their 
                                                 
132
 I. Fertö and A. Kovacs, ‘Parliamentary Amendments to the Legislative Proposals of the 2013 CAP 
Reform’, in J. Swinnen (ed), The Political Economy of the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy: 
An Imperfect Storm (Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd, London, 2015) 379, 388. 
133
 European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy, COM (2011) 628.  
In addition, there was a proposal to address the application of direct payments to farmers for the 
transitional year of 2013: COM (2011) 630, Explanatory Memorandum 7. 
134
 Regulation (EU) 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 
on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing 
Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) 
No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008, [2013] OJ L347/549, Preamble (54). 
135 
Ibid. 
136
 Council Regulation (EC) 73/2009 of 19 January 2009 establishing common rules for direct support 
schemes for farmers under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support schemes 
for farmers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1290/2005, (EC) No 247/2006, (EC) No 378/2007 and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, [2009] OJ L30/16. 
- 241 - 
implementation. For instance, with regards to the former, the most obvious change 
has been the inclusion of cross-compliance as part of the horizontal framework. In 
particular, this move underscores the role of cross-compliance for enforcing basic EU 
standards and the polluter pays principle under both pillars of the CAP. Thus, in 
addition to applying to most forms of direct payments (with a notable exception being 
the exclusion of the small farmers scheme), the framework now clearly and 
unequivocally applies to the majority of rural development measures, including the 
agri-environmental instruments covered above.  
 In keeping with the changes proposed by the Commission in 2011, Regulation 
1306/2013 has also sought to simplify the structure of the SMRs and GAECs by 
including all relevant measures in a single list, under Annex II of the Regulation, 
rather than two separate lists as was previously the case.137 Accordingly, SMRs and 
GAECs are currently grouped based on nine defined issues relating to the areas of (i) 
environment, climate change, good agricultural condition of land; (ii) public health, 
animal health and plant health and;  (iii) animal welfare. Thus, while the three original 
areas of cross-compliance remain largely unchanged, the focus issues, as well as list 
of SMRs and GAECs, have been organised in a more cohesive manner than was 
previously the case. In particular, it may be noted that the new framework reduces the 
number of applicable SMRs from 18 to 13 and GAECs from eight to seven, while also 
eliminating the optional GAECs that were included under Annex III of Regulation 
73/2009.138 
 In total, the new cross-compliance framework requires compliance with 25 
specified standards and provisions under the following sub-themes and issues:  
 
Environment, climate change, good agricultural condition of land: 
 (i) Water 
 (ii) Soil and Carbon Stock 
 (iii) Biodiversity 
 (iv) Landscape Minimum Level of Maintenance 
Public health, animal health and plant health: 
 (v) Food Safety 
 (vi) Identification and registration of animals 
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 (vii) Animal Diseases 
 (viii) Plant Protection Products 
Animal Welfare: 
 (ix) Animal Welfare.139 
 
This amounts to an increase in the number of specified sub-themes, which has risen 
to nine from six under Regulation 73/2009.140 And of primary relevance to the current 
discussion is the expansion of the environmental issues that are intended to underpin 
implementation of the post-2014 cross-compliance framework. Indeed, while Annex 
II of the Regulation loosely defines the ‘environment’ as a thematic focus area of 
SMRs, the new regime include four main issues aimed at implementing standards 
relating to the environment, climate change and good agricultural condition of land.  
 Certainly, these revisions have served to create greater consistency and 
coherence between the different elements of the cross-compliance framework. When 
contrasted with the initial objectives of the 2013 reforms, however, they have arguably 
added little in terms of substance. In order to appreciate the potential impact of these 
changes, a few key points may therefore be highlighted. 
 
6.4.2 The Substantive Outcomes: A Substantial Retreat from Earlier 
Ambitions? 
First, the cross-compliance framework was definitely adjusted to account for the 
introduction of the greening measures under Pillar I. For instance, the protection of 
permanent pasture was removed as a feature of GAEC and replaced by the permanent 
grassland measure under the Direct Payments Regulation.141 Moreover, the optional 
standards for crop rotation were superseded by the implementation of the crop 
diversification measure under Article 44 of that regulation. Importantly, as pointed 
out in Chapters four and five, the ability of the greening measures to enhance the 
CAP’s environmental performance was premised upon them going beyond the 
obligations and standards already imposed by cross-compliance.142 And, to this effect, 
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the Commission stressed that simplification of the scheme should take place ‘without 
watering down the concept of cross-compliance itself’.143 However, rather than 
reinforcing the system of cross-compliance, as was initially expected, the new crop 
diversification and permanent grassland measures appear to have added notably little 
to the framework that was already in place prior to the 2013 reforms.  
 Secondly, given the adoption of the greening measures and their focus on 
addressing biodiversity and the preservation of carbon-rich grasslands, the CAP 2020 
reforms had initially emphasised the role of cross-compliance for improving the 
protection of water resources, as well as ensuring a minimum level of maintenance of 
landscape features. With regards to the latter, this was followed through by enhancing 
GAEC 7 for the protection of landscape features, which now includes an additional 
obligation to ban the cutting of hedges and trees during the bird breeding and rearing 
season, as well as an optional element to place restrictions on invasive species.144  
 In the case of water protection, on the other hand, the final cross-compliance 
framework has left much to be desired. In particular, as noted in Chapter 4, the 
Commission initially proposed to include relevant provisions of the WFD and the 
Sustainable use of Pesticides Directive, once they had been fully implemented by the 
MSs.145 According to the timelines imposed by these directives, MSs were required 
to implement the relevant provisions applicable at farm level by 1 January 2013 and 
2014 for the WFD and Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive, respectively.146 Thus, 
the transposition of both directives into national legislation should have been 
completed by 1 January 2015, when the 2013 reforms were set to take effect. Yet, 
both regulations remains outside the cross-compliance regime, despite the continued 
role of agriculture in contributing to water pollution and the loss of biodiversity.147 
 With regard to water management, the cross-compliance regime does continue 
to include a statutory management requirement in respect of the Nitrates Directive, 
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while there are also three ‘water-related’ GAECs.148 Moreover, as a novel feature, the 
Horizontal Regulation lays down detailed provisions on information in the field of the 
protection of water which is to be provided by the Farm Advisory Service.149 
Notwithstanding these additional features, however, the failure to include obligations 
under the WFD and Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive creates an obvious 
lacunae given that the EU is considered to be far from reaching its water policy 
objectives.150 Indeed, the EEA has recently highlighted that fertiliser run-off from 
agriculture remains a major sources of diffuse water pollution in Europe.151 Thus, 
‘[w]hile there is relative clarity about the types of pressures encountered in river 
basins, there is less clarity on how these will be addressed and how measures will 
contribute to achieving environmental objectives’.152 
  In its 2014 report on the integration of water policy, the ECA drew particular 
attention to the weaknesses of the cross-compliance regime which, in its view, 
remained limited compared to the ambitious policy targets set for the CAP.153 For 
instance, the ECA found that the GAEC on authorisation procedure for irrigation had 
‘little impact’, as it does not require MSs to establish such a procedure where none 
already exists.154 In other words, the measure has no bearing in MSs with weak 
authorisation procedures or in those that lack such a procedure altogether.155 And, 
overall, it noted that delays in implementing the WFD have hindered the integration 
of EU water policy into the CAP.156 This failure is of primary relevance to several 
Southern MSs were water-related issues are of pressing concern. Indeed, as noted in 
Chapter 2, in MSs such as Greece, Portugal and Spain, potential water shortages, 
falling aquifer levels and salt-water intrusion are often a result of agricultural 
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production and irrigation practices.157  In addition, the implications of climate change 
are generally expected to increase these stresses.158   
 EU water protection objectives are further undermined by the use of 
agricultural pesticides, which remain widely detected in surface and groundwater 
bodies across Europe.159 For this reason, the integration of the Sustainable Use of 
Pesticides Directive, and the principle of integrated pest management in particular, 
was originally intended to enhance the cross-compliance framework as part of the 
2013 CAP reforms. This raised a certain level of optimism, with the ECA even 
suggesting that ‘[t]he expected inclusion in cross-compliance of certain requirements 
deriving from the WFD and from the directive on the sustainable use of pesticides 
ought to address the issues raised’ in its report.160 However, despite repeated 
assurances by the European Commission that ‘[n]ational, EU and global monitoring, 
reporting and review obligations will be improved and streamlined as far as possible 
with requirements under other environmental legislation, such as the Water 
Framework Directive’,161 these important elements have yet to be incorporated. 
 The reluctance on the part of the legislative institutions of the EU to implement 
and enforce water protection obligations at farm level, entails that pesticide use 
continues to be addressed by a single SMR, which does not impose mandatory 
limitations on the use of phosphorous or the application of pesticides in the immediate 
vicinity of water bodies.162 Rather, Regulation 1306/2013 merely goes so far as to 
include a Joint Statement by the European Parliament and the Council which invites 
the European Commission to monitor their transposition and implementation by the 
Member States and, ‘where appropriate’, to come forward with a legislative proposal 
once implementation by all Member States is complete and the obligations directly 
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applicable to farmers have been identified.163 In response, the ECA expressed its 
concern that the timetable of that Joint Declaration ‘implies that the implementation 
of a very important policy decision could be very slow’.164   
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Conclusion 
 
Definitely, food security has always been at the heart of the CAP. However, the way 
in which this objective has been pursued and formulated has changed considerably 
since the policy was first introduced in 1962. During this time, the European approach 
to food security has evolved from being primarily focused on ensuring high levels of 
food supply and internal price stability, to becoming increasingly responsive to the 
environmental implications of agricultural intensification. Thus, as the wider costs of 
intensive production have garnered heightened recognition, so too, has appreciation 
of the need to move towards ecologically sustainable forms of agriculture, as a pre-
requisite for securing long-term food security.  
 Early signs of this direction of travel were already signalled in 1985 with the 
adoption of the SEA, which required environmental protection to be integrated within 
EC policies, although primarily for the purpose of harmonising rules and eliminating 
environmental barriers to trade on the internal market. The integration of 
environmental concerns within the CAP was especially emphasised in the 
Community’s fifth Environmental Policy Assessment, Towards Sustainability, in 
light of mounting scientific and empirical evidence of pollution and habitat loss 
stemming from decades of intensive agricultural production and management 
practices. Importantly, the document impressed, along with others, the need to reduce 
the externalities linked to farming in order to ensure the long-term viability and 
sustainability of ecological functions and resources.  
 The principle of environmental integration was further elevated by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam and the inclusion of sustainable development as a general principle of 
EU law. And, as extensively discussed in Chapter 3, sustainable agriculture has 
subsequently been adopted as a key CAP objective and has provided an underlying 
rationale for the introduction of agri-environmental measures and obligations that 
have featured in every CAP reform package that has been implemented since the early 
1990s.  
 Likewise, improved environmental governance was expressed as a central aim 
of the 2013 reforms. Thus, from the outset of this process, there was ample reason to 
expect that the policy was heading down a more sustainable path. In particular, 
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increased recognition of the need to safeguard natural resources and biodiversity and 
to mitigate against climate change were identified as primary objectives for ensuring 
long-term food security, with sustainable agriculture being at the core of this 
approach.1 Key amongst the proposed measures was the introduction of the ‘greening 
component’, intended to impose agri-environmental obligations upon farmers in 
exchange for their receipt of basic income support under the direct payment 
framework.2 The proposals also introduced changes to the rural development 
framework, as well as the rules on cross-compliance, although these were far less 
substantive than the ones related to greening. 
 The overarching aim of this thesis has been to explore the role of the CAP for 
ensuring food security, with a clear focus being on the ecological dimensions of 
production and land-use. Importantly, it has been argued that the unprecedented 
challenges to food security are such as to warrant significant reductions of the 
environmental impacts of agriculture itself. Indeed, considering indications that the 
bio-physical and chemical thresholds have already been transgressed with regards to 
biodiversity loss and climate change, as well as the global flows of nitrogen and 
phosphorous, failure to do so will likely further undermine the stability of these 
systems, with unknown consequences for food security.  
 Given the prominence of the CAP as a flagship EU policy, the way in which 
these challenges are addressed is likely to have significant implications for 
environmental governance in the years to come. For instance, the policy remains the 
most well-funded and wide-ranging, accounting for just under 40 per cent of the entire 
EU budget in 2015 and potentially affecting much of the almost 50 per cent of EU 
territory that is currently devoted to farming.3 This coverage, in particular, entails that 
agricultural land-use and management practices impact upon wildlife habitat, 
biodiversity, as well the quality of water resources and waterways more than any other 
sector. Thus, the imperative to improve environmental protection and the benefits 
delivered under the CAP framework, arguably remains as strong as ever. 
                                                 
1
 European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the 
common agricultural policy COM (2011) 625, 3. 
2 
Ibid. Preamble (26); S. Tangermann, Direct Payments in the CAP Post 2013 – Note (European 
Parliament, Brussels, 2011). 
3 
A. Massot, Financing of the CAP. Fact Sheets on the European Union (European Parliament, 
Brussels, 2016). 
- 249 - 
 The 2013 reforms provided a promising platform for taking renewed and 
decisive action to respond to the environmental challenges that previous regimes had 
failed to sufficiently address. For instance, the Commission acknowledged in 2013 
that ‘agriculture has to improve its environmental performance through more 
sustainable production methods’.4 And, as intimated throughout the thesis, this would 
require the realisation of significantly improved benefits stemming from agricultural 
land use, as well as notable efforts to reduce the negative and pervasive impacts of 
production agriculture. 
 However, notwithstanding the Commission’s initial assertion that the new 
framework would ‘accelerate the process of integration of environmental 
requirements…and reinforce the ability of land and natural ecosystems to…address 
major EU biodiversity and climate change adaptation objectives’,5 translating these 
ambitions into reflective legal measures and instruments has arguably left much to be 
desired.6 Not least, the potential scope and application of the greening measures were 
significantly limited following inputs and amendments tabled by the Council and the 
EP as part of the reform negotiations.7 Compared to the proposed measures, for 
instance, the enacted framework reduced the proportion of EU farms subject to the 
greening obligations, by both raising the thresholds for compliance and including a 
number of exceptions to the rules and their applicability.8 Indeed, this was particularly 
the case with regard to the EFA measure and the types of features and agricultural 
uses that could be included to this end. Likewise, the introduction of equivalence 
measures following the inter-institutional negotiations allowed for further digression 
from the proposed framework.  
 In consequence, Bureau and Mahé argue that the tentative outlook for Pillar I 
payments following the implementation of the greening measures is that they will 
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continue to ‘have barely any connection with public goods’.9 This would appear to 
confirm early concerns raised by environmental actors, which questioned the ability 
of the greening measures to deliver benefits beyond those already generated under 
cross-compliance. And Erjavec et al have even gone so far as to suggest that the 
greening approach has resulted in ‘failure’, inter alia, because of ‘[t]he use of 
exceptions, especially those that allow conventional farming of protein-rich crops in 
ecologically sensitive areas, deals quite a blow to the Commission’s initial logic’.10 
 Given the weakened scope of the final instruments, there is no doubt that they 
have not generated significant benefits for biodiversity and contributing towards 
meaningful climate change mitigation. For instance, Pe’er et al have argued that 
despite EU policy-makers ‘announcing the new CAP as greener…the new 
environmental prescriptions are so diluted that they are unlikely to benefit 
biodiversity’.11 They also observed that the greening measures have failed to fulfil the 
EU’s own target to ‘maximise areas…covered by biodiversity-related measures under 
the CAP’.12  In terms of addressing climate change it is likewise doubtful whether the 
measures provide meaningful contributions, considering the ensuing and pervasive 
effects that this phenomenon is expected to have on productivity in the coming years. 
For instance, Mahé argues that the architecture of the permanent grassland measure 
in its present form is ‘regrettable’ considering that the obligation to maintain 
permanent grassland will only require direct action by farmers in the event that the 
ratio of these grasslands would fall by more than five percent compared to the 2015 
reference level.13 In other words, it is only once these grasslands have already been 
converted that MSs will be under an obligation to put in place measures to protect 
them.   
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 Further, it has been submitted that the significant increase in coupled support 
for livestock sectors, pursued by 27 MSs, denotes a particularly deflating outcome of 
the 2013 reforms and seriously undermines the EU’s aim to address climate change 
as a matter of utmost urgency and priority. Indeed, it may be reiterated that the EU 
does not expect the mitigation measures introduced by the 2013 reforms to have 
measurable effect on climate change.14 Moreover, long-term projections and trends 
indicate that, while other sectors such as transport and energy are expected to 
significantly reduce their share of GHG emissions, agriculture is set to maintain 
current levels, thereby overtaking these sectors in terms the overall share of 
emissions.15 
 Undoubtedly, the focus of much of the recent debate has been on the greening 
measures and the extent to which they may be expected to provide greater benefits 
under the new direct payments framework. This has been reflected in the current 
thesis, with a large part of the analysis considering the implementation and outcomes 
of these novel instruments. That said, the 2013 reforms have delivered a number of 
changes that provide reason to be cautiously optimistic about the potential for further 
improving the CAP environmental framework post-2020. For instance, a particularly 
promising element has been the ability to undertake collective implementation with 
regard to instruments under both pillars of the CAP. Indeed, in recognition of the 
synergies and enhanced environmental benefits that may be harnessed by such 
implementation, obligations relating to the agri-environment-climate measure, as well 
as the payment for organic farmers may be met on a join basis by two or more 
holdings. Likewise, it has been noted that collective implementation of the EFA 
measure has been permitted in two MSs, the Netherland and Portugal, as well as 
Wallonia notwithstanding the administrative implications that this may have. Hence, 
given the importance that added connectivity could have for supporting biodiversity 
additional MSs should be encouraged to adopt this option during the next 
programming period.  
 However, measuring the success of the 2013 reforms arguably requires almost 
equal recognition of what was accomplished, as that which was not. Not least, the 
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failure to implement water protection and pesticide management measures within the 
cross-compliance framework represents a particularly disappointing outcome. Indeed, 
notwithstanding the original intention by the Commission to include the relevant 
provisions of the WFD and the Pesticides Directive, this was resisted by the Council 
and EP and ultimately removed from the main text of Horizontal Regulation. They 
have only gone so far as to issue a Joint Statement in which they invite the European 
Commission to monitor the transposition and implementation of these directives by 
the MS and, ‘where appropriate’, to deliver a legislative proposal to include the 
relevant provisions, once they have been implemented in all MS and the obligations 
directly applicable to farmers identified.16 In light of these outcomes, Bureau and 
Mahé have argued that ‘the removal…of the Water Framework Directive from cross-
compliance and its banishment to a vague declaration in an annex do not bode well 
for the expectation that member states will be firm when proposing measures ensuring 
a reversal of environmental damage’.17 
 Considering that the EU is far from reaching its targets relating to the 
protection of waterways and resources, as well as biodiversity, there would therefore 
be ample reason to suggest that the revised environmental framework represents a 
severe mismatch between the stated objective of ‘enhancing the environmental 
performance’18 of the CAP and the actual outcomes that are expected to result from 
the implementation of these specific instruments. Indeed, Matthews has recently 
suggested that the process of reform has amounted to little more than ‘fine-tuning … 
rather than adding up to a great reform’,19 while Pe’er et al denote it as a lost 
‘opportunity to design better guidelines to improve agricultural sustainability’.20 
 Against this background, it is argued that the 2013 reforms have largely served 
to perpetuate the status quo, which has hitherto been incapable of bringing about the 
types of changes that are necessary for addressing the scale of current and projected 
challenges to food security. Thus, although the process of integration has served to 
                                                 
16
 Regulation (EU) 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 
on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing 
Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) 
No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008, [2013] OJ L347/549. 
17
 Bureau and Mahé (n 9) 123. 
18 
Direct Payments Regulation (n13) Preamble (37). 
19 A. Matthews, ‘Reflections on the CAP post-2014’, in J. Swinnen (ed), The Political Economy of 
the 2014-2020 Common Agricultural Policy: An Imperfect Storm (Rowman & Littlefield International 
Ltd, London, 2015) 493, 501. 
20 
Pe’er et al (n 11) 1091. 
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drive the formulation and adoption of agri-environmental measures under both CAP 
pillars, it continues to fall short of sufficiently reducing the externalities of 
conventional agriculture and adapting to the rising ecological challenges to 
productivity. Moreover, it appears unlikely that this highly incremental approach to 
environmental integration will bring about the fundamental changes that are needed 
to transform agricultural systems and the underlying rational of the CAP in the context 
of future reform.  
 There is consequently a pressing need to take more decisive steps to ensure 
that agri-environmental objectives are formulated and implemented in ways that 
reflect the complex intersectional challenges to food security. Indeed, Baldock et al 
have highlighted that an ‘important priority for the future CAP and broader land use 
policy will be to ensure that both the overall approach and the more specific measures 
adopted complement those of a growing circle of related policy domains’.21 Likewise, 
the need for a broader vision has been articulated by the EEA and with reference to 
the greening measures, it stated that ‘a more ambitious and long-term approach would 
be needed to address the resource efficiency of the agricultural sector in terms of 
productivity, land take, carbon capture, water use, and dependence on mineral 
fertilisers and pesticides’.22  
 Moving forward, water protection and the implementation of the WFD and 
Pesticides Directive in particular, are likely to be of central focus. Not least, 
implementation of the WFD is set to take place in a series of steps reaching beyond 
2020 and although this process will largely depend on the actions of MSs, it is likely 
to affect agricultural practices by constraining the use of certain techniques due to 
more demanding standards aimed at addressing and controlling the problem of diverse 
water pollution across the EU.23 Consequently, there remains a continued expectation 
that relevant provisions will become part of the cross-compliance framework so as to 
ensure that recipients of CAP funding comply with basic standards of EU 
environmental law. In the meantime, however, some balance may nonetheless have 
been achieved following recent actions taken at EU level. For instance, in recognition 
of the harmful effects of certain neonicotinoid pesticides on biodiversity, and 
                                                 
21
 D. Baldock, S. Gardner, C. Keenleyside, Scoping the Development of the Environmentally 
Sustainable Production Agenda (IEEP, 2009) 11. 
22
 EEA, The European Environment State and Outlook 2015: Synthesis Report – 6. Understanding 
the Systematic Challenges Facing Europe (EEA, Copenhagen, 2015) 149. 
23
 Baldock et al (n 21) 11. 
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pollinators in particular, the EU has limited their use.24 Moreover, it may be reported 
that the EP narrowly voted in favour of banning the use of pesticides on EFAs, which 
will undoubtedly serve to enhance the environmental potentials of this measure. 
 It has been suggested that the objective of sustainable agriculture needs to be 
dramatically reconceptualised to meet the mounting challenges to food security. In 
doing so, moreover, the ecological and perpetual dimensions of food security need to 
be prioritised in order to inform the design of future policy and agri-environmental 
measures. For the CAP to maintain a meaningful role in the twenty-first century it is, 
therefore, imperative that the approach to sustainable agriculture be reoriented in ways 
that prioritise the long-term ‘common good’ over short-term socio-economic gains 
that stand to be made from appeasing a limited set of interests and considerations. 
This, undoubtedly entails pursuing an agricultural policy that, not only refrains from 
further damaging the ecological resources base, but which does its utmost to safeguard 
that this is handed down to coming generations in the best possible condition. In 
conclusion, agricultural policy needs to take on a more transformative, rather than 
reactive, role in addressing the unprecedented challenges facing future agriculture and 
food security. 
                                                 
24
 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 485/2013 of 24 May 2013 amending Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 540/2011, as regards the conditions of approval of the active substances 
clothianidin, thiamethoxam and imidacloprid, and prohibiting the use and sale of seeds treated with 
plant protection products containing those active substances, [2013] OJ L139/12. 
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